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FOREWORD
On the morning of September 11, 2001 (9/11),
al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four passenger aircraft,
crashing three of them into the World Trade Center in
New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, DC,
killing up to 3,000 people in the process. Just under 3
years later, a group of predominantly Chechen gun
men took over School Number One in Beslan, North
Ossetia, beginning a siege that ended with the death
of nearly 400, including 156 children. On the evening
of November 26, 2008, 10 members of Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LET) began a series of bomb and gun attacks in the
Indian city of Mumbai, killing more than 170 people
over a 48-hour period. For Americans, Russians, and
Indians, each of these attacks was warlike in its pro
portions and, after each, popular and political opinion
demanded a militarized response.
Dr. Geraint Hughes’s Letort Paper reminds us
that in repeated cases in which liberal democratic
states have used their armed forces to fight terrorism-notably Israel against successive Palestinian groups,
Britain in Northern Ireland from 1969-98, or indeed
America and its allies against al-Qaeda and affiliated
groups currently--the employment of military means
in counterterrorism has been inherently controversial.
As Audrey Kurth Cronin notes, terrorism picks at the
vulnerable seam between domestic law and foreign
war, and conceptually it does not fit the paradigms of
either criminality or warfare.1 Although a particular
state or a coalition of powers may use its militaries
to protect its citizens in counterterrorist campaigns,
the threat posed by specific terrorist groups has to be
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treated sui generis, and the applicability of military
means in counterterrorism depends on a series of
factors--these include whether the terrorist threat is a
domestic or an international one, the lethality of the
groups concerned, and the threat they pose to state
stability. Furthermore, the involvement of armed forc
es in counterterrorism can be problematic. One has
only to look at the post-2001 “War on Terror” and the
criticisms expressed by foreign governments, mem
bers of Congress, human rights activists, journalists,
and academics regarding the treatment of detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) in air-strikes in Pakistan; and the ci
vilian casualties caused by U.S. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) military operations in
Afghanistan.
Dr. Hughes examines the challenges of deploying
the military in counterterrorism from both a historical
and a contemporary perspective, outlining not only
the specific roles that armed forces can perform either
to prevent terrorist attacks or to mitigate their conse
quences, but also the strategic, constitutional, practi
cal, diplomatic, and ethical problems that have arisen
from a variety of counterterrorist campaigns, be they
in Palestine, Northern Ireland, Quebec, Kashmir, Af
ghanistan, Pakistan, or the North Caucasus. Clause
witz reminds us that in “war everything is simple, but
the simplest thing is difficult,”2 and this observation is
as true of counterterrorism as it is of interstate warfare.
For example, the British Army interned Republican
terrorist suspects in Northern Ireland from 1971-75,
gaining valuable intelligence about the United King
dom’s (UK) adversaries, but this policy also enraged
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the Catholic community and poisoned relations be
tween the UK and the Republic of Ireland. The Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) has used targeted killings against
the leaderships of Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah, but has
been unable to translate tactical-level successes into
outcomes that serve Israel’s overall strategic objective,
which is a regional peace settlement that gives the Jew
ish state recognition and security from its neighbors.
As is the case with other democracies, America’s
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines are trained in
the application of controlled and discriminate vio
lence. Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan
have demonstrated repeatedly that whenever the U.S.
military confronts irregular adversaries that conceal
themselves within a civilian population, it is both
ethically important and strategically sound to employ
force with precision, and in such a manner as to mini
mize casualties among the wider populace. Members
of the armed forces are also required to be accountable
for their actions and to ensure that their operations are
coordinated with those of civilian governmental agen
cies, host nation officials, and other allied powers. The
challenges posed by the current “Long War” are many
and, as Hughes observes, Western civilian and mili
tary officials have the hard task of resolving the di
lemma facing all democratic states confronted by ter
rorism; namely, how they fight this threat and protect
their citizens without undermining the constitutional,
legal, and normative characteristics upon which gov
ernment by consent is founded. In this respect, this
paper is required reading for military practitioners
and scholars who wish to develop an informed un
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derstanding of the complexities of counterterrorism,
which will be a source of considerable deliberation
within our defense establishment and those of allied
countries for the foreseeable future.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
ENDNOTES - FOREWORD
1. Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding
the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns, Princeton NJ: Princ
eton University Press, 2009, p. 116.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter
Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1984, p. 119.
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SUMMARY
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11)
attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopt
ing a militaristic response to the threat posed by alQaeda and affiliated groups. As the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and that in Northern Ireland demonstrate,
any liberal democracy that uses its armed forces to
combat terrorism will incur controversy both domes
tically and internationally. The use of military power
in counterterrorism is contentious, because historical
and contemporary examples suggest that it can have
the following negative strategic, political, and ethical
effects: The state can generate indigenous resentment
that terrorist groups can exploit, and can, by resorting
to military force, kill or maim a substantial number of
civilians. It can also encourage human rights abuses
that are antithetical to the norms of a liberal democra
cy--such as the maltreatment and torture of detainees
--and can (as demonstrated by Uruguay in 1973 and
Russia currently) lead to the subversion of the consti
tutional order and its replacement by authoritarian
rule.
While addressing these criticisms, this Letort Pa
per also argues that there are contingencies in which
democratic states are obliged to employ military
means in order to protect their citizens from the threat
of terrorism, whether in a purely domestic context or
when facing a transnational terrorist network such
as al-Qaeda. While outlining the specific roles that
armed forces can perform (including hostage rescue,
military aid to the civil authority, interdiction, and
intelligence-gathering), this paper also describes the
strategic, political, diplomatic, and ethical challenges
that arise from using military means to fight terror-
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ism either on one’s home soil or in the international
arena. This paper’s principal conclusion is that demo
cratic governments can use their armed forces if the
existing police/judicial framework cannot address
the threat posed by terrorists, but that military means
have to be integrated as part of an overarching strat
egy to contain terrorism and to limit the capacity of its
practitioners to conduct attacks against citizens. The
author also outlines a series of questions that civilian
decisionmakers should ideally resolve prior to turn
ing counterterrorism missions over to their military
counterparts.
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THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN
COUNTERTERRORISM:
EXAMPLES AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES

INTRODUCTION
During an official visit to Mumbai, India, on Janu
ary 15, 2009, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband
delivered a speech which essentially condemned the
counterterrorism policy the United States had ad
opted in the aftermath of al-Qaeda’s attacks on New
York City and Washington, DC, on September 11,
2001 (9/11). Miliband declared that “[the] belief that
the correct response to the terrorist threat was a mili
tary one: to track down and kill a hardcore of extrem
ists” was “misleading and mistaken,” and his criti
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cisms reflected the widespread view of the Western
center-left that the War on Terror declared by former
President George W. Bush had been entirely counter
productive.1 Domestic political opponents accused the
then-Foreign Secretary of cowardice and opportun
ism; Miliband did, after all, have plenty of opportuni
ties to publicly express his concerns about American
counterterrorist policy well before the end of the Bush
administration’s tenure in office. Yet the majority of
critics missed the key flaw in his speech, namely the
stark contrast between his comments and the venue
chosen for their delivery, the Taj Mahal hotel.2
This hotel was one of the five targets selected by
the 10 heavily-armed Pakistani terrorists from Lashkar
e-Toiba (LET) who conducted a sea-borne assault on
Mumbai on November 26, 2008. The Taj Mahal, like
the Trident Oberoi and the Leopold Café, had been
chosen by LET (a jihadi group originally set up by
the Pakistani Army to fight as insurgents in Kash
mir) because they were patronized by Western tour
ists. But the attackers also chose Nariman House (a
cultural center for the city’s Jewish community) and
the Chhatrapati Shivaji train station, where many of
their victims were commuters returning home from
work. Over the course of 3 days, the LET terrorists
killed over 170 people in a series of grenade and gun
attacks at these locations, causing pandemonium and
overwhelming the inadequately-armed and poorlytrained police. As one group of analysts noted after
the event, the civil authorities in Mumbai were simply
unable to cope with a terrorist atrocity that was un
precedented in scale and scope:
[The LET raid] was sequential and highly mobile.
Multiple teams attacked several locations at once—
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combining armed assaults, carjackings, drive-by
shootings, prefabricated IEDs [Improvised Explosive
Devices], targeted killings (of policemen and selected
foreigners), building takeovers, and barricade and
hostage situations.3

All these tactics had been implemented in previ
ous terrorist attacks; what was unique in this instance
was their combination. From November 26-29, Mum
bai was essentially subjected to a commando raid, al
beit one directed against civilian rather than military
targets, and it required the intervention of the Indian
Army and Special Forces to quell the LET attackers.
Miliband not only demonstrated questionable judg
ment in choosing the Taj Mahal as the venue for his
homily, but the reality of what had happened at the
hotel—not to mention the city as a whole—suggested
that there would be circumstances in which states
would have no option but to adopt a military response
to terrorism.4
Furthermore, Miliband’s implicit expectation that
the new U.S. President would repudiate his predeces
sor’s apparently discredited policies were disabused
by the continuation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) strikes into the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) of Northwest Pakistan, and also
by President Barack Obama’s speech on U.S. policy
toward Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 2009.
Although President Obama avoided the contentious
phrase “War on Terror,” the substance of his speech
differed little from those made by his predecessor.
He asserted that a U.S.-North Atlantic Treaty Orga
nization (NATO) victory in Afghanistan was essential
to defeat the radical Islamist ideology that inspired
al-Qaeda, and to forestall any future mass casualty
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atrocities by its adherents. Furthermore, although
Obama outlined a policy of fostering socioeconomic
development to remove the causes of internal strife in
both Afghanistan and Pakistan, he still emphasized
the military contribution to stabilizing both countries,
stressing that “we will use all elements of our national
power to defeat al-Qaeda and to defend America, our
allies, and all who seek a better future.”5 The follow
ing November, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ex
pressed the U.S. objective in Afghanistan, which was
to ”dismantle, eradicate and defeat those who attacked
us [on 9/11].”6 President Obama reiterated his aim
of defeating al-Qaeda in late-March 2010 while ad
dressing U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and the follow
ing month he announced that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and the U.S. military had received his
authorization to kill Anwar al-Awlaki, an Americanborn radical cleric thought to be hiding in Yemen.7
Counterterrorism is therefore as much a priority for
the current U.S. administration as it was for its Repub
lican predecessors, and has retained its military as
pect. According to press reports, Obama has opted to
bolster the parts of the U.S. defense budget that are of
direct relevance to the Long War (notably the budget
for U.S. Special Operations Command—increasing it
from $9bn in 2010 to $9.8bn in 2011—and assistance to
foreign militaries, raised from $350m in 2010 to $500m
in 2011).8
On the other side of the Atlantic, Miliband’s
own colleague—then-Defence Secretary John Hutton—further undermined his arguments in a speech
in late-April 2009, which advocated a “rebalancing
of investment [within the United Kingdom’s (UK)
armed forces] in technology, equipment and people
to meet the challenge of irregular warfare,” notably
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terrorism, and increased attention to Special Forces
and other assets that could be employed in this task.9
Although it remains to be seen whether this aspect of
Labour policy will influence the forthcoming Strategic
Defence and Security Review (SDSR) initiated by its
Conservative-Liberal coalition successor, it is evident
that both the U.S. and British governments still con
sider that counterterrorist policy requires a significant
military input.10
The decade since 9/11 has seen a prolonged debate
within the Western world—incorporating politicians,
the professional military, academics, and the me
dia—concerning what British political scientist Nor
man Geras wryly refers to as FKATWOT (“Formerly
Known as the War on Terror”).11 The revulsion shown
by critics toward the essential idea of a war against
terrorism is understandable, given the manner in
which the Bush administration (with British compli
ance) used 9/11 as one of the pretexts for the invasion
of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, not to mention revelations
about the treatment of suspected terrorists held in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and CIA black prisons, in ad
dition to those delivered by extraordinary rendition
to Middle Eastern countries where the local security
forces systematically torture prisoners.12 Furthermore,
the policies of the Bush administration (in addition
to those associated with former British Prime Minis
ter Tony Blair) have both antagonized Muslim opin
ion worldwide and raised concerns about the state of
civil liberties in both the United States and the United
Kingdom (UK).13
As Ahmed Rashid has rightly pointed out, U.S.
declarations of counterterrorist policy placed insuffi
cient emphasis on the need for other policies to fight
Islamic extremism. These included the requirement
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for political, economic, and social reforms within
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Yemen, and other countries
where al-Qaeda has associated itself with local Is
lamist militants.14 David Kilcullen also notes that the
Bush administration’s extravagant rhetoric inherently
associated al-Qaeda with other Islamist groups such
as Hezbollah and Hamas, thereby not only embroiling
the United States in a protracted conflict with a multi
tude of foes (including many not actually aligned with
Osama bin Laden), but also contributing to al-Qaeda’s
propaganda claim that the War on Terror was in fact
a war against Islam. In this respect, Obama’s concilia
tory speech at Cairo University on June 4, 2009, was
intended to repair some of the damage done to the
U.S. reputation within the Muslim world by the previ
ous administration’s rhetoric and policies.15
These are all pertinent criticisms of the direction of
American (and allied) counterterrorist policies since
2001, but there are also journalists and scholars who
argue that all military responses to terrorism are in
herently illegitimate and conceptually flawed.16 Take
George Kassimeris’s statement that “[the] real War on
Terror ought to be fought by means of effective po
lice work and intelligence and a genuine hearts and
minds campaign to separate the terrorists from the
communities where they derive their support.”17 This
is undoubtedly the ideal, and it certainly represents
the model applied by West European governments
combating domestic extremism. However, policing,
public relations, and community outreach could not
address the problem posed by al-Qaeda’s symbiotic
relationship with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan from
1996 to 2001. The idea that post-9/11 Osama bin Laden
and the thousands of well-armed and trained fighters
under his command could have been quashed with
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out resort to military force is absurd, given that diplo
matic efforts to persuade the Taliban regime to expel
al-Qaeda and cease providing it with a sanctuary had
all come to naught. After Mumbai, it is also clear that
when a small, indoctrinated, and well-armed group is
able to infiltrate a major city and launch lethal attacks
against its citizens, normal policing measures simply
do not work. Both these cases show that there may
be contingencies in which a government (or govern
ments) has no choice but to involve armed forces in
the defense of states and their societies against a ter
rorist organization, and to argue otherwise is to argue
in the face of reality.18
The employment of the military in counterterror
ism has been examined before, but this subject requires
a more up-to-date analysis.19 In order to begin to com
prehend this issue, scholars need to understand the
historical background as well as the challenges posed
by contemporary counterterrorism. Any analysis of
this subject is complicated by the fact that terrorism of
ten co-exists with other forms of internal conflict, and
in practice it is often difficult to distinguish between
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN).
Furthermore, terrorism can also be a by-product of
intense civil strife, as was the case with Lebanon be
tween 1975 and 1990, and Somalia currently.20
The confusion between insurgency and terrorism
is not helped by willful acts of conflation, such as the
Bush administration’s insistence that the invasion and
occupation of Iraq was part of the War on Terror.21 It
is for this reason that, aside from specific examples
which may be relevant in future contingencies, this
paper will not cover the consequences of Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM, or the course of U.S. and Coalition
operations in Iraq since the spring of 2003. The author
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also does not discuss the war in Afghanistan in any
great detail, except with reference to specific aspects
of Operation EDURING FREEDOM that are relevant
to the debate about military contributions to counterterrorism. A prime example (covered in the conclud
ing chapter) is the debate within the Obama admin
istration as to whether the U.S. military can reduce
its commitment from the current COIN campaign in
Afghanistan to a more restrictive focus, using UAVs,
Special Forces, and indigenous tribal allies to cripple
al-Qaeda and to eradicate its operatives.22
Readers also need to bear in mind the historical
trends that have shaped terrorism as an international
phenomenon over the past 50 years. These include
decolonization, the end of the Cold War, the process
of democratization (most notably in Eastern Europe,
the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR],
Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Latin America), and
also the transition from old to new terrorism. The lat
ter is a particularly worrying trend for those scholars
and policymakers who grew accustomed to the idea
that the violence inflicted by terrorists was limited by
the latter’s overall objectives, and whose experiences
were shaped by an era in which the Enniskillen and
Omagh bombings in Northern Ireland (1987 and 1998,
respectively) could be classified as mass casualty at
tacks. Recent experience—notably that of Chechnya—
shows that terrorism can also have a negative effect
on the process of democratization, retarding political
reform and ultimately assisting the return of authori
tarianism, as has been evident in Russia under former
President, and current Prime Minister Vladimir Pu
tin.23
As far as research methodology is concerned,
there are limitations in the prevailing metrics-based
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approach employed by political scientists. The accu
mulation of data sets and their statistical analysis take
scholars only so far, and run a clear risk of sacrific
ing contextual understanding for reductionist assess
ments. In certain cases, verifiable data are a rare com
modity; readers will see this for themselves in the third
section, with reference to the varying estimates on the
number of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants accounted
for by Predator strikes in the FATA. One of the princi
pal points of this paper is that the use of military force
can only be envisaged in given circumstances, and
that in adverse political and social conditions it can
have a deleterious effect. For example, it is commonly
believed that for the government side to win a coun
terterrorist campaign its security forces must outnum
ber its adversary by at least 10:1. Kilcullen reminds
us that during the Cyprus emergency of 1955-59, the
British Army outnumbered the Ethniki Organosi Ky
prion Agoniston (EOKA) by 110:1. Yet the latter won,
largely because it gained the passive support of the
Greek Cypriot majority, and also because the British
government lacked the will to conduct a campaign of
unrestricted repression against the civilian populace,
given domestic and international pressure in favor of
self-determination and independence from colonial
rule. The Cyprus example shows that if scholars and
practitioners studying terrorism are to use history as
an educational tool, they will need to understand the
varying factors and developments that made the dif
ference between the successful use of military means
and failure.24
This paper will therefore address both the poten
tial utility and the pitfalls of employing armed forces
in counterterrorist roles, taking recent historical and
contemporary examples from liberal democratic states
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(mainly, but not exclusively, the United States and
UK), and also democratizing ones (notably the Rus
sian Federation and Turkey). This is not to say that
nondemocratic states can offer no useful examples for
counterterrorism as a whole. For example, the Saudi
authorities have attracted favorable attention for
their deradicalization program, in which imams deindoctrinate imprisoned jihadis prior to their release
and reintegration into society.25 However, the military
record of nondemocratic states fighting terrorism is
invariably a dismal one. The mailed-fist approach that
characterized President Islam Karimov’s fight against
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) since the
mid-1990s has only inspired further support for Is
lamism in Uzbekistan and its neighbors.26 The dirtywar methods employed by certain Latin American
states and apartheid South Africa during the 1970s
and 1980s (incorporating death squads, “disappear
ances,” and the extra-judicial killings of peaceful dis
senters) also offer negative examples that democracies
should avoid, not just because they are unethical, but
because they also undermine the legal foundations
upon which a government’s legitimacy and credibility
with its citizens are founded.27
There are limitations to the scope of this paper
that the author acknowledges, most notably that it
does not examine in any detail the troubled state of
the U.S./NATO campaign in Afghanistan (in par
ticular, the controversial circumstances behind Gen
eral Stanley McChrystal’s dismissal in June 2010). It
is not the author’s intention to write a guide on how
to win in Afghanistan or how to win the Long War. It
is important to emphasize here that the United States
and other partners may prevail in a COIN campaign,
without necessarily achieving a strategic success in
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counterterrorism. Likewise, states may achieve posi
tive results in thwarting terrorist attacks in their own
countries without addressing the sources of instabil
ity overseas—a prime example here being the series of
terrorist plots thwarted by the British police and MI5
since 2006, and the impotence of the UK authorities
in countering the training of British-Muslim militants
in Pakistan. As Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney ob
serve, “succeeding against an insurgency and succeed
ing against specific terrorists that are part of a wider
global ideological movement may be two different
things.” As noted in the conclusion, the debate over
counterterrorism and COIN in Afghanistan rests on
two completely different strategic calculations as to
what Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is supposed
to achieve.28
There is also a risk that current debates on terror
ism will be focused almost exclusively with reference
to al-Qaeda and affiliated groups. It would be foolish
to rule out a resurgence of ethno-nationalist or politi
cally extremist terror in future decades, which is why
this manuscript examines historical cases with refer
ence to groups such as the Provisional Irish Repub
lican Army (PIRA), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque
Homeland and Liberty in Spain [ETA]), Fatah (the
Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine),
and the Red Army Faction.29 The key point here is that
political and strategic calculations provide the context
in which military means are employed in any form of
conflict, and counterterrorism can either be incorpo
rated as part of the armed forces, COIN, or stabiliza
tion doctrine, or in a domestic context within what
the British armed forces refer to as Military Aid to the
Civil Authority (MACA). 30
Before discussing the use of armed forces in coun
terterrorism, it is necessary first to define what consti
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tutes terrorism, and also to address the controversy
surrounding how this phenomenon is to be addressed.
This debate revolves around the difficult question of
whether terrorism is a crime or an act of war, and
whether its practitioners end their campaigns because
they are defeated, contained, or mollified by state au
thorities. This manuscript will then discuss the coun
terterrorist framework, before critically examining
the military contribution to counterterrorism as far as
democracies are concerned. In this respect, a state’s
armed forces can be employed on an ad hoc basis (in
situations where it has specific capabilities that the
civil authorities require in the short term), or as part
of a prolonged engagement. The author will describe
the full range of actions that armed forces can perform
in counterterrorism—not merely the more sensational
ones, such as hostage rescue, but nonkinetic opera
tions such as deterrence, military assistance to civil
authorities, and intelligence-gathering—and will also
summarize the possible problems that may arise both
in the international and domestic sphere when such
means are employed in the fight against terrorism.
The main conclusion of this paper is that there are
specific scenarios and situations in which a military
response to terrorism is essential, be it on a short-term
or prolonged basis, but that military measures have
to be firmly integrated within an overall, politically
directed strategy to contain terrorism and remove
the grievances that national and transnational terror
ist groups exploit. Furthermore, democratic govern
ments are obliged to consider the potentially nega
tive consequences of employing military force prior
to deciding whether to hand specific counterterrorist
missions over to their generals and admirals. At the
heart of this analysis is the dilemma facing all demo
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cratic states confronted by terrorism; namely, how
they fight this threat and protect their citizens without
undermining the constitutional, legal, and normative
characteristics upon which government by consent is
founded.31 The author does not promise to offer easy
answers to this dilemma, nor to the challenges arising
from it, but it is his hope that his examination of this
topic provokes the debate and reflection that can pro
vide the basis for both an informed consensus, as well
as discussions about workable solutions to a perennial
problem.
IS TERRORISM A MILITARY PROBLEM?
For nonacademics, the outlining of definitions may
appear pedantic. Yet it is important to define our ter
minology, as an individual’s perception of any intel
lectual problem is shaped by his or her understanding
of concepts that can otherwise be taken for granted
(terrorism, democracy, the military, etc.). A specific
viewpoint on the characteristics and causes of ter
rorism shapes perceptions about whether a state can
employ its armed forces as part of its effort to contain
and ultimately defeat terrorism, or whether the use of
military means would be counterproductive.32
With few exceptions, states maintain their own
armed forces, which are configured, trained, and or
ganized to fight a state-based adversary, although
they can also be employed on peacekeeping/peace
support missions, as is the case with some Western
countries in stabilization/COIN missions overseas.33
In the United States, the UK, and certain other West
ern countries, there is a clear distinction between the
military and the constabulary services employed for
domestic policing; the latter are civilian organizations,
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and are lightly armed or (in the case of the UK) largely
unarmed when they exercise their everyday duties.
However, other states may have internal security forc
es trained and equipped on paramilitary lines. While
the French gendarmerie and the Italian carabinieri are
recognizable as police units, the Turkish jandarma, the
Russian Interior Ministry (MVD) troops (vnutrenniye
voiska), and the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) and
Rashtriya Rifles (RR) are militarized forces in terms of
their organization and their armament, and all have
participated in combat operations against, respec
tively, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), Chechen
rebels, and Kashmiri insurgents.34 In the U.S. case,
the CIA not only has its own paramilitary arm (the
Special Activities Division), but it also controls the
unmanned, armed drones used in targeted killings of
terrorist leaders.35 It is also alleged that the Blackwater
Private Military Company (or Xe Services, its current
name) has covertly cooperated with U.S. Special Forc
es and the Pakistani authorities in both targeted kill
ings and snatch operations against al-Qaeda suspects
in Pakistan.36 These distinctions are worth noting, as
in certain cases a military response by a democratic or
democratizing country may not involve the employ
ment of a regular army, navy, or air force.
This paper uses Fareed Zakaria’s definition of a lib
eral democracy as “a political system marked not only
by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a
separation of powers, and the protection of basic lib
erties of speech, assembly, religion, and property.”37
Liberal democratic states differ from nonliberal ones
(such as Russia), in which the formal characteristics
of a democracy, such as regular elections for the ex
ecutive and legislature, are observed, but where sig
nificant constraints exist on civil liberties and freedom
of speech. Established liberal democracies also differ
14

in character from democratizing states undergoing a
transition from totalitarian/authoritarian rule to rep
resentative government—a prime example here being
Turkey’s transition since the 1990s, and the gradual
erosion of the military’s dominance over national pol
itics in that nation.38 The distinction is worth noting,
insofar as politicians and senior military and security
force personnel conditioned to operate in a dictatorial
system may resort to old regime methods when deal
ing with internal security threats. For example, the
Russian state’s response to Chechen separatism owes
much to the repressive traditions of the Soviet and
Tsarist regimes.39
As noted below, there is no internationally ac
cepted definition of terrorism, although the author
concurs with Magnus Ranstorp and Paul Wilkinson’s
reference to:
[The] systematic use of coercive intimidation usually,
though not exclusively, to service political ends. It is
used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a
wider group than the immediate victims of the vio
lence, often to publicise a cause, as well as to coerce a
target into acceding to terrorist aims. Terrorism may
be used on its own, or as part of a wider conventional
war. It can be employed by desperate and weak minor
ities, by states as a tool of domestic or foreign policy,
or by belligerents as an accompaniment or additional
weapon in all types and stages of warfare.40

Alex Schmid identifies four intrinsic factors, which
affect a liberal democracy’s response to nonstate ter
rorism: freedom of movement, freedom of association,
abundance of targets, and the constraints of the legal
system. Democratic norms also stress openness, toler
ance, legality and the high value of each individual
human life (hence the fact that very few liberal de
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mocracies have the death penalty).41 This can affect
a state’s counterterrorist policy in a number of ways,
as shown in the British case both by Labour’s efforts
to introduce identity cards (which the ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition opted to abolish soon after
it assumed office in May 2010), and also the legal ef
fort to block the extradition of radical Islamist clerics
to their home countries, where they might be arrested
and tortured. They have historically manifested them
selves in instances where domestic critics highlight
human rights abuses committed by the military and
security services in conflicts of decolonization (as was
the case with the British in Cyprus and the French in
Algeria from 1954-62), and also in current cases where
Western powers have become involved in overseas
military interventions within the context of the War
on Terror.42 The persistent articulation of these norms
is a sign of a healthy democracy, but it also shows how
intrinsically controversial it is for a state to become in
volved in the fight against terrorists, whether in the
domestic or international sphere.
The Conceptual Framework.
For Western democracies, “terrorism” tradition
ally occurred in wars of decolonization, such as the
National Liberation Front’s (FLN) campaign against
French rule in Algeria, or the series of conflicts involv
ing the British—notably the Irish War of Indepen
dence (1918-22), the struggle against Irgun and Lehi in
Palestine (1944-48), EOKA’s campaign for Enosis (uni
fication) between Greece and Cyprus, and the Aden
insurgency (1964-67). The late-1960s and early-1970s
led to a rise in domestic terrorism in Western Europe,
whether ethno-nationalist (notably the PIRA and its
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Loyalist foes in Northern Ireland and the ETA in the
Basque region of Spain) or politically radical like the
Red Army Faction in West Germany; [BR] in Italy,
November 17 [N17] in Greece, and Action Directe in
France).
The same period also saw the internationaliza
tion of terrorism by the Palestinian Liberation Orga
nization (PLO) and rival groups such as the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which
was responsible for the multiple hijacking of passen
ger aircraft on September 7, 1970. While this brand of
transnational terror had the specific goal of publiciz
ing the Palestinian cause, the globalized effort of alQaeda and its affiliates from the mid-1990s has more
ambitious goals: to expel Western influence from the
Islamic world, and to eventually establish a global ca
liphate.43
At present, there is no internationally recognized
definition of what constitutes terrorism. Some states,
notably Arab countries, eschew definitions that crimi
nalize the use of violence as a tool for national self-de
termination, while the belief within Western left-wing
circles that terrorism can be a legitimate means of
self-defense on the part of oppressed peoples derives
from Frantz Fanon’s Les Damnes de la Terre (1962).44 In
this vein, commentators such as Noam Chomsky are
quick to accuse the United States and certain other
countries (such as the UK and Israel) of being terror
ist states due to their employment of military force
against weaker countries, while ignoring (or even
excusing) cases on nonstate terrorism or examples
of state terror which cannot be blamed on the West.45
There are more nuanced and less strident versions of
this argument, which may deplore the characteristics
of terrorism while recognizing that its practitioners
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may have justifiable motives. Terrorism is described
as a strategy of the weak (Lawrence Freedman46) and
as the poor man’s air force; these statements should
not be seen as implying moral equivalence between
state and nonstate groups, but merely recognition that
some of the latter, and their state sponsors, use terror
ism as a cheap and easy way of retaliating against a
stronger adversary.47 A prime example of this process
occurred when Colonel Muammar Gaddafi increased
arms supplies to the PIRA after the British govern
ment gave its U.S. ally permission to use airbases in
the UK to support air strikes on Libya in April 1986.48
To a certain degree, the plight of a particular eth
nic or national group can be treated as a factor behind
terrorist violence. It is possible to condemn suicide at
tacks against Israeli civilians, but also recognize that
the dispossession of the Palestinian people in 1948 and
their lack of statehood are contributory causes of Pal
estinian terrorism. Nevertheless, gross injustice does
not necessarily force its victims to adopt terrorism as
a means of resistance. From the late 1970s to July 1989,
Solidarnosc (Solidarity) waged a campaign of civil
disobedience against the Polish Communist regime,
eschewing violence even when the authorities used
force against their own citizenry; as was the case af
ter the declaration of martial law by General Wojciech
Jaruzelski in December 1981. This decision on the part
of Polish dissidents was influenced to a considerable
degree by ethical considerations and a desire to retain
the moral high ground (a calculation reinforced by
their ties to the Catholic Church), although Solidarnosc
activists were also aware that a general insurrection
could provoke a Soviet military intervention.49
The words “terrorist” and “terrorism” are pejora
tive, as they automatically imply amorality and bar
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baric ruthlessness on the part of their practitioners.
This explains why Western media agencies such as
the BBC employ less value-laden language in their
news reports, employing phrases such as “militants,”
“separatists,” “guerillas,” and “insurgents.” For the
victims of terrorism, this approach can be seen as
deceitful equivocation.50 Although the author of this
manuscript offers his own definitions of what a ter
rorist is, he too uses other phrases to describe them
(“gunmen,” “hostage takers,” etc.), for no underlying
reason other than to avoid repetition.
For the purposes of this paper, the author will fo
cus on examples where armed nonstate groups have
employed lethal violence in order to intimidate their
target(s)—one government or several, or a particular
national community—into acceding to their political
demands. Terrorism can be a domestic or an interna
tional phenomenon, and its practitioners can launch
attacks within a specific country that are not actually
directed against that particular government or its peo
ple. PIRA attacks in Germany and Holland in 1988
89 were directed against British military personnel
stationed in both countries, while the six ethnic Arab
(Ahvaz) gunmen who took over the Iranian embassy
in London on April 30, 1980, had no grievance with the
UK, as opposed to the theocratic regime in Tehran.51
Nonetheless, the consequences of terrorist violence
are often felt by innocent third parties; Al-Qaeda’s
targets in the Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam bombings of
August 7, 1998, were the U.S. embassies in both cities,
but the majority of those killed and maimed by both
attacks were Kenyan and Tanzanian bystanders.52
Bruce Hoffman draws a distinction between old
terrorist groups that had relatively limited objectives,
and were comparatively more scrupulous about mini
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mizing casualties caused by their attacks, and new ter
rorists who possess global ambitions and often have
eschatological or anti-systemic objectives.53 The latter
no longer conform to Brian Jenkins’s statement about
terrorists launching attacks that leave “a lot of people
watching, and a lot of people listening, and not a lot of
people dead.”54 There is also a contrast to be drawn be
tween the defined hierarchical structure of traditional
groups (notably that of PIRA, with its Army Council,
chief of staff, general headquarters [GHQ], and other
military trappings), and what John Arquilla and Da
vid Ronfeldt refer to as “netwar,” in which “dispersed
organizations, small groups and individuals … com
municate, coordinate and conduct their campaign in
an internetted manner, without a precise central com
mand.”55 In this respect, in the aftermath of 9/11, alQaeda provides an example of franchise terrorism in
which the Internet is used to share information on tac
tics and technology (notably on bomb construction),
and in which the leadership inspires but does not
direct sympathizers across the globe to conduct acts
of violence against their host societies.56 The implica
tions for this trend for any counterterrorist strategy
are disturbing, as a protean network is far less easy
for a state’s security forces to attack and weaken by at
trition than a centrally-commanded group organized
along quasi-military lines.57
Terrorism can also be incorporated as part of a wid
er campaign of insurgency, defined as a paramilitary
and subversive effort waged by an irregular armed
faction, or factions, to overthrow a state’s government,
to secede from a state, or (in the case of Hamas regard
ing Israel) to destroy the state.58 The example set by the
Karen and other rebel groups in Burma shows that it
is possible for insurgents to eschew terrorism. The Pa
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tani United Liberation Organisation currently waging
an insurgency in Southern Thailand has also declared
that it will not conduct bombings beyond its Muslim
heartland, recognizing that attacks in Bangkok or in
tourist resorts will attract hostile international atten
tion. It is also true that some terrorist organizations
lack the means to threaten their adversaries with a
wider insurgency (as was the case with European ter
rorist groups such as the ETA and the Red Army Fac
tion, and also PIRA after the early 1970s).59 Yet, in other
cases, terrorism can be merged within a wider insur
gent threat to state stability or state survival, as with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia (FARC)
and the Sunni Arab muqawamah (resistance) fighting
the Coalition and the post-Baathist government in Iraq.
Prior to its defeat in May 2009, the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) posed such a significant military
threat to the Sri Lankan government, which included
its own small navy and air force, that the latter had to
use its armed forces to crush it.60 The same can be said
of the Tehrik e-Taleban Pakistan (TTP), an alliance of
militant Pashtun tribesmen and foreign fighters that
has not only waged an insurgency in the FATA since
2004, but has also been responsible for supporting a
series of terrorist attacks in Pakistan conducted by al
lied jihadi groups (including, Islamabad alleges, the
suicide bombing that killed former President Benazir
Bhutto in December 2007).61 If a terrorist group has the
numbers, resources, and sufficient popular support
to threaten the government’s authority, then a state’s
counterterrorist policy has to be incorporated within a
wider COIN strategy.
COIN involves the coordinated response of a
state’s government and its external supporters to in
tegrate political, socioeconomic, legal, police, and
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military measures to frustrate and ultimately defeat
an insurgency. Within that framework, counterterror
ism includes defensive measures to minimize the abil
ity of a terrorist/insurgent group to inflict violence
against the civilian population; examples here include
emergency legislation to ban membership in an orga
nization and its political wing, increased police and
military patrols in public places, and information cam
paigns to inspire public vigilance against potential at
tacks. An enlightened counterterrorism policy will
also attempt to strike a balance between public safety
and civil liberties, and will acknowledge the need for
policies that alleviate the causes of terrorism. This will
involve measures to alleviate popular grievances that
terrorist groups exploit, and promote dialogue with
community leaders and political figures who may
be sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause, if not their
methods.62 Counterterrorism does, however, incorpo
rate more offensive measures to undermine terrorist
groups and neutralize its members. These include the
recruitment of terrorists to inform on their comrades
(to work as agents), and also the turning of captured
members of a group (preferably through persuasion,
not coercion) so that they provide intelligence on their
former comrades.63
Democratic norms dictate that neutralization
should ideally involve arrest, followed by the estab
lished procedures of trial by due process, conviction,
and incarceration. Yet neutralization can also involve
the killing of terrorists by members of the security
forces. This can either be because the former are armed
and resist arrest, or because they are in the process of
committing a violent act, in which case soldiers or po
lice act under rules of engagement (ROE) permitting
self-defense. The British Army in Northern Ireland
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was theoretically bound by the Yellow Card each sol
dier carried, which authorized the use of deadly force
solely in circumstances in which soldiers felt that their
lives were at risk; for example, in a situation when a
suspect appeared likely to use a firearm or explosive
device against them. However, in Northern Ireland,
as in other cases, critics allege that lethal violence is
used because there is a specific, if undeclared, policy
to kill suspected terrorists rather than capture them.
As noted below, some states, notably Israel, have con
ducted targeted killings, and the French example in
Algeria shows that in a permissive environment even
a democratic state’s military and security forces can
employ unpalatable measures such as torture and ex
trajudicial executions against suspected terrorists.64
The British government’s current, declared coun
terterrorist policy acknowledges the multifaceted na
ture of the terrorist threat, and the means needed to
address it. The Ministry of Defense’s (MOD) Strategic
Defence Review: A New Chapter (2002) and Delivering
Security in a Changing World (2003) both committed the
UK armed forces to a more overt role in counterterror
ism, both in intervention operations overseas (notably
Afghanistan) but also in domestic security.65 However,
the main document expressing British government
policy in dealing with the post-9/11 terrorist threat
is the Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) paper
first published in 2006, and then revised 3 years later.
The declared aim of British counterterrorism policy is:
“to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas
from international terrorism, so that people can go
about their lives freely and with confidence.66
According to CONTEST, the UK’s approach to
counterterrorism involves (1) the prevention of ter
rorism by tackling its causes, (2) the pursuit of terror
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ists and their sponsors, (3) the protection of the public
and key services, and (4) preparation to respond to
and mitigate the consequences of a terrorist attack.
CONTEST places the Home Office as the lead agency
for domestic counterterrorism, and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) as the key Ministry
overseeing its international aspects, while the MOD
supports both departments. CONTEST emphasizes
the primacy of political and nonmilitary means of
fighting terrorism. These include the need to isolate
the terrorist physically and psychologically from the
wider population, and to use other levers of national
power (notably the diplomatic and economic) to re
solve the grievances that cause terrorism (such as the
radicalization of young British Muslims).67 Nonethe
less, CONTEST also has an explicit military dimen
sion. The UK’s armed forces are explicitly committed
to prevention and pursuit (most notably in the context
of current operations in Afghanistan). Specialist ele
ments are committed to protection (notably the inter
ceptors of the Royal Air Force’s Quick Reaction Alert
[QRA] force) and, at least nominally, to preparation,
this being the declared role of the Civil Contingency
Reaction Force (CCRF) announced in the 2002 New
Chapter, which is supposedly drawn from the British
armed forces reserve units.
Criminality or Warfare?
Scholars of terrorism identify two distinct models
that a state can employ in response to this threat. The
criminal justice approach treats terrorism as a law
and-order issue, and although the government may
introduce emergency legislation to bolster the state’s
legal framework, it is the judiciary and the police that
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play the lead role in implementing counterterrorist
measures. The war model, in contrast, treats terrorism
as a mortal threat to the state, which can only be ad
dressed by military force.68 The latter is more or less
the default approach of an illiberal state such as postCommunist Russia. After a series of bombings in Rus
sian cities during September 1999, which were blamed
on Chechen separatists, President Putin declared the
latter would be “wasted in the shit-house,” and that
his government and its security forces would “quick
ly, decisively, with clenched teeth, strangle the vermin
at the root.” In a similar vein, the Russian President
responded to the Beslan massacre of September 2004
with the pledge to “wipe out all terrorist scum, no
matter where they are.” Such rhetoric reflected the
prevailing state of public opinion within Russian so
ciety.69
As Audrey Kurth Cronin observes, terrorism picks
“at the vulnerable seam between domestic law and
foreign war . . . [arguing] over which paradigm best
fits the threat—war or crime—says more about the
rigid intellectual and bureaucratic structures of the
state than it does about the nature of terrorism.”70 It
is therefore unsurprising that in practice many de
mocracies adopt counterterrorist policies that contain
elements of both models, and the degree to which an
individual country conforms closest to the criminal
justice or war model depends on the following factors:
Constitutional framework and normative constraints.
Prior to 9/11, the U.S. military operated under the
constraints of the Posse Comitatus Act (1876), which
imposed restrictions on the use of the armed forces in
domestic policing.71 In contrast, Britain has a tradition
of using its armed forces as part of a policy of Mili
tary Aid to the Civil Authority (MACA), discussed in
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more detail later. Aside from the small size of the Red
Army Faction and affiliated groups, one of the prin
cipal reasons why the Federal Republic of Germany
(FRG) made the police the lead agency in the fight
against far-left terrorism was that its political elite
was determined to avoid the excesses of the Nazi era,
and to ensure that the balance between civil liberties
and security favored the former. The Greek govern
ment’s reluctance to crack down on N17 until the late
1990s derived in part from political and popular dis
gust with the repressive record of the military junta
between 1967 and 1974.72
How lethal are they? The main indicator of the threat
that a terrorist group—or groups—poses to a particu
lar state is proportionate to the numbers within the
organization and its ability to mount serial and deadly
attacks against civil society. The lowest-level example
is that of so-called lone wolves like David Copeland,
the British neo-Nazi responsible for three bomb at
tacks in London in the spring of 1999. Leftist terrorists
in West Germany never managed recruitment beyond
double figures (25-32 at most), and between 1969-79
managed just 63 attacks (bombings, bank raids, kid
nappings, and assassinations), which claimed 33 lives.
There was therefore little public or political pressure
to call in the Bundeswehr to deal with them.73
The BR was, however, a larger and deadlier group,
being responsible for increasing terrorist violence in
Italy during the late 1970s: 467 attacks in 1975; 685 in
1976; 1,806 in 1977; and 2,275 in 1978. Given the ex
tent of this activity, and the public alarm aroused by
the kidnapping of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro
on March 16, 1978, and his murder 54 days later, it is
surprising that the Italian state persisted with a policecentric campaign against the BR, let alone an adherence
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to the rule of law. The normative constraints noted
above (in this case, institutional and public memories
of Fascism) clearly shaped the Italian response; hence,
the quote attributed to carabinieri General Carlo Dalla
Chiesa when a subordinate suggested that BR sus
pects could be interrogated more harshly to help the
security forces find Moro, “Italy can survive the loss
of Aldo Moro. It would not survive the introduction
of torture.”74
A contrasting example can be seen with Israel’s
reaction to Palestinian attacks from the Munich mas
sacre of 1972 and Ma’alot atrocity of May 15, 1974—in
which the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Pales
tine (DFLP) massacred 22 schoolchildren—to the first
Hamas suicide bombing in Israel on April 16, 1994.
Between 1994 and 2007, suicide attacks have killed
several hundred Israelis. Reprisals have included the
targeted killings of militant leaders and key figures
and retaliatory attacks against targets in both the oc
cupied territories and neighboring countries.75 On the
extreme end of the lethality scale, albeit in a nondemo
cratic state, one can see the example of the Armed Is
lamic Group (GIA) and the Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC) insurgents in Algeria during the civil
war of 1992-2002. Islamist terrorists from both groups
were involved in a series of barbaric atrocities (includ
ing the extermination of entire villages) in a conflict
that killed up to 100,000 people. Although the Alge
rian state’s own extensive human rights abuses cannot
be condoned, it is important to note that the scale of
GIA and GSPC violence obliged it to adopt a milita
rized response.76
Are they a domestic or international phenomenon? A
terrorist group operating in one democratic state may
be contained by the existing legal-police framework,
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particularly if it lacks widespread popular support.
However, if it operates on a regional or global level,
these means may be insufficient, particularly if the
terrorists can rely on an overseas sanctuary. For ex
ample, in the United States, domestic terrorists from
the Weathermen during the 1970s to the Unabomber
and far-right militia groups of the 1990s could be con
tained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The same could not be said of al-Qaeda, with its global
presence and more wide-ranging scale of activity and
support.77
State sponsorship. State support can have a dramatic
impact on the effectiveness and lethality of a terror
ist organization. Sympathetic governments can pro
vide sanctuary, funding, training (including specialist
knowledge in more sophisticated techniques, such as
bomb construction and commando-type tactics, from
intelligence and military personnel), and arms (from
assault rifles to surface-to-air missiles). Poorly armed
and incompetent terrorists can be beaten by an or
dinary constabulary and its criminal investigative/
Special Branch elements; they are also more liable
to suffer from their own efforts, for example, being
blown up by their own bombs while assembling or
planting them. Yet state support can effect a quanti
tative improvement in the operational effectiveness
of a terrorist group. A prime example is that of the
Red Army Faction after the East German secret po
lice, the Ministerium fur Staatssicherheit, provided the
Faction with sanctuary and training in the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR). The Red Army
staged fewer attacks than before receiving East Ger
man support, but these were far more professionally
executed than they had been previously—one ex
ample being the bombing that nearly killed the Su
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preme Allied Commander of NATO Forces in Europe,
General Alexander Haig, on June 25, 1979. Likewise,
PIRA’s capabilities were significantly enhanced when
it received Libyan arms (including heavy weaponry
and Semtex plastic explosive) from the mid-1980s, al
though as noted in the next chapter the loss of the bulk
of these weapons with the interception of the Eksund
(October 1987) was a serious blow to this organiza
tion.78
State support can provide terrorist groups with
significant military capabilities. The PLO (notably
Yasser Arafat’s Fatah) and its rivals formed substan
tial private armies in Jordan (before September 1970)
and Lebanon, thanks to lavish assistance from the So
viet bloc, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, and subse
quently Iran. Hezbollah’s evolution into a sophisticat
ed guerrilla/terrorist force depended principally on
training from Sepah e-Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps) cadres based in the Bekaa Valley during
the 1980s.79
Are they a wider threat to state stability? Certain ter
rorist groups have a purely parasitic relationship with
society, having no significant supporting constituen
cy—a prime example in this regard being the German
Red Army Faction. However, in other cases, such as
PIRA and ETA, these organizations can rely on a sup
port base within civil society. If a terrorist campaign
is waged concurrently with widespread civil disorder
and strife (for example, in Northern Ireland in the early
1970s, or Kashmir from 1989) or it exists alongside an
existential threat to the state—as posed by many of Is
rael’s neighbors historically, and Iran currently—then
it is more likely that a government might resort to the
military means outlined below. Israel has adopted a
deterrence-based response to the PLO and, currently,

29

Hamas and Hezbollah, as its political and military
leadership fear that an irresolute response will convey
weakness, inspiring further offensive action that may
lead to an all-out attack on the Jewish state by its inter
nal and external enemies.80
As far as MACA is concerned, the British Army
was originally deployed in Northern Ireland in Au
gust 1969 because the Royal Ulster Constabulary
(RUC) was unable to contain widespread rioting by
Catholics and intersectarian conflict between the latter
and the Protestants. In fact the RUC (and its B Special
reservists) was very much part of the problem because
of its pro-Protestant partisanship and heavy-handed
treatment of the Catholic community—as shown by
the excessive violence police had employed against
peaceful civil rights demonstrations in October 1968.
A combination of ham-fisted British policy and PIRA
militancy led to a low-level insurgency during the
early 1970s, but once the British Army began to con
tain terrorist violence, the British government moved
toward a policy of police primacy, designating a re
formed RUC (from 1976) as the lead agency over the
military in the struggle against terrorism. Although a
substantial military presence was required in North
ern Ireland until after the Good Friday Accords, the
British authorities were determined that the local
police should play a more prominent role in provid
ing security once both the threat of insurgency and
civil war between Catholics and Protestants had been
quelled.81
So are terrorists soldiers or criminals? Most terror
ist groups, save those capable of waging an insurgen
cy concurrently, lack the military capabilities needed
to engage a state’s armed forces on the latter’s terms.
Yet they still employ military nomenclature when

30

describing their organizations and their objectives,
and it is rare for any organization to accept the ter
rorist label.82 This is evident from the Irish Republican
volunteers serving in Brigades and Companies, and
also in the martyrdom video of the ringleader of the
four suicide bombers involved in the July 7, 2005, at
tacks on London; Mohammed Siddique Khan justified
his actions and those of his associates by stating that
“[we] are at war, and I am a soldier.”83 This militarized
ethos is also illustrated by bin Laden’s declaration of
war against the Jews and Crusaders (February 23,
1998), and in the rhetoric that his subordinates used
to justify 9/11. The attacks on New York and Wash
ington, DC, were lauded by al-Qaeda propaganda as
a means of mobilizing wider Muslim opinion against
an America simultaneously condemned for being a
global oppressor, and derided for being internally
weak and decadent. Furthermore, as Daniel Benjamin
and Steven Simon note, on 9/11, al-Qaeda conducted
an attack on the United States which was warlike in
its dimensions, in terms of the devastation caused and
the losses (human, material, and financial) suffered.
Critics of War on Terror rhetoric overlook the fact that
the militarization of this current struggle is not a onesided affair.84
If one accepts Clausewitz’s statement that “war is
an act of violence to compel our enemy to do our will,”
it is clear that acts of terrorism are not purely criminal
in nature. Terrorist groups are, after all, seeking to use
force to coerce their target(s) into acceding to their de
mands, whether these are for a united Ireland, a Tamil
homeland, or the expulsion of Western influence from
the Muslim world.85 British General Frank Kitson
stated that, “there can be no such thing as a purely
military solution [in COIN] because insurgency is not
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primarily a military activity,” there is also “no such
thing as a wholly political solution . . . short of surren
der, because the very fact that a state of insurgency ex
ists implies that violence is involved which will have
to be countered to some extent at least by the use of
lethal force.” 86 The same can be said of counterterror
ism. While it is understandable that some analysts of
terrorism do not wish to legitimize this phenomenon
by ascribing to it the characteristics of state-based
warfare, the essentially military character of terrorism
should be acknowledged in addition to the fact that
if a terrorist organization poses a significant threat to
the security of a state, then the latter’s armed forces—
as deliverers of security to the society they serve—are
likely to be involved in countering that threat.
It is commonly agreed by Western academics and
informed commentators that a purely militaristic fo
cus on counterterrorism is misconceived, but there
are equally simplistic assumptions that need to be
dispelled. The first is the fatuous statement that “one
man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”
This cliché can be dispelled by a straightforward com
parison between (for example) Nelson Mandela and
Andreas Baader. For Mandela, terrorism was a last
resort. For Baader, it was an end in itself. Mandela
expressed coherent and understandable reasons why
the African National Congress’ military wing, Mkhon
to we Sizwe, took up arms, namely in order to liberate
and enfranchise a politically oppressed and socioeco
nomically disadvantaged majority, and to overthrow
a despotic and racist regime. Baader provided no clear
rationale for the Red Army Faction’s activities, other
than expressing a vague notion of liberating a Ger
man proletariat with whom he and his comrades had
nothing in common. Even within terrorist groups, one
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can see a vast difference in character, motivation, and
technique between its members. PIRA, for example,
could attract individuals like Francis Hughes—recog
nized by British Army officers as a committed profes
sional, and one of the seven Provisional prisoners who
starved themselves to death in the 1981 hunger strike.
Yet the movement Hughes sacrificed himself for also
attracted the mafia-type characters Eamon Collins
condemned in his memoirs as a PIRA volunteer, not
to mention the thugs who beat Robert McCartney to
death in a Belfast pub on January 31, 2005.87
From the freedom fighter cliché comes another
pernicious analogy: the idea that the default response
to a terrorist campaign should be the pursuit of ne
gotiations. Thomas Mockaitis draws a useful distinc
tion between insurgents who have a viable cause (and
who are ready to seek a compromise settlement with
their foes) and terrorists whose “goals are so idealistic
as to be virtually unattainable.”88 In contrast, former
Northern Ireland Secretary Mo Mowlam and Jonathan
Powell (one of Blair’s former advisors) have argued
that the Good Friday Accords offer a template for ne
gotiations with al-Qaeda. Powell and Mowlam pre
sumed that PIRA’s goals and those of bin Laden were
somehow comparable, and that it is as easy to achieve
a nonviolent solution with those focussed on an
apocalyptic struggle between Islam and a degenerate
West as it is with a movement committed to a united
Ireland.89 It is also important to distinguish between
terrorists whose objectives involve rectifying a gross
injustice, and those who simply seek revenge. For ex
ample, the African National Congress (ANC) did not
want a racial war against Afrikaaners; it sought a truly
democratic South Africa in which both whites and
blacks had equal rights before the state and the law.
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The ANC was, after all, a multiracial organization,
with white members such as Joe Slovo and Ronnie
Kasrils. Hamas, by contrast, is an avowedly anti-Se
mitic organization, whose founding charter proclaims
the inevitability of a final struggle in which “Muslims
will fight the Jews” and destroy them. If Hamas ever
achieved its objectives, the result would be the ethnic
cleansing of Jews from Palestine. The argument that
Israel is somehow duty bound to talk to enemies who
seek its destruction is therefore an unrealistic one,
and critics of Israel’s military actions against Hamas
should examine whether the latter’s own ideological
intransigence is in itself one of the sources of the cur
rent impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.90
In considering the potential for negotiation and
reconciliation, it is also instructive to bear in mind the
contrasting examples of two Islamists who turned to
terrorism. The first is Imad Mugniyah, a senior Hez
bollah military commander killed in a car bomb attack
in Damascus on February 12, 2008 (attributed to, but
not admitted by, Mossad). Mugniyah was described by
U.S. and Israeli intelligence sources as the founder of
Hezbollah’s armed wing, the Islamic Resistance (IR),
and the main instigator of attacks on Western targets
in Lebanon during the 1980s. Mugniyah was also in
strumental in conducting the IR’s guerrilla campaign
against the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in Southern
Lebanon until the latter’s withdrawal in 2000.91 David
Barkai, a former IDF intelligence officer, described
Mugniyah as follows:
His is one of the most creative and brilliant minds
I have ever come across. He is a man with deep un
derstanding, an excellent technical grasp, and leader
ship ability. Unfortunately, a mixture of personal and
geopolitical circumstances led him to channel his out
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standing talents into the path of blood and destruction
and to make him into a dangerous enemy.92

Mugniyah was clearly a skilled practitioner of ter
rorism and guerrilla warfare, but showed no sign of
having any overarching political perceptions, or any
sign of compromising with his violent objectives to
ward the West or Israel. A contrast can be seen with
Nasir Abbas, an Indonesian who became a member of
Jemaah Islamiyah, al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian network.
Abbas became a jihadi while fighting the Soviets in
Afghanistan during the 1980s and believed that it was
a good Muslim’s duty to fight infidels occupying Is
lamic land. However, the Bali bombings on October
12, 2002, which killed 202 civilians, led him to become
a police informant. Abbas saw the mass murder of
nightclub revellers as a violation of what was sup
posed to be a defensive jihad against godless aggres
sors.93 Some terrorists’ motivations may compel them
toward violence regardless of the cost, others may
reassess and abandon their commitment to a lost or
discredited cause. Western governments therefore
have more prospects of negotiating and compromis
ing with the Abbas’s of this world than they would
have with the Mugniyahs.
The “negotiations work” school also misses two
further aspects of terrorism. The first is that groups
with originally “just” goals may fight on even when
these objectives have been achieved. The majority
of Spanish Basques are satisfied with the autonomy
that they were given after the demise of Franco and
his regime in 1975 and do not support ETA’s contin
ued resort to violence. The second is that negotiations
with an undefeated terrorist/insurgent organization
can simply lead to the flouting of peace accords, as
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demonstrated by the failure of Colombian President
Andres Pastrana’s efforts to seek a settlement with
FARC in the late 1990s.94 A further example is offered
by the Pakistani Army’s repeated efforts to negotiate
truces with the TTP in the FATA (in 2004, 2006, and
2008), which simply encouraged the latter to launch
wider attacks to take over neighboring districts in the
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) in February
2009. The Army’s decision to fight back and its recap
ture of Buner and Swat in July 2009 were applauded at
that time by the majority of Pakistanis, who believed
that peace agreements with the TTP inspired the latter
toward further violence.95
Above all, claims that conflict resolution in North
ern Ireland offers a model overlook the underlying
reasons behind the Good Friday Accords. For all Sinn
Fein’s propaganda, it is evident that by 1997 PIRA was
militarily contained and frustrated by the British Army
and the RUC, leaving the majority of Irish Republi
cans convinced that they had no option but to follow
nonviolent political methods in pursuing their goals.96
In certain cases, military and police operations can be
integrated as part of an overall policy of containing
and, if necessary, neutralizing hard-core terrorists
who wish to fight to the bitter end, while impressing
those amenable to compromise that negotiations offer
a more viable means of achieving objectives than the
continuation of violence.
To summarize, terrorism represents a strategic
choice, namely a decision by an armed nonstate fac
tion to use violence for political ends. Terrorists can be
skilled guerrilla fighters or rank amateurs. They can
be rational individuals who relate violence to the at
tainment of their political objectives, or sadistic thugs
who revel in butchery for its own sake. They can be
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motivated by high-minded ideals or unmitigated mal
ice toward their enemies/victims. They can adhere to
coherent goals providing the basis for a diplomatic
resolution, or aspire to boundlessly utopian or nihil
istic ideas. Furthermore, all these types of terrorists
can conceivably exist within one particular group or
network. The assumption that the causes of terrorism
can automatically be resolved by ushering its practi
tioners to the conference table is therefore as flawed as
the belief that the latter can only be dealt with by force.
In accepting that there may be conditions in which
military power can be employed against terrorism, it
is therefore easier to examine the specific tasks that a
state’s armed forces can perform in a counterterrorism
campaign, which are outlined in the next section.
THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN
COUNTERTERRORISM
Some of the tasks discussed here can be carried out
by specialized police units. For example, the FRG’s
first dedicated counterterrorist unit (GSG9) was re
cruited in April 1973 not from the Bundeswehr, but
from the border guards. In the same year, the French
authorities raised the National Gendermerie Interven
tion Group (GIGN) from the ranks of the gendarmerie.
Both of these formations have successfully stormed hi
jacked aircraft and rescued hostages—GSG9 in Moga
dishu in October 1977 following the takeover of Luf
thansa Flight 181 by the PFLP, and GIGN in Marseilles
in December 1994 to recover Air France Flight 8969,
taken over by the GIA in Algiers. Civil police forces
usually have bomb disposal teams, and may also
have a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
(CBRN) response capability, such as that of the Met
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ropolitan Police’s Tactical Support Group, which can
respond to a CBRN emergency in London.97 However,
there are contingencies that are beyond the capabili
ties or the training of a police service, and these can be
summarized as follows:
Military Aid to the Civil Authority.
In British law, MACA is defined as the employ
ment of the UK’s armed forces by the government in
circumstances beyond traditional disturbances to the
peace. MACA can be subdivided into Military Aid to
the Civil Power (MACP), which involves the use of
the armed forces to assist the civil authorities in the
restoration of law and order, and Military Aid to the
Civil Community (MACC), usually involving disaster
relief, but also including specific responses to a mass
casualty terrorist attack. Western armed forces have
specialized units such as the UK’s Joint CBRN Regi
ment, a British Army-Royal Air Force (RAF) forma
tion, trained in the containment and decontamination
processes needed in the aftermath of a major CBRN
attack. This theoretical capability was available from
the Japanese Self-Defence Force during the Sarin gas
attack committed by Aum Shinrikyo on the Tokyo sub
way system on March 20, 1995, although this incident
was on such a small scale that the police and emer
gency services were able to contain and decontami
nate the stations affected and also treat most casual
ties successfully.98
A further contingency within MACC involves the
scrambling of fighter jets to shoot down a hijacked air
liner in order to prevent a 9/11-style atrocity. In Brit
ain’s case, the responsibility for responding to such a
scenario is allocated to the QRA force based at RAF
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Coningsby. In all of these contingencies, there has to
be a clear request from the Home Office to the MOD,
and the decision to deploy military units on MACA
tasks requires ministerial approval. The criteria that
need to be met are: The use of the armed forces has to
be an action of last resort; lives must be judged to be in
danger if military assistance is not requested; and the
military can only use resources under their own direct
command and can only follow a clear request for as
sistance from civilian police chiefs endorsed by min
isterial approval.99 The practical application of MACA
can be seen in May 1980, during the Iranian Embassy
siege. After the hostage takers murdered an Iranian
diplomat, the Metropolitan Police relayed a request
for military intervention through the emergency com
mittee meeting in the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A
(COBRA). COBRA was established in the aftermath
of the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972, and its
bureaucratic framework for crisis management still
operates according to that initiated with the Iranian
Embassy siege 30 years ago.100
The best-known example of MACP in a democratic
state is that of Operation BANNER, the deployment of
the UK armed forces (principally the British Army) to
Northern Ireland from 1969-2007. As noted earlier, the
problem of terrorist violence was compounded by a
low-level sectarian civil war, while the lead civil polic
ing agency was associated by the Catholic community
with the discriminatory and oppressive policies of the
Protestant/Unionist hierarchy, which dominated the
devolved Parliament in Stormont.101 A lesser-known
example was the deployment of Canadian troops un
der the War Powers Act in Quebec during October
1970 at the request of the provincial Premier and the
Mayor of Montreal. In this case, the Canadian Forces
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acted in a supporting role, leaving the task of arrest
ing and detaining members of the separatist Front de
Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) to the local police.102
Deterrence.
The military can also be deployed in a preventative
role if the authorities receive intelligence indicating
that a terrorist attack is imminent. Any public venue
where large numbers of people congregate, such as a
major sporting event or an airport, offers a natural tar
get for an atrocity (for example, the attack by the Japa
nese Red Army on Lod Airport in May 1972; the Mu
nich Olympics Massacre in September 1972; attacks on
passengers by the Abu Nidal Organisation [ANO] at
the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985; and
the failed attack on Glasgow airport in July 2007 by
Islamist militants). Examples of deterrence operations
include the deployment of troops to Heathrow air
port on January 5-6, 1974, in response to an apparent
plot by Palestinian terrorists to shoot down airliners
with portable anti-aircraft missiles.103 As a result of the
Lod and Munich atrocities, the British MOD drafted
contingency plans to preempt an attack at Heathrow
(known as Operation MARMION), and these plans
were implemented in January 1974, with 150 soldiers
and 180 extra police deployed to patrol London’s
principal air terminal. In February 2003, there was a
similar operation at the same airport, initiated by the
Blair government in response to intelligence indicat
ing an imminent al-Qaeda attack.104
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Interdiction.
Maritime and air forces can be employed in the in
terception of terrorist personnel and arms shipments.
The IDF has two significant successes to its credit.
The first was the seizure of the Karine-A by the Israeli
Navy on January 3, 2002. The vessel was carrying $15
million worth of weapons from Iran to the Palestin
ian Authority, which the Israelis presumed would be
employed in the intifada in the occupied territories.
The second was the capture of the Francop by the Is
raeli Navy’s Special Forces (Shayetet 13) on November
4, 2009. This vessel is reported to have been carrying
rockets, mortar shells, grenades, and small arms am
munition from Iran, apparently for Hezbollah.105
The Royal Navy was involved in maritime inter
diction patrols during the troubles in Northern Ire
land, assisted by the Irish Naval Service (INS) as well
as the French authorities. The INS captured two trawl
ers carrying arms for PIRA—the Claudia on March
28, 1973, (with a Libyan weapons shipment) and the
Marita Ann on September 24, 1984, (which had arms
purchased from the United States on board) with the
Royal Navy and RAF providing surveillance sup
port. French customs officers intercepted the Eksund
in October 1987 (a merchant vessel carrying 150 tons
of Libyan weaponry), but it is reported that during its
voyage from Tripoli the Eksund was under observa
tion from unidentified military aircraft, and its cargo
was also betrayed to the British and Irish intelligence
services by a mole within PIRA. Although prior to
the autumn of 1987 PIRA had managed to smuggle in
smaller quantities of Libyan arms, the lost of the Eksund
and its cargo was a major disaster for this group. It
thwarted PIRA’s plans to escalate its operations with
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heavier weaponry, and to launch a Tet-like offensive,
which would inflict significant losses on the British
armed forces and the RUC, undermining Britain’s will
to continue the anti-terrorist struggle in Northern Ire
land. Furthermore, the Libyans blamed the Eksund’s
loss on inadequate security measures, cutting off aid
to Irish Republican terrorists as a consequence.106
More current examples include the involvement
of NATO and other navies in Operation ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR since October 4, 2001. This involves a
combination of deterrence and interdiction, patrolling
choke points such as the Straits of Gibraltar and also
boarding vessels suspected of carrying illicit passen
gers or cargo. The U.S.-led Combined Task Force 150
(CTF150) off the Horn of Africa provides another ex
ample, although its activity has since been subsumed
into anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia
and Yemen.107 The efficacy of these operations can be
questioned. For example, U.S. and allied naval patrols
in the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf region have been
intensive (Coalition forces boarded 180 ships in the
10 months following 9/11), but have detained no alQaeda terrorists. The scale of arms trafficking in sensi
tive regions, notably the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden zone,
also suggests that naval missions such as CTF150 are
overstretched, particularly if they are also expected to
quell Somali pirates.108 Furthermore, maritime opera
tions like ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR do little to stop nonstate groups from acquiring weapons within Europe,
whether from organized criminal groups such as the
Neapolitan Camorra, or free-lance dealers such as the
Russian arms trafficker Viktor Bout.109
Two examples of air interdiction suggest that such
a process works best on the basis of precise intelli
gence. The first involves the interception by U.S. Navy
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fighters of an Egyptian airliner carrying the Palestine
Liberation Front (PLF) hijackers of the Achille Lauro on
October 10, 1985. The plane was forced to land at Sigo
nella Naval Air Station in Sicily, where, after a tense
stand-off between U.S. Special Forces and the cara
binieri, the PLF terrorists were handed over to Italian
custody. A more recent occurrence was the air-strike
conducted on an arms convoy of around 23 trucks
crossing Sudan in March 2009. The convoy, which was
destroyed either by the Israeli air force or UAVs, is
supposed to have carried Iranian arms for Hamas.110
Training Allied Forces.
Since September 2001, Western armed forces have
become increasingly involved in providing counterterrorist training to the military and security forces
of friendly governments in regions where Islamist
extremists are active. This includes U.S. assistance to
Central Asian military forces, notably those of Uz
bekistan and Kyrgyzstan,111 and also the American-led
Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA), located at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, which
trains allied African military personnel. Camp Lem
onier also allegedly provides a base for U.S. Special
Forces operations throughout the Horn of Africa and
Yemen. Since October 2008, CJTF-HOA has been un
der the command of the U.S. military’s Africa Com
mand (AFRICOM), established in response to Wash
ington’s concerns over ungoverned spaces on the
continent and their potential for developing as havens
for al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups.
As of 2010, AFRICOM has a staff of 1,300 (includ
ing 170 troops on training missions), and a budget
of $278 million.112 AFRICOM has in recent years also
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taken a close interest in training local security forces in
Northwest Africa in response to the increased threat
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses to re
gional security. Between May 3-23, 2010, AFRICOM
oversaw Operation FLINTLOCK, a training exercise
in the Sahel involving 600 U.S. troops; 150 Europeans
from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and
the UK; and 400 soldiers from Burkina Faso, Chad,
Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal.113
Other relevant examples include U.S. assistance to
the Yemeni security forces combating al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), with reports of several
dozen American Special Forces operatives assisting
the Yemenis, ostensibly in noncombatant roles such
as intelligence-gathering, and U.S. and British finan
cial assistance to train the nascent armed forces of the
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG).114
Hostage Rescue.
The Munich disaster of September 5-6, 1972,
in which 11 Israeli athletes were murdered by the
Black September Organization (BSO)—nine during a
botched West German police attempt to free them at
Furstenfeldbruck airfield—inspired the FRG and oth
er states to set up specialized hostage rescue teams for
employment in either domestic or foreign emergen
cies. For example, by late 1972, the British government
had prepared contingency plans earmarking a troop
from the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (22SAS)
to “supplement police resources in the event of a
hijacking incident at an airport in the United King
dom.”115 Declassified British government files contain
little on the development of 22SAS’s counterterrorist
unit (known by the codenames Snowdrop, then Pa
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goda), although sources show that its first exercise,
Icon, took place in July 1973. An officer and a sergeant
from 22SAS also accompanied GSG-9 when it stormed
Lufthansa Flight-181 5 years later.116 The formation
of the U.S. Army’s Delta Force in 1977 occurred after
President Jimmy Carter, reacting to GSG9’s success
at Mogadishu, Africa, asked his advisors whether the
U.S. armed forces had an equivalent unit with similar
capabilities.117
These units require well-trained personnel able to
swiftly assault a defended location to neutralize ter
rorists within it and to liberate their captives. Hostage
rescue is an intensely dangerous activity, since there is
a clear risk that gunmen may attempt to massacre their
prisoners once they come under attack. Their loca
tion—a public building, an aircraft, or an oil rig—can
also be rigged for explosives, primed for detonation if
the authorities send in troops or police. The Mogadi
shu and Marseilles examples cited above show that a
specialist police or gendarmerie unit can be success
fully employed in hostage rescue. However, in cases
when an incident takes place offshore or in a foreign
country, where the terrorists are too numerous and
well-equipped for a police unit, or where the hostage
takers can rely on local assistance, military forces may
be required to conduct a successful rescue. The mili
tary also possesses specific characteristics that make
it ideally suited to fill particular roles. For example,
the Royal Marines and, in particular, its Special Forces
arm, the Special Boat Service (SBS), were a natural
choice for British maritime counterterrorist planners
in the late 1970s, because of the former’s role as the
Royal Navy’s maritime/amphibious infantry arm,
and the latter’s intensive training in the hazardous
and complex task of diving under combat conditions.
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Declassified documents show that the Royal Marines
and SBS were involved in offshore exercises around
the North Sea oil fields from the summer of 1976.118 In
May 1980, the Royal Marines established a specialist
unit (Commachio Company) to protect or recapture
ships or oil rigs against armed opposition, although
this unit’s counterterrorist duties were transferred in
full to M Squadron, SBS in July 1987.119
Military Special Forces units have been employed
successfully in hostage rescue missions; these in
clude the Bijzondere Bijstands Eenheid (BBE), ending
two hostage crises in the Netherlands: in Glimmen in
May 1977 (when a train and school were taken over
by South Moluccan separatists); and Assen in March
1978 (when 70 people were taken hostage in a local
government building by the same group). Recruited
from the Royal Dutch Marines, the BBE freed all but
two of the hostages at Glimmen, while at Assen the
Marines stormed the local government offices in time
to prevent the Moluccans from killing two of their
captives.120 22SAS gained public notoriety when the
Pagoda unit stormed the Iranian embassy on May 5,
1980, with the world’s media filming the assault. Of
the six Ahvaz gunmen, five were killed during the
course of Operation NIMROD, and all but two of the
21 hostages were freed.121
The most spectacular external hostage-rescue mis
sion was conducted by the IDF’s Sayeret Maktal in June
1976, which liberated over 100 Israeli and Jewish pas
sengers of Air France Flight 139, held by Palestinian
and West German terrorists at Entebbe Airport out
side Kampala, Uganda. The success of this mission
was remarkable because of its complexity—it involved
around 100 commandos being flown a distance of
3,800 kilometers in four C130 transport planes, sup
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ported by two Boeing 707s (one airborne command
post and one hospital plane), all of which required air
to-air refueling during the mission. Furthermore, in
contrast with Mogadishu the following year, in which
GSG9 enjoyed the full cooperation of the Somali au
thorities, the Israelis had to conduct a rescue on hostile
territory. Ugandan dictator Idi Amin supported the
hijackers and ordered his army to protect them. In a
domestic hostage situation, or one in friendly territory
overseas, police or military Special Forces can count
on regular security personnel to cordon off the terror
ists and their captives and to also gather intelligence
critical to any rescue attempt—such as the number of
hostage takers, their location, and that of their victims.
The Israelis were denied this cooperation in Entebbe,
and a more effective Ugandan defense, not to mention
mechanical failure on any of the planes, could have
led to a disastrous failure similar to the U.S. effort to
free their embassy hostages in Iran (Operation EAGLE
CLAW) 4 years later. 122
Clandestine Operations/Intelligence-Gathering.
One of the principal problems with deploying
armed forces on MACA/MACP tasks is that they are
doctrinally prepared and trained for interstate war
fare, not for the hard task of identifying and tracking
down terrorists who hide among the civilian popu
lace. This has been a perennial problem for the Brit
ish Army in particular, not only with its operations in
Northern Ireland but also with previous conflicts such
as Cyprus. The former commander of EOKA, General
George Grivas, retrospectively mocked his British en
emies for “hunting field mice with armoured cars.”123
British commanders in Cyprus did actually recognize
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the weaknesses of overt military activity. The British
Army has a tradition of combining conventional oper
ations—public patrolling, guarding likely targets for
a terrorist attack, check points, etc.—with clandestine
ones. These have included locally recruited countergangs such as the Q-Patrols (recruited from the Greek
populace during the Cyprus Emergency), which
caused EOKA more difficulties than Grivas was sub
sequently prepared to admit. The British Army also
has a history of raising its own plain-clothes units—
such as the Keeni Meeni patrols in Aden (1966-67)—
and similar formations were extensively employed in
Operation BANNER.124
With clandestine operations, intelligence is gath
ered in an unobtrusive and discreet manner, so as not
to attract the target’s attention. Plain-clothes military
units can be involved in static or mobile surveillance—
on foot or in unmarked vehicles—of suspects, their safe
houses and arms caches, and can provide time-sensi
tive intelligence to direct military and police patrols
to arrest terrorists. This was the role performed by the
British Army’s 14 Intelligence Company in Northern
Ireland from early 1973 onward, and since April 2005,
this is the remit of the Special Reconnaissance Regi
ment (SRR).125 More controversially, the Army’s Intel
ligence Corps also established the Force Research Unit
(FRU) in 1980 to recruit informants among the Catholic
and Protestant communities of Northern Ireland and
to run agents within Republican and Loyalist terrorist
groups. If the security forces are able to penetrate ter
rorist groups and recruit spies within their midst, then
the former find it easier to contain the latter’s activities
and frustrate their operations. Yet such intelligencegathering activity is fraught with ethical problems,
which are discussed later.126
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Other armies have also employed undercover
units. The IDF’s Mista-Aravim troops have been em
ployed as part of a strategy of targeted killing against
Palestinian militants,127 while the U.S. Army estab
lished the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) in the
aftermath of the Iranian hostage crisis. ISA’s successes
include locating American citizens held by Hezbollah
in Lebanon during the mid-1980s—although the ad
ministration of President Ronald Reagan did not use
this intelligence to order a mission to rescue them—
and the assistance its signals intelligence (SIGINT)
specialists gave to the Italian police in January 1982,
which enabled the latter to free kidnapped U.S. Briga
dier General James Dozier, who was held hostage by
the BR.128
State SIGINT agencies such as the U.S. National
Security Agency (NSA) and the UK Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) are also in
volved in the interception of emails, mobile phone
calls, and other communications between terrorist
suspects. NSA is predominantly a military organi
zation, whose director is a three-star officer drawn
from the U.S. armed forces, and which is supported
by U.S. military intelligence assets worldwide. While
GCHQ is nominally overseen by the FCO, it also uses
Royal Navy, RAF, and Army SIGINT units as part of
its intelligence-gathering effort.129 NSA and GCHQ co
operate closely with each other and their Canadian,
Australian, and New Zealand counterparts (respec
tively; the Communications Security Establishment,
the Defence Signals Directorate, and the Government
Communications Security Bureau) in the Echelon pro
gram. Although it is officially described as directed
against terrorism and organized crime, critics suspect
that Echelon has also been exploited for more dubious
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practices, such as commercial espionage. Nonetheless,
it is clear that Western SIGINT services have been ac
tive against terrorist groups, although given the sheer
volume of intercepted traffic—around 1.3 billion email
users worldwide send a daily total of approximately
210 billion messages—and limitations on the ability of
agencies to collate and assess such material (in par
ticular, the limited number of linguists and translators
NSA, GCHQ, and other services employ) the SIGINT
process is not as efficient as it is portrayed in Holly
wood thrillers. Furthermore, official secrecy prevents
an accurate assessment of the extent to which SIGINT
enables Western states to thwart terrorist plots, al
though it is apparent that until a leak in the American
media in August 1998, the NSA had a tap on one of
bin Laden’s satellite phones.130
Preemptive Intervention.
The clandestine units discussed above can also as
sist operations to apprehend terrorists on the verge
of committing an attack. In Northern Ireland, 14 In
telligence Company provided surveillance support
to 22SAS, which, alongside the RUC’s Headquarters
Mobile Support Unit, would intercept PIRA members
on active service. 22SAS killed around 40 members
of PIRA during Operation BANNER, but arrested a
further 100, thereby belying Republican propaganda
claims that 22SAS operated according to a shoot-to
kill policy.131 The increasing reliance on preemptive
intervention by the British Army and the RUC can be
seen in the outcome of security force ambushes—nine
Republican terrorists were killed by such means prior
to 1983, and 35 were shot between this year and 1997.
The two most effective operations were the ambush of
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a PIRA unit in the process of attacking the RUC sta
tion at Loughgall on May 8, 1987, during which 22SAS
shot dead eight armed members of PIRA’s East Ty
rone Brigade; and the arrest of a 4-man sniper team in
South Armagh by SAS soldiers in April 1997.132
Given the fact that from the mid-1970s onward
PIRA numbered around 300-400 active members at
most, these killings and arrests had a disproportionate
effect. Furthermore, as Ed Moloney notes, the Lough
gall ambush was followed up by a series of undercover
Army operations that led to further losses for PIRA’s
Tyrone Brigade (renowned as the most hard-line of
Provisional units); 28 of its members were killed in
security force ambushes between May 1987 and Feb
ruary 1992. The shooting of PIRA volunteers in pre
emptive operations, most notoriously the Gibraltar
killings of March 1998, did contribute to Republican
propaganda demonizing the SAS, but these opera
tions also had a demoralizing effect on the Provision
als and contributed to the ceasefire PIRA’s leadership
declared in July 1997.133
A more recent example includes the use of Ameri
can and British Special Forces units, including 22SAS,
to disrupt Sunni and Shia insurgent activity in Bagh
dad, notably the suicide and car-bomb attacks com
mitted by al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). On completing his
tour as the commander of multinational forces in Iraq
in August 2008, General David Petraeus explicitly
praised the efforts of Special Forces in crippling AQI
activity in the Iraqi capital, stating that this contribut
ed to the decline in terrorist and internecine violence
in Baghdad which followed the surge of U.S. troops
from February 2007.134
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Targeted Killing.
For the purposes of this paper, the distinction
between targeted killing and preemptive interven
tion missions that have ended lethally (such as the
Northern Ireland examples noted above) needs to be
emphasized. As Cronin states, “[naming] individu
als and ordering their assassination is different from
killing an enemy while he is engaged in an attack.”
From a purely legal perspective, assassinations are
illegal, since they involve extrajudicial killing, but
in conventional warfare, it is permissible to kill key
figures within an enemy’s command structure. Exam
ples include the failed attack by British commandos
on General Erwin Rommel’s headquarters in Libya
in November 1941, and the interception and destruc
tion of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto’s transport plane
by American fighter planes in April 1943 during the
Pacific war.135 During the early phases of Operation
IRAQ FREEDOM from March-April 2003, Coalition
forces tried to kill Saddam Hussein by bombing his
suspected hideouts, while the British military ordered
an air strike on a house in Basra that was (wrongly)
identified as the headquarters for Ali Hasan al-Majid,
in charge of the defense of Southern Iraq.136 If states
treat counterterrorism from a warfighting perspec
tive, a strategy of decapitation is simply an extension
of existing practice in interstate conflict.
Since 9/11, both the Bush and Obama administra
tions have conducted targeted strikes against their ad
versaries. This contentious policy is evident not only
with the air strikes by Predator UAVs against al-Qa
eda suspects and TTP leaders in the FATA,137 but also
in other cases such as the UAV strike on Qaid Sunyan
Ali al-Harithi (a senior al-Qaeda terrorist) in Yemen
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on November 3, 2002, and the helicopter gunship at
tack on a convoy carrying Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in
Somalia on September 15, 2009.138 The underlying cal
culation behind a targeted-killing strategy is that the
elimination of key leadership and support figures (no
tably bomb makers and financiers) can have a critical
effect in weakening a terrorist group. In this respect,
U.S. and Pakistani officials hoped that the death of
TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud in a Predator strike in
South Waziristan on August 8, 2009, would create a
damaging rift within this organization, although de
spite an apparent bout of infighting among rival TTP
commanders, these expectations remain unfulfilled.139
The effect of such strikes on the morale of the rank and
file of militants in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere re
mains to be seen, although there is anecdotal evidence
to suggest that UAV attacks have had a demoralizing
effect on some survivors.140
The Israelis have also been consistent practitioners
of this tactic, historically, against organizations such
as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Targeted killings
have been conducted beyond Israel’s borders by both
military units and the Mossad.141 Examples involving
the IDF include the raid on Beirut, Lebanon, in April
1973, during which the Sayeret Maktal assassinated
three BSO leaders; the commando attack that killed
one of Yasser Arafat’s key deputies, Khalil al-Wazir,
at his home in Tunis; and the death of the Hezbollah
leader, Sheikh Abas Musawi, in South Lebanon in
February 1992 (Musawi’s vehicle convoy was inter
cepted and destroyed by helicopter gunships).142 The
IDF and security forces have also conducted similar
actions against Palestinian militants in Gaza and the
West Bank from the early 1990s, using Mista-Aravim
teams, uniformed Special Forces, and air strikes (such
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as the one that killed Hamas’s spiritual leader, Sheikh
Ahmed Yassin, on March 22, 2004).143
Retaliation.
A state’s armed forces can be used to launch retal
iatory raids or strikes against either another state that
has supported a terrorist group, or against a nonstate
actor based within a weak or failing state. These op
erations are coercive in nature, since they are intended
to persuade an adversary to “choose between making
concessions or suffering the consequences of continu
ing its present course of action.”144 In the cases dis
cussed below, retaliatory raids are intended to compel
terrorist groups to desist from perpetuating further
attacks and to force their state sponsors to cease as
sisting them.
Israeli forces conducted raids into Egypt during
the early 1950s in response to attacks by the Cairobacked Palestinian Fedayeen, and also into Jordan
during the late 1960s as a retaliation against the PLO,
PFLP, and other groups’ attacks on Israel. The latter
arguably contributed to King Hussein’s decision to
crack down on the Palestinian guerrilla movement’s
state-within-a-state in September 1970, although this
also had the unintended effect of inspiring Arafat to
create the BSO. It is also noteworthy that the Syrians
would not permit Palestinian groups based on its soil
to launch attacks directly against the “Zionist entity,”
insisting that any such operations be staged from Leb
anon or Jordan; Syria clearly preferred that other Arab
states should face the brunt of Israeli reprisals.145 The
U.S. air strikes on Libya on April 15, 1986 (Operation
EL DORADO CANYON), also provide an example
of retaliation against a state sponsor, as the opera
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tion was a response to the bombing of a disco in West
Berlin earlier that month (frequented by U.S. military
personnel), which was sponsored by Gaddafi’s intel
ligence services.146
With the Turkish-Syrian crisis of October 1998, the
mere threat of military intervention forced a state to
cease sponsoring a terrorist group. Syria had provided
a safe haven for the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Oca
lan, and PKK fighters were able to use training camps
in the Bekaa Valley (Lebanon being under Syrian oc
cupation at that time). After repeated attempts to per
suade Damascus to expel the PKK, the Turkish gov
ernment threatened Syria with war in early October
1998, backing hostile rhetoric with military maneuvers
near the Syrian border. Then-Syrian President Hafez
al-Asad was fully aware that his country was diplo
matically isolated and militarily weaker than Turkey
(which was also a NATO member, and could count on
close alliance ties with the United States and Israel).
Ocalan was deported from Syria on October 9, 1998,
facilitating his capture by the Turkish secret services
in Kenya the following February, and the PKK were
subsequently expelled from the Bekaa Valley. Success
in this case derived not only from a credible military
threat, but also the fact that President Asad conclud
ed that the benefits gained from supporting the PKK
were minimal compared to the risks.147
Examples of retaliation specifically directed
against terrorist groups include the French air raids
on the Bekaa Valley in October 1983, in response to
a Hezbollah suicide bombing that killed 58 French
paratroopers serving with the Multi-National Peace
keeping Force (MNF) in Lebanon. (A simultaneous
attack on the same day, October 23, 1983, killed 241
U.S. Marines also with the MNF.)148 In response to the
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Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam attacks, the administration
of President Bill Clinton ordered cruise missile at
tacks against al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan
and a suspected chemical weapons plant in Sudan,
on August 20, 1998 (Operation INFINITE REACH).149
On March 1, 2008, the Colombian Army raided FARC
camps in neighboring Ecuador, killing one of its se
nior commanders, Raul Reyes, in the process.150 The Is
raelis themselves have set several precedents, includ
ing the invasion of Lebanon in April 1982, intended to
destroy the PLO’s Fatahland in Southern Lebanon; the
July-August 2006 war against Hezbollah caused by an
ambush against an IDF patrol in Northern Israel; and
the December 2008-January 2009 campaign to cripple
Hamas in Gaza (Operation CAST LEAD), in response
to the latter’s rocket attacks on Sderot and other towns
in Southern Israel.151
Regime Change.
The final example involves an invasion to over
throw a government that either promotes terrorism
or provides a safe haven to terrorist groups. The only
two examples to date have both followed the 9/11
atrocities and the Bush administration’s declaration
of a War on Terror. The first involved the invasion of
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, and the support giv
en by U.S. and Coalition intelligence, air, and Special
Forces to the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
The latter became a target for regime change, because
it had sheltered al-Qaeda since mid-1996 and provid
ed it with a base of operations to conduct attacks on
U.S. targets up until 9/11. The Taliban leader, Mullah
Omar, refused U.S. demands to hand over al-Qaeda’s
leadership and close down its training camps, prin
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cipally because his regime depended not only on bin
Laden’s largesse, but also on the thousands of foreign
ers who had come to train in Afghanistan, providing
the Taliban with their most reliable and dedicated
troops organized within al-Qaeda’s 055 Brigade.152 This
was very much evident during the early phases of Op
eration ENDURING FREEDOM (October-December
2001), when a total of around 5,000 Arab, Pakistani,
and other foreign soldiers proved to be more effective
and dedicated fighters for the Taliban than native Af
ghans—who generally defected to the Coalition and
the Northern Alliance once it was apparent that the
latter would prevail.153
In much the same way that the PLO handicapped
itself in Lebanon in 1982 by organizing itself along
conventional military lines, thereby leaving itself to
be fixed and destroyed by the IDF, al-Qaeda fighters
in Afghanistan in October-November 2001 chose to
fight the Northern Alliance in positional warfare and
suffered heavy losses from U.S. air strikes directed
by Special Forces personnel liaising with indigenous
anti-Taliban forces.154 By December 2001, al-Qaeda
and its leadership had opted to disperse; hence, the
flight of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and an estimated 1,0001,500 fighters across the Afghan border into the FATA
during the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001.155
Al-Qaeda’s blunder in fighting on terms that favored
the American way of war should be noted, as it is ex
tremely rare for terrorists to fight on a footing which
favors regular militaries.
The second example is the Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia in December 2006, which was assisted by U.S.
air power. American Special Forces units from CJTFHOA were also apparently active in supporting Ethio
pian forces. The pretext for this invasion was the sup
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posed tolerance of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) for
al-Qaeda’s activities, a claim vigorously disputed by
the ICU itself. In much the same way that Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM led to U.S. and allied forces
being involved in a complex stabilization mission that
deteriorated into an insurgency against a resurgent
Taliban, Ethiopia’s intervention drew it into a debili
tating conflict in Somalia that lasted until it withdrew
its troops in January 2009.156 Both cases show the limi
tations of military force as a counterterrorist tool, dis
cussed in more detail in the next sections.
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERTERRORISM—
THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The previous section shows that in a variety of sce
narios, armed forces can be employed both to support
a state’s counterterrorist policies and also to provide
capabilities which civilian agencies (such as the police
and the intelligence services) may lack. For example,
with Operation FLAVIUS in March 1988, soldiers
from the 22SAS were sent to Gibraltar by the British
government because the local police force lacked the
trained personnel required to arrest the PIRA terror
ists, who were planning a bomb attack on the penin
sula. Military personnel often also have the physical
and psychological stamina needed to operate in hos
tile environments bereft of the comforts that Western
civilians take for granted, which makes them, and in
particular Special Forces operatives, a tempting asset
for policymakers envisaging a decisive strike against
overseas terrorist groups and sanctuaries.157
Given the can-do attitude that is a characteristic of
Western militaries, and also the fact that their person
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nel are prepared to endure considerable hardship and
risk to life and limb as part of their profession, there is
a clear temptation for governments to treat their armed
forces as a magic bullet for solving complex problems.
Yet, as the BBC journalist Hugh Sykes noted, the mili
tary often deals with symptoms, not causes, and the
same can be said of counterterrorism.158 There are sev
eral potential pitfalls of employing military means to
fight terrorism in the international arenas listed below.
Those dealing with domestic counterterrorism are ex
amined in the following section. These issues are often
interlinked and should not be considered in isolation.
Cooperation with Local Security Forces.
One of the first risks a state runs when providing
military personnel to assist allied forces in counterterrorist training is that its own soldiers can become
targets for attack. In February 2010, three U.S. ser
vicemen working with the Pakistani Frontier Corps
died in a bombing in the NWFP (two schoolgirls
were also killed in this attack).159 Second, the ability
of Western troops to interact effectively with indig
enous personnel can vary. American counterterrorist
cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) is facilitated by decades of contacts between
an Anglophone AFP and the U.S. armed forces. An
Economist journalist writing on this relationship noted
that American and Filipino service personnel regular
bonded off-duty over a few beers and a karaoke ses
sion, wryly observing that such a technique might not
work with Yemeni soldiers. AFRICOM’s exercise in
the Sahel in May 2010 (Operation FLINTLOCK) expe
rienced certain practical difficulties, most notably re
garding the fact that nearly all the African personnel
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involved were Francophone; the challenges of trans
lating remarks by U.S. instructors were compounded
by the difficulties in finding French phases for specific
military terms, such as “a contact.”160
Third, there are few guarantees that training mis
sions can prevent local security force personnel from
going rogue, or from conducting themselves in a man
ner that discredits both the host nation and its Western
ally (or allies). Operation MONOGRAM, the British
MOD’s program for training foreign armies in coun
terterrorist tactics, received negative press scrutiny
in July 2008 that focused on the Kenyan Army’s elite
unit, 20 Para. This British-trained formation has been
accused of numerous human rights abuses against ci
vilians in its operations against the Sabaot Land Defence Force, a militant group active near the Ugandan
border. For media critics, the abuses allegedly com
mitted by 20 Para were reminiscent of the atrocities
committed by the British colonial forces during the
Mau Mau uprising in Kenya of 1952-57.161
As Daniel Byman notes, the task of training indig
enous police and military forces to fight both terrorists
and insurgents is fraught with problems. States beset
by terrorism or guerrilla violence are in certain cases
poorly governed and administered, and local security
forces can be inadequately trained and equipped. A
lack of professionalism—not to mention the tendency
of some governments to coup-proof their regimes
by creating parallel paramilitary forces, dividing the
armed forces’ chain of command, or by promoting
commanders on the basis of loyalty rather than com
petence—means that Western military trainers are of
ten hampered in their efforts to establish professional
and effective security forces.162 There is also a risk that
elite units trained and funded by the United States
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and other Western countries might be used by auto
cratic governments to suppress dissent and to crush
political opposition. The former Pakistani military
dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, used U.S. aid in
tended to fight extremists in the FATA against insur
gents in Baluchistan. Funds that had been provided
to help the Pakistani Army against Islamist terrorists
were instead used to crush a nationalist movement
unconnected with al-Qaeda or the TTP. Regarding Ye
men and its own internal problems, the government
of President Al Abdullah Saleh is far more concerned
with the rebellion by the Houthi tribesmen and South
ern separatists than with AQAP. It is therefore likely
that U.S. and British assistance to the Yemeni security
forces will not actually be employed for the purposes
intended by the donors.163
The dilemma for Western governments is that
regional allies such as Pakistan and Uzbekistan are
perceived to be of such strategic importance that state
failure could have disastrous consequences for re
gional and international security; this is, of course, a
particularly frightening prospect in a nuclear-armed
Pakistan.164 This supposition is based on the debat
able proposition that these states are on the verge of
collapse. Furthermore, by funding and arming indig
enous security forces, external supporters become
automatically linked with human rights abuses and
atrocities committed by the former, thereby becom
ing the focus of both international criticism and local
resentment. President Karimov’s egregious despotism
and corruption is an affront to civilized values, but
Uzbekistan’s provision of host-nation logistical sup
port for the NATO mission in Afghanistan makes him
a necessary ally as far as Western governments are
concerned. Karimov also has leverage over his West
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ern sponsors, as demonstrated in the aftermath of the
Andijan massacre on May 13, 2005, in which hundreds
of anti-government demonstrators were gunned
down by his security forces. The Uzbek government
responded to State Department condemnation of this
atrocity by ordering American military personnel out
of the Karshi-Khanabad air base on July 29; the base
had been leased to the United States in the aftermath
of 9/11. Karimov showed the United States and other
Western powers that he was in a position to respond
to criticisms of his domestic record by hampering NA
TO’s war effort against the Taliban.165 It is therefore not
surprising that Western governments have continued
to tolerate Uzbekistan’s abominable human rights re
cord as the price to pay for its support for the troubled
mission in Afghanistan, and, indeed, U.S. defense co
operation with Tashkent was subsequently resumed
in early 2010.166
A further problem, common to COIN as well, is
that the security forces of local allies can become in
filtrated with terrorist sympathizers and informants,
not to mention various other undesirable elements.
During the British military occupation of Basra from
2003-09, the local police was heavily infiltrated by
militias and insurgents, and became a compromised
force heavily involved in organized crime, political
feuding, and anti-coalition attacks.167 A similar prob
lem affects U.S. and allied policy toward Pakistan, in
sofar as the Pakistani Army and its intelligence wing
(Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI]) have an unknown
number of personnel who support the ideology of the
Afghan Taliban and its Pakistani counterparts in the
FATA.168 The shortcomings of the Frontier Corps in
fighting the Taliban in the FATA became evident in
2006-07. Not only was this paramilitary force poorly
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trained and equipped, but many of its ethnic Pashtun
soldiers sympathized with the Taliban militants they
were fighting.169
Police training is often the weak link in Western
aid programs to indigenous security forces. It is the
police who provide a direct link with the population,
maintaining law and order and the writ of the govern
ment. They are of crucial importance in both COIN
and counterterrorism because they are familiar with
the local environment and provide a permanent pres
ence amongst the civilian population. Yet, as current
experience with the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the
Afghan National Police (ANP) shows, police training
is often a secondary priority to the training of local
militaries, despite the fact that it is as important to cre
ate an effective constabulary as it is to raise an army.
Furthermore, the culture/experience gap dividing
Western police advisors (and military police train
ers) from their indigenous recruits needs to be borne
in mind. A U.S. civil affairs officer noted with refer
ence to his experiences in Vietnam in 1973 that “[ce
ment] police weren’t able to advise rice-paddy cops,”
and these differences between developed and Third
World policing need to be considered in any program
training souq or arbakai cops today.170
Practicality.
In some scenarios, notably hostage rescue, coun
terterrorist operations can be thwarted by either a lack
of host-nation support or even by local authorities co
operating with the terrorists. A prime example was
the takeover of TWA Flight 847 on June 14, 1985, by
Hezbollah. U.S. efforts to free the hostages with a mil
itary operation became impossible once the hijacked
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plane landed in Beirut and the crew and passengers
were dispersed across the city.171 On December 25,
1999, Indian Airlines Flight 814 was hijacked by Har
kat ul-Mujadidin (HUM), a Pakistani group involved
in the Kashmiri insurgency, which also had close links
with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The plane was flown to
Kandahar, and the hijackers and their hostages were
guarded by the Taliban regime. A rescue mission was
therefore impossible, and so the Indian government
was forced to concede to HUM’s demands and re
lease its leader, Maulana Masud Azhar, and two other
members from prison.172
On April 24, 1980, the Carter administration at
tempted to send a rescue force to liberate the U.S.
diplomats held hostage by the Iranian revolutionary
regime following the embassy takeover on November
4, 1979. In retrospect, this was very much a “Mission:
Impossible,” and its failure had more to do with the
sheer scale of the challenge faced by the planners than
any shortcomings within the U.S. military. Opera
tion EAGLE CLAW involved flying a combined Delta
Force/U.S. Army Ranger group 1,500 kilometers from
Masirah air-base in Oman to a clandestine location in
Iran (known as Desert One). U.S. military command
ers rejected bases in Turkey for fear that the Soviets
might pick up the helicopter and C130 flights by radar
and alert the revolutionary regime. The rescue force
was then to drive and helicopter to Tehran to storm
the embassy and free the captives, making its escape
from the Iranian capital right under the noses of the lo
cal security forces, not to mention the various militias
that had emerged in the aftermath of Ayatollah Kho
meini’s seizure of power. As one Delta Force officer
quipped, the only difference between Operation EA
GLE CLAW and the Alamo was that “Davy Crockett
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didn’t have to fight his way in.” The attempted rescue
mission was aborted by President Jimmy Carter while
it was assembling at Desert One, and eight U.S. ser
vicemen were killed when a helicopter collided with
a C130. Yet it can be argued that the Americans were
lucky; if Carter had not aborted Operation EAGLE
CLAW, there could well have been catastrophically
high casualties among the commandos and also the
embassy staff. The harsh fact was that nothing short of
a full-scale military invasion of Iran, with all the dip
lomatic and political consequences involved, could
have worked, and even in this instance it is likely that
the Iranians would have murdered their captives well
before they could have been rescued.173
Even in cases where host governments are not col
laborating with terrorists, petty politics can hamper
hostage rescue missions. During the Munich crisis of
September 5, 1972, the Federal German government
rejected Israeli appeals to send a Sayeret Maktal team
to free the athletes held by the BSO, relying instead
on the Bavarian police. While the Israeli army Special
Forces had one successful hostage rescue mission to
their credit (with the storming of Sabena Flight 571 at
Lod airport on May 9, 1972), the Bavarian state police
had no counterterrorist experience whatsoever. The
grisly consequences of this decision were seen on the
runway of Furstenfeldbruck the following morning.
On November 23, 1985, the ANO hijacked EgyptAir
Flight 648 en route from Athens to Cairo, diverting
the plane to Luqa Airport, Malta. The Maltese gov
ernment turned down American offers to send Delta
Force to storm the plane, pleading neutrality, and
turned instead to its Egyptian counterpart, Force 777.
The Egyptian commandos bungled the November
25th rescue mission, provoking a firefight in which
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56 out of 88 passengers were killed.174 In both cases,
a high price was paid for observing political niceties.
Retaliatory missions can also be unfeasible if state
sponsors are strong enough to escalate in response.
For example, throughout the Cold War it was impos
sible for Western countries or Israel to take any action
against the USSR or other Warsaw Pact states (such
as the GDR or Czechoslovakia) that offered assistance
to the PLO or to far-left European terrorist groups.
Iran’s implicit threat to unleash Hezbollah, Hamas,
and other proxies, not to mention to increase assis
tance to anti-Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan,
is such that the United States, Israel, and other Euro
pean countries are unwilling to use military means to
coerce Tehran.175 As noted below, the Indians face a
similar problem regarding Pakistan’s sponsorship of
groups (such as LET and HUM) involved since 1989
in the insurgency in Kashmir.
Military Reluctance.
A further obstacle to the involvement of armed
forces in counterterrorism is the unwillingness of
military chiefs to become involved. For example, after
the U.S. Marine barracks bombing in Beirut in October
1983, the U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger,
with the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
barred retaliatory strikes against IR positions in the
Bekaa Valley. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War,
and following the adoption of an all-volunteer force in
1973, the U.S. Army focused its training, organization,
and doctrine on the challenges of interstate warfare
(with the USSR and Warsaw Pact until the end of the
Cold War, and then with potential adversaries such as
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea from 1990). Counterterror
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ism, alongside other missions such as peacekeeping
and COIN, has been traditionally viewed by the U.S.
military hierarchy as a distraction from missions more
important to the national interest.176 Even in the post
9/11 environment, there is still a pronounced concern
among U.S. Army officers that a force which focuses
too much on fighting irregular foes will lose the ability
to fight so-called proper wars, and that the U.S. mili
tary risks a disastrous defeat if called upon to wage
a conventional war against a state-based adversary.177
During the Clinton administration, the JCS proved
to be particularly reluctant warriors. The chiefs repeat
edly provided a negative response to White House
queries about the feasibility of sending U.S. Special
Forces units to capture bin Laden in Afghanistan dur
ing 1998-99, stating that such raids were militarily im
possible. The chiefs were correct in this assessment;
operations in Afghanistan since October 2001 show
that such military operations cannot be conducted
without the support of neighboring powers, and with
out a massive commitment in terms of manpower and
logistical resources. However, critics of the JCS argued
that the military hierarchy was also affected by an ex
cessive timidity concerning losses (deemed the “body
bag” mentality), and also the widespread distrust
and dislike for the Clinton administration within the
U.S. armed forces. The failure of the Somalia peace
keeping mission from 1992-93 impressed upon the JCS
the suspicion that the White House would order them
into ill-defined, insufficiently resourced, and compli
cated tasks, and would dodge responsibility if mis
sions went awry and military personnel were killed.178
Although the British armed forces have a more
sustained record of involvement in counterterrorism,
not to mention COIN, there is also evident disquiet
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within the UK’s military hierarchy concerning the cur
rent operational focus on the War on Terror. Prior to
his retirement, former head of the British Army Gen
eral Sir Richard Dannatt suggested that Afghanistan
and other commitments may sap the Army’s ability
to conduct high-intensity military operations and ma
neuver warfare. The Royal Navy is also concerned that
its current involvement in anti-piracy and Operation
ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR-type missions may result in
“skills fade,” particularly in areas of maritime warfare
relevant to interstate conflict such as antisubmarine
warfare.179
“Pin-Pricks”—The Perception of Ineffectiveness.
Retaliatory strikes may have a counterproduc
tive effect if they are judged—not least by the targets
themselves—to be ineffective. Operation INFINITE
REACH failed to kill bin Laden, and therefore en
abled the latter to present himself to fellow Muslims
as someone who had defied a superpower and sur
vived the consequences.180 For its part, the U.S. media
automatically linked the cruise missile strikes on Af
ghanistan and Sudan with Clinton’s forthcoming im
peachment by Congress over his affair with Monica
Lewinsky. Operation INFINITE REACH was greeted
by comparisons with a Hollywood satire in which a
fictional President, beset by a sex scandal, concocts
an artificial war to distract media attention and to ex
ploit the patriotic response from the American pub
lic. When Secretary of Defense William Cohen faced
a press conference after the missile strikes, one of the
first questions asked was whether President Clinton
had been inspired by the film, Wag the Dog.181
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Clinton did recognize that the use of precision
weapons would be interpreted not as discrimination,
but as cowardice, by bin Laden and his followers. The
apparent unwillingness of Americans to risk the lives
of troops in raids on al-Qaeda camps contributed to
bin Laden’s propaganda claims that the United States
was weak, and that its soldiers lacked the courage to
fight. Conscious of this potential reaction, Clinton ap
parently cornered Chairman of the JCS General Hugh
Shelton after a National Security Council (NSC) meet
ing on August 17, 1998, (following the decision to
launch Operation INFINITE REACH) to suggest the
following:
Hugh, what I think would scare the shit out of these
al-Qaeda guys more than any cruise missile . . . would
be the sight of U.S. commandos, Ninja guys in black
suits, jumping out of helicopters into their camps,
spraying machine guns. Even if we don’t get the big
guys, it will have a good effect.182

Clinton’s unfamiliarity with the practicalities of
military operations is evident here, but he also dis
played a fairly accurate understanding of his enemies’
psyche.
Related weaknesses can be identified in military
operations on the ground, sometimes as a conse
quence of inflated expectations and government spin.
Following the clash between U.S. forces and al-Qaeda
fighters in Operation ANACONDA in March 2002, a
multinational task force was sent into Southeastern Af
ghanistan (Operation JACANA) the following month,
its mission being to “destroy the terrorist infrastruc
ture in South-East Afghanistan.” The bulk of this force
came from 45 Commando Royal Marines, and prior to
JACANA, the British government informed the media
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that a major battle was imminent. The failure of the
Royal Marines to actually confront al-Qaeda fighters
in combat was therefore treated by the press as evi
dence that the mission was a failure, notwithstanding
the fact that al-Qaeda retreated and denied 45 Com
mando a chance to engage and destroy them.183
The third Israeli invasion of Lebanon from July
13-August 14, 2006, also highlighted the problem
of inflated expectations. It was counterproductive
not merely because of the civilian casualties caused
by IDF air strikes (these, apparently, involved 1,191
killed and 4,409 injured), but also because the aircentric campaign was treated by Hezbollah’s propa
ganda as evidence of Israeli unwillingness to fight the
IR face-to-face. IDF Chief of Staff Air Force Lieutenant
General Dan Halutz contributed further damage to
the Israeli war effort by proclaiming that air strikes
alone would destroy Hezbollah’s missile sites and
cripple the IR. In fact, Israeli ground troops had to be
committed on July 23 to engage Hezbollah’s fighters
in close-quarter combat. Although the IR apparently
lost around 500 dead (to 121 IDF personnel), Hezbol
lah hailed the outcome of the conflict as a “divine and
strategic victory,” with Sheikh Hasan Nasrallah gloat
ing about “the Zionists’ failure to defeat us.”184 On the
Israeli side, there was widespread public criticism
of Ehud Olmert’s government, reflecting the general
view that Israel had lost because of its failure to de
stroy the IR. The Lebanon war was therefore judged
by regional opinion to have damaged the credibility of
Israel’s deterrence strategy, and to have had the same
effect on Hezbollah as the Karameh clash of February
15, 1968, (an indecisive and costly IDF cross-border
raid into Jordan that gave its target, Fatah, wider re
gional prestige for standing up to “the Zionists”).
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The “Bully Effect”—The Ethical Aspect of a Military Response.
Paradoxically, military retaliation can also arouse
international and domestic criticism, and claims that
the states involved are resorting to disproportionate
and indiscriminate violence. This partly arises from the
problems involved in acquiring accurate intelligence
identifying the perpetrators of any terrorist atrocity,
not to mention their sponsors, and then of using such
information to justify a retaliatory strike. With Opera
tion EL DORADO CANYON in April 1986, the United
States could not reveal that it could link Libyan intel
ligence to the West Berlin disco bombing through SI
GINT intercepts, so air strikes on Libya were regarded
even by U.S. NATO allies, with the exception of the
UK, as unjustified. This problem becomes a more sig
nificant one for democratic states if there are substan
tial civilian casualties, which almost invariably occur
as a consequence of retaliatory operations.185
The Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) stress that
states do have a right to resort to military action
(known as jus ad bellum), provided that in the process
they can demonstrate just cause (notably the require
ments of self defense: lawful authority; right intention;
that they act in proportion to the injury received; have
a reasonable chance of success; and are using force
as a last resort. An examination of the U.S. attack on
Afghanistan shows how contentious these principles
are in practice. The Bush administration could claim
just cause because al-Qaeda had attacked the United
States, and the Taliban were complicit insofar as they
had granted it a sanctuary in Afghanistan and consid
erable influence over the country. The Americans had
no United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolu
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tion endorsing Operation ENDURING FREEDOM,
but acted with the implicit approval of fellow per
manent members of the Security Council, and indeed
nearly all United Nations (UN) member states. The
UNSC had already issued a resolution (SCR1267) on
October 15, 1999, demanding that the Taliban cease
assisting and sheltering al-Qaeda, and the passage
of SCR1373 on September 28, 2001, and SCR1378 on
November 14, 2001, implicitly legitimized the U.S.-led
effort to overthrow Mullah Omar’s regime. Although
some governments insist that Article 51 only applies
to attacks from states, in the case of Afghanistan there
was a near-universal consensus that al-Qaeda and the
Taliban were de facto aggressors after 9/11.186
Critics argue that war was not a last resort because
the Bush administration did not engage in a diplo
matic alternative, such as to persuade the Taliban to
hand over bin Laden for trial. Proponents of military
action convincingly argue that such an effort would
have been futile given the dependence of Mullah
Omar’s regime on al-Qaeda, and that supposed Tali
ban attempts to negotiate with the United States prior
to October 7, 2001, constituted a cynical effort to play
for time. U.S. diplomats had, after all, repeatedly tried
to persuade the Taliban to give up bin Laden before
9/11, and the Taliban’s response to President Bush’s
demands to hand over al-Qaeda’s leadership and
close its training camps were a repetition of the bad
faith and equivocations Mullah Omar’s envoys had
offered over the past 3 years.187 Right intention can
be judged to be in contention with proportionality; if
the latter is considered to be more important than the
former, then the Afghan civilian losses caused by the
war outweigh the intention of the United States and
its allies to remove al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and to
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promote a post-Taliban government, which is repre
sentative of all ethnic groups and can maintain peace
and security within Afghanistan’s borders. As for the
question of whether the U.S.-led intervention had a
reasonable chance of success, the insurgency by a re
vived Taliban movement is considered by critics of the
war as proof that the United States, Britain, and other
states involved in the conflict had no justification for
thinking that a successful outcome was feasible. An
alternative argument is that it was the Western Coali
tion’s objectives, such as democratization, rather than
the intervention which lacked feasibility.188
Critics of military reprisals—whether govern
ments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or
the media—can employ double standards. Both the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 2006 and the Gaza war
of December 2008-January 2009 aroused international
condemnation of the casualties that ensued (with ref
erence to the latter, Palestinian sources claimed that
926 civilians were killed), not to mention frequent
allegations of IDF war crimes. In contrast, the latter
phases of the Sri Lankan Army offensive against the
LTTE in May 2009 attracted far less censure. The UN’s
Human Rights Council was vocal about the former,
but made no complaint about the latter.189 The Israeli
government also issued furious protests when the Hu
man Rights Council’s Fact Finding Mission, chaired by
the South African Judge Richard Goldstone, issued its
report on September 15, 2009, claiming that the report
placed insufficient emphasis on Hamas’s own conduct
during the Gaza war.190
Certain claims about the humanitarian conse
quences of retaliatory strikes also need to be examined
with care. Chomsky asserts that the U.S. cruise mis
sile strike on the al-Shifa plant in Sudan on August
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20 destroyed half of that country’s pharmaceutical
supplies, and that this “one bombing, according to
the estimates made by the German Embassy in Sudan
and Human Rights Watch (HRW), probably led to
tens of thousands of deaths.” In fact, neither the HRW
nor the German diplomatic service had produced any
such estimates. Chomsky also failed to explain how
any source could produce such a precise assessment
on civilian losses within a state which, at the time he
was writing, was still undergoing a bloody civil war.191
A further example involves the IDF operation to clear
the West Bank town of Jenin of Palestinian militants
in response to a series of suicide bombings in Israel
(April 2-11, 2002). Palestinian claims that the Israeli
military were involved in a wholesale slaughter of
hundreds of civilians continue to circulate on the In
ternet, despite an HRW report showing that this mas
sacre did not take place.192
One of the first problems with military strikes in
volves the utility of intelligence. The Clinton adminis
tration targeted the al-Shifa plant as part of Operation
INFINITE REACH because of inaccurate intelligence
indicating that it was owned by bin Laden, and that
chemical weapons were being produced there. At the
NSC meeting on August 17, 1998, opinions were evi
dently swayed when Clinton’s National Security Ad
visor, Sandy Berger, asked “What if we do not hit [the
al-Shifa factory] and then, after an attack, nerve gas
is released in the New York City subway? What will
we say then?”193 The Israeli record of retaliatory raids
into the Palestinian territories and the West Bank, not
to mention the closing phases of the Sri Lankan civil
war and the MACP examples discussed subsequently,
also illustrate the severe challenges of identifying and
targeting terrorists and militants who fight from with
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in the midst of a wider civilian population.194 As with
COIN in general, if armed forces kill large numbers
of irregular adversaries, but also cause substantial ci
vilian losses, then this military success is ultimately a
counterproductive one, since it can mobilize popular
support toward the insurgent/terrorist cause.
A final issue here, particularly evident regarding
the Gaza war, is the issue of proportionality. The UN
Human Rights Council and NGOs such as HRW as
serted that the IDF campaign against Hamas (Opera
tion CAST LEAD) was a disproportionate response,
and essentially involved the collective punishment of
the 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza. The Israeli govern
ment’s response was that it was obliged to act in selfdefense, as Hamas and other militant groups were fir
ing Qassam rockets from Gaza at civilians in Southern
Israel. The Israelis also acted on the basis that a strictly
proportionate response to the Qassams—namely, re
prisal air or ground raids on suspected launch sites—
would not deter continued attacks against their peo
ple.195 A proportionate response would therefore be
less effective than an overwhelming military response
that forced the Hamas leadership into stopping Qas
sam strikes against Southern Israel. Given the reduced
rate of rocket attacks from Gaza in the aftermath of
Operation CAST LEAD, Israeli officials can claim that
(in the short term) the IDF assault on Hamas was actu
ally an effective response.196
Political Sensitivities.
Military action can be blocked by wider political
considerations, as demonstrated by the U.S. Govern
ment’s repeated efforts between August 1998 and
September 2001 to kill bin Laden with a cruise missile
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strike. The task was already a complicated one because
intelligence on the al-Qaeda leader’s whereabouts
was time-sensitive, and because of the time period re
quired for the Tomahawk missiles on U.S. Navy sub
marines to be prepared for firing. On at least two occa
sions in 1999, the order to strike was not given by the
Clinton administration for fear of substantial civilian
casualties amongst Afghans. Reports of a desert camp
being constructed were received by Washington, DC,
in February 1999, and initial CIA assessments were
that it was being prepared for bin Laden. However,
the CIA subsequently received reports that the camp
was for some princes from the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) present in Afghanistan on a hunting trip. Rath
er than taking the risk of missing bin Laden—while
incinerating members of the royal family of an allied
power—the Clinton administration decided to abort
the planned strike.197
Fears of military retaliation may block internation
al cooperation against terrorism. One example was
Riyadh’s response to the Khobar Towers bombing
of June 25, 1996, that killed 19 American servicemen.
The attack was linked to an Iranian-supported group
recruited from the kingdom’s Shia minority; yet the
Saudi authorities refused to assist the FBI’s investiga
tion into the attack, apparently for fear that the United
States, once it had proof of Tehran’s complicity, would
launch reprisal attacks on Iran.198
In the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. drone strikes in the
Middle East and Pakistan have had profound politi
cal implications. While regional governments may
privately sanction and, in the case of the Pakistanis,
actually provide base rights and intelligence to the
Americans, the popular reaction to UAV attacks
places U.S. allies under severe pressure. The Yemeni
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government acquiesced in the strike that killed Qaid
al-Harithi in November 2002, up until the point where
then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld publicly
announced the U.S. role in his death; once American
involvement was no longer plausibly deniable, the re
gime in Sanaa was forced by Yemeni public opinion
to condemn the UAV strike. The reported killing of
Rashid Rauf in a drone attack on November 21, 2008,
also caused problems for Anglo-American relations.
Rauf, wanted in connection with the thwarted plot to
bomb transatlantic airliners in August 2006, had Brit
ish citizenship, and reports of his death were greeted
with considerable unease by the Labour government,
which was conscious of the hostile reaction that UAV
attacks in the FATA arouses among the one million
British citizens of Pakistani descent.199 The Pakistani
government, for its part, faced popular resentment
that the country has been dragged into “Washington’s
war.” Pakistani civilian and military officials are also
becoming increasingly hostile toward Western accusa
tions that they are not doing enough to fight terrorism,
most notably with reference to the Afghan Taliban’s
havens in Pakistan, pointing out that Pakastani armed
forces have suffered thousands of casualties in their
war against the TTP.200
Diplomatic Consequences.
Specific military measures may be treated by other
states as a threat to their own national interests and
can cause diplomatic implications. The establishment
of AFRICOM as a U.S. military regional command
has aroused a generally wary response from African
states, hence the fact that its headquarters is still based
in Stuttgart, Germany. Nigerian officials suspect that
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it is a means of undercutting their country’s regional
influence, while the South African government has
expressed concerns that AFRICOM will destabilize
the continent by embroiling it in the War on Terror,
thereby undermining the African Union. Academic
critics also portray AFRICOM as a Trojan Horse for
U.S. neocolonialism, and as a cover for its commercial,
economic, and strategic competition with China and
other powers that are developing their own stake in
exploiting the continent’s resources.201
Some of the sensitivity surrounding AFRICOM
can be seen with Operation FLINTLOCK. U.S. officials
were quick to deny claims that the exercise had more
to do with satisfying American objectives—notably re
connaissance for future intervention missions in West
Africa—than with the training requirements of the Af
rican troops involved. Algeria refused to take part in
Operation FLINTLOCK and has made its own efforts
to combat AQIM with regional partners, including the
establishment of a joint military command with Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger based at Tamanrasset. Algerian
suspicions of U.S. intentions in the region may prove
to be a significant barrier to multilateral cooperation
against AQIM.202
U.S. military assistance to the former Soviet repub
lics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan also carries
with it significant diplomatic risks, given not only the
authoritarian nature of the regimes concerned, but the
fact that all three states are embroiled in intractable
disputes over territory and separatism—Armenia and
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia with the
self-declared republics of South Ossetia and Abkha
zia (both backed by Moscow, with the former being
the casus belli of the war of August 2008). American
training and equipment may therefore be employed
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by its recipients in these frozen conflicts, rather than
for counterterrorism.203
Even in a domestic context, military action can
affect relations with neighbors, particularly if troops
cross international borders either accidentally or
as part of a policy of hot pursuit. During Operation
BANNER, the poorly demarcated border between the
UK and Eire led to a series of Anglo-Irish squabbles
arising whenever the Irish police (Garda Siochana) and
armed forces discovered British troops on the wrong
side of the frontier. These incidents generally arose
from navigational errors, notably when two carloads
of plain-clothes soldiers from 22SAS were arrested by
the Garda on May 5, 1976, but they also aroused suspi
cions on both sides of the border that British assassina
tion squads were slipping across the border to murder
PIRA suspects living in the Irish Republic.204 Accord
ing to BBC journalist Mark Urban, a major incident
was narrowly avoided during the late 1970s when a
patrol of British paratroopers was landed in error by
an RAF helicopter within Eire, and almost ended up in
a firefight with the Irish Army. If Urban’s story is true,
it represented a rare lapse in the cooperative, albeit
discreet, relationship between the police and military
forces that both states developed from the early 1970s
onward. Close Anglo-Irish cross-border contacts en
sured that accidental British incursions did not have
wider political repercussions on bilateral relations.205
With Operation BANNER, the British government
was dealing with a counterpart with which it had gen
erally friendly relations. The same could not be said
with Turkey and the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG) in Northern Iraq. During the 1990s, when Iraqi
Kurdistan emerged as a de facto independent state,
the PKK used Northern Iraq as a sanctuary in its mili
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tary campaign against the Turkish state, and the Turk
ish military conducted cross-border reprisal raids in
1995 and 1999. In the aftermath of the Anglo-Ameri
can invasion of Iraq (March-April 2003), the Turkish
General Staff and nationalist politicians feared that
the KRG would secede from the Iraqi state and pro
vide the focus for a successful Kurdish secessionist
campaign in Southeastern Turkey. The existence of
PKK bases in Northern Iraq was therefore not only a
source of tension between Ankara and Irbil, but also
had a negative impact on U.S.-Turkish relations. The
Kurdish question had the potential to destroy Wash
ington’s relationship with one of its key regional al
lies, and when the Turks launched air strikes against
PKK sites in Iraq in December 2007—followed by a
land offensive with 10,000 troops (Operation SUN) in
February 2008—Iraqi Kurdish politicians publicly de
clared that the Turkish General Staff’s real intention
was to crush the KRG, not the PKK. Since Operation
SUN, the KRG’s efforts to persuade Turkey that it has
no pan-Kurdish agenda have eased tensions, although
the PKK problem still has a potentially destabilizing
effect on the quadrilateral relationship between Wash
ington, Ankara, Baghdad, and Irbil.206
Making a Bad Situation Worse.
The decision to resort to military retaliation, either
against terrorists located in a weak but friendly state,
or against a state sponsor, can have destabilizing con
sequences. The IDF’s strike against the BSO in Beirut
in April 1973 helped intensify the communal tensions
in Lebanon at that time. The Palestinians suspected
the Christian-dominated government of conniving in
the Sayeret Maktal’s commando raid. This operation
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was therefore one of many factors that contributed to
the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war 2 years later.
Israeli military intervention in 1982 also contributed
to intercommunal and sectarian violence in Lebanon;
the most damning example being the IDF’s role in fa
cilitating the Phalangist militia’s bloody assault on the
Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Chatilla in Sep
tember of that year. While Sabra and Chatilla was one
of many atrocities committed by the warring factions
during the Lebanese civil war (for which their Syrian,
Iranian, Iraqi, and Libyan sponsors remain complicit),
Menachem Begin’s Israeli government was justifiably
pilloried by domestic and international opinion for al
lowing this massacre to occur.207
Aside from one Special Forces raid into South Wa
ziristan on September 3, 2008, the Americans have
avoided ground attacks across the Afghan border into
the FATA, recognizing that these may well lead to a
furious backlash in Pakistan, if not to clashes between
U.S. and Pakistani troops.208 President Obama has,
however, continued his predecessor’s policy of or
dering Predator strikes in FATA, and firm figures on
militant and civilian losses are difficult to obtain. Esti
mates vary from between 14 members of al-Qaeda and
687 Pakistani civilians killed between January 2006
and April 2009, to 865 al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban
killed (for the loss of an additional 95 civilians) during
the same period. A recent BBC estimate lists a total of
700 fatalities in UAV strikes (without differentiating
between militants and civilians) since January 2009,
and a further 1,800 deaths caused by militant attacks
across Pakistan during the same period.209
The following points are worth noting: First, drone
attacks have killed a number of significant militant
leaders between August 2009 and July 2010, including
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Baitullah Mehsud, Tahir Yuldashev (the leader of the
IMU), Hussein al-Yemeni (the alleged plotter of the
suicide bomb attack against a CIA outpost in Khost
on December 31, 2009), and Saeed al-Masri (the com
mander of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan), although claims
that the current TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud was
killed in February 2010 have been proven false. Sec
ond, it is impossible to independently distinguish
between militant and civilian casualties after a strike
because TTP fighters cordon off the scene of any at
tack. The FATA is also in this respect an extremely
dangerous environment for any Western or Pakistani
journalist or NGO activist trying to investigate the ef
fects of drone strikes. Third, the Pakistani researcher
Farhat Taj argues that Predator attacks are privately
condoned by many Pashtun tribesmen, since they
eliminate militants who have imposed a reign of terror
across the FATA; the disadvantage being that the TTP
and al-Qaeda are swift to hunt down and execute sus
pected informants after each UAV strike. But it is also
evident that beyond the FATA, Predator attacks cause
fierce resentment within Pakistani public opinion and
have also led the TTP and its allies to increase their
attacks against the authorities and the security forces,
which they view as complicit in U.S. drone strikes. The
challenge for American policymakers is to balance the
tactical benefits of eliminating senior militants in the
FATA with the strategic problem of ensuring Islam
abad’s continued engagement in a struggle against the
TTP, which has led to several thousand military and
civilian casualties (the latter arising mainly from sui
cide bombings which have intensified since the Paki
stani Army’s offensive into the FATA). While the vast
majority of Pakistanis have no sympathy for the Tali
ban, they are also sensitive to the civilian losses and
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infringements of sovereignty that drone strikes entail;
thus the United States risks beating the TTP and other
Islamist militants in an unpopularity contest.210
The Predator strikes raise a further dilemma con
cerning the efficacy of decapitation attacks aimed at a
terrorist group’s leadership. While military and civil
ian bureaucracies may run the risk of mirror-imaging
in assuming that the death or incapacitation of key
leaders in a terrorist organization will have a crippling
effect on the latter’s operations, groups facing a com
bination of police and military pressure may adopt
a more horizontal organizational structure in order
to survive. Al-Qaeda has clearly become more net
worked and less hierarchical as a result of Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM, which removed its Afghan
sanctuary, not to mention global cooperation between
police and intelligence services to neutralize its opera
tives worldwide. But as a consequence, bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri have sacrificed their capability to
control and direct the various branches of al-Qaeda
worldwide. The most immediate by-product has been
the series of atrocities against Muslims, such as those
committed by AQI in Iraq since 2003, which have out
raged Islamic opinion and caused a backlash against
bin Laden and his cause.211
The Russians faced a problem similar to that of the
Americans with FATA, involving the Pankisi Gorge
in Georgia. The local population has ethnic ties with
the Chechens, and the Gorge is described by Moscow
as a sanctuary for Chechen separatists and a conduit
for assistance to the insurgency in Chechnya itself.
The Georgian government rejected Russian demands
to station troops in Pankisi, and in the summer of
2002 the Russians threatened to invade. From Tblisi’s
perspective, Russia’s counterterrorist policy regard
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ing the Pankisi provides a pretext for the continued
coercion of Georgia, and persistent efforts to dictate
the terms of Georgian foreign policy and to force the
country to remain within the Russian sphere of influ
ence. The quarrel over Pankisi is not the sole cause of
Russo-Georgian tensions, but it contributed to the de
cline in relations between Moscow and Tblisi, leading
to war in August 2008.212
Military action can also have calamitous conse
quences if it is directed against the wrong target. This
point is amply demonstrated by the manner in which
the Bush administration exploited 9/11 to settle scores
with Saddam Hussein, but also by the second Israeli
invasion of Lebanon in April 1982. Begin and his Defence Minister, Ariel Sharon, used the attempted as
sassination of the Israeli ambassador to London by
the ANO as the pretext for destroying the PLO. When
Israeli Chief of Staff General Rafel Eitan was told by
subordinates that the terrorists who shot Argov be
longed to a group that loathed Arafat and Fatah, his
intemperate response was as follows, “Abu Nidal?
Abu Shmidal! They’re all PLO!” The Israeli interven
tion may have destroyed the PLO’s power in Lebanon,
but it came at the cost of damaging the Jewish state’s
international reputation, and also led to the creation
of a more dangerous enemy in the form of Hezbollah
and the IR.213
Military operations against state sponsors are usu
ally intended to coerce the target into ceasing its assis
tance to terrorist groups, or its instigation of attacks,
but does coercion work? Defenders of retaliatory
policy can point to the Clinton administration’s re
sponse to an Iraqi plot to kill former President George
H. W. Bush during a visit to Kuwait in April 1993. On
June 26, the United States destroyed Iraqi intelligence
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headquarters with a volley of Tomahawk missiles.
Saddam Hussein had been a persistent sponsor of ter
rorist organizations, notably the ANO and PLF, dur
ing the 1980s, but after the June 1993 missile strikes, he
apparently curtailed his support for such groups. In
contrast, Operation EL DORADO CANYON probably
inspired Gaddafi to order the Lockerbie bombing of
December 22, 1988, which killed 270 people, as an act
of revenge.214
Escalation.
Reprisal raids can lead to interstate war, with the
onus for such an outcome being shared by the state
sponsor and the retaliating power. IDF attacks against
the Fedayeen in Egypt during the early 1950s contribut
ed to the worsening of tensions that preceded the Sinai
war of October 1956. The Samu incident of November
1966, in which Israeli and Jordanian forces clashed fol
lowing an IDF cross-border attack against Fatah, had
a wider diplomatic impact, which led to the Six Day
War from June 5-10, 1967.215 A similar danger of escala
tion exists in Indo-Pakistani relations, particularly be
cause of Pakistani sponsorship of groups like LET and
HUM, who are involved in the Kashmir conflict and
have launched attacks on India itself. Since May 1998,
both India and Pakistan are declared nuclear powers,
and a major terrorist incident on Indian soil has the
potential to provoke a disastrous military confronta
tion. It was because of this that General Anthony Zin
ni, the then-commander in chief of U.S. Central Com
mand (CENTCOM), telephoned Pakistani Chief of
Staff General Jehangir Karamat on August 20, 1998, to
inform him of the decision to launch Operation INFI
NITE REACH; U.S. officials feared that the Pakistanis
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would pick up Tomahawks bound for Afghan targets
on their radar, assume that it was an Indian preemp
tive strike, and retaliate.216
The potential for war reemerged on December
13, 2001, when five terrorists from Jaish e-Mohamed
(a Pakistani-backed group) launched a suicide bomb
and gun attack on the Lok Sabha (the lower House of
Parliament) in New Delhi. This attempt to slaughter
Indian parliamentarians outraged public and political
opinion and led to the massing of the Indian armed
forces on the border with Pakistan, meeting a similar
response from Islamabad. From December 2001 to
October 2002, both countries were poised for confron
tation, which was mitigated only by American diplo
matic mediation.217 The Mumbai attack of November
2008 also provoked popular demands within India
for retaliation, although both the Indian and Paki
stani governments managed to avoid a major crisis.
Nonetheless, the possibility of a subcontinental Sara
jevo—of a terrorist outrage provoking a cataclysmic
Indo-Pakistani war—still exists. Indeed, it is likely
that the Lok Sabha raid was intended by its instiga
tors to provoke a major crisis, forcing Pakistan to send
troops away from the FATA toward India, assisting
the escape of al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters from the
Coalition offensive in Afghanistan. The Mumbai at
tack may likewise have been intended by its LET in
stigators to cause a crisis that would see the removal
of Pakistani Army units from the Afghan to the Indian
border, thereby reducing the threat posed to the TTP
and other allied groups.218
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The Price of Intervention.
As demonstrated by the Israeli occupation of
Southern Lebanon from 1982-2000 and NATO’s cur
rent predicament in Afghanistan, a retaliatory or
regime-change mission may lead to a prolonged oc
cupation and the involvement of military forces in a
debilitating and controversial struggle against insur
gents. The Iraq war and current NATO operations in
Afghanistan are also contributing to a growing sense
among European and, to a lesser extent, U.S. public
opinion that military intervention is in itself a source
of insecurity, insofar as such operations alienate Is
lamic opinion, inciting Muslims in Western countries
into committing atrocities such as the Madrid train
station bombings of March 2004, and the July 7, 2005
(7/7) bombings in London.219 While these perceptions
may not be strictly accurate—the process of radicaliza
tion in Britain and other Western countries preceded
the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq—they are
nonetheless prevalent. Such concerns, in conjunction
with public disquiet over military losses, may compel
the British and other allied governments into with
drawing their forces from Afghanistan, in much the
same way as Israeli public opinion over the losses the
IDF sustained in Southern Lebanon contributed to its
withdrawal on May 24, 2000.220
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT IN COUNTERTERRORISM—
THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT
Turning to the internal dimension of military inter
vention in counterterrorism, it is important to stress
that democracy rests on the idea that governance is
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based on the consent of the majority and that any po
litical disputes are resolved nonviolently. If changes
to the political or socioeconomic order are required to
address popular discontent, then these need to be af
fected incrementally, and by consensus on the process
of reform, and not by either the application of violence
from below (in the form of an insurrection) or above
(in the form of an authoritarian coup). The ability to
debate, to reason, and ultimately to persuade is a key
feature of liberal democratic politics, as is a clear and
understandable distaste for those who use intimida
tion and the application of force to achieve their objec
tives. The norms of democracy also stress the impor
tance of the rule of law, that governments are bound
by an implicit social contract with the governed, and
that the worst crime a state’s rulers can commit is to
abuse the authority vested in them by the electoral
process, and to turn governance by consent and re
sponsibility into rule by fear.221
All of this means that the use of military means
to fight domestic terrorism is fraught with political,
practical, and ethical problems. No democratic politi
cian should feel completely comfortable with the idea
that the task of fighting terrorism should be entrusted
to an organized body of men and women who are
conditioned to the idea of using violence—albeit in a
controlled and discriminate manner—to achieve set
objectives, who adhere to principles of hierarchy and
chain-of-command, and who are accustomed to the
idea of identifying an enemy and planning and con
ducting a sequence of actions aimed at its destruction.
The contradiction between democratic politics and
the military ethos should be recognized. While it is
dangerous to assume that the latter is superior to the
former and also naïve to assume that democracy can
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survive against internal and external threats without
any means of defense, the contradiction between the
norms of the liberal democratic state and military re
alities is a key theme in this section. Students of civilmilitary relations in democracies recognize that the
friction between the frock coats and the brass mani
fests itself in warfare against state-based adversar
ies.222 The same is true of democracies beset by armed
and lethally inclined internal enemies as well.
Resources.
A key question that governments need to ask is
whether their armed forces actually have the assets
and manpower needed to make a valid contribution
to a counterterrorist campaign. A prime example is
offered in the UK’s case by the CCRF, the formation
of which was announced in the MOD’s Strategic Defence Review: New Chapter (2002). As of December 31,
2003, the CCRF officially consisted of 14 regional units
500-strong, nominally drawn from the Royal Naval
Reserve, the Territorial Army and the Royal Auxiliary
Air Force.223 Yet the establishment of the CCRF failed
to take account of the fact that that the British mili
tary’s reservists were overwhelmingly committed to
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Furthermore, the
CCRF’s exact relationship with the emergency services
was unclear, particularly regarding the establishment
of communications between the two, and few CCRF
exercises have actually been conducted beyond the
confines of London District. The CCRF was dismissed
as a cosmetic exercise intended purely for public con
sumption. As one officer involved in its establishment
complained, “[We] have a name and a role but no
troops and no resources.” Neither the Labour govern
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ment nor the MOD gave any clear indication as to the
CCRF’s roles, or as to what assets it can rely on in re
sponding to a major terrorist attack, and in this respect
it is therefore fair to describe it as a “paper force.”224
Boots on the Streets.
It is a rare and disturbing sight to see armed sol
diers in full battle order, complete with webbing and
ammunition, in public in a liberal democratic state.
The sight of troops on the streets is instinctively unset
tling. The average civilian can be forgiven for assum
ing that he or she may be shot dead for performing
an innocuous action that may be interpreted by sol
diers as a threat, while the more politically aware may
wonder if the sudden presence of troops precedes
a more sinister action, such as a coup d’etat. With a
deterrence operation, one of the key problems for a
state is how to prove a negative. No government can
inform the media and the populace with true certainty
that a decision to put soldiers on the streets definitely
thwarted a terrorist attack, given the often imprecise
nature of the intelligence involved. It will never be
known for certain whether an al-Qaeda militant ob
served the deployment of the Grenadier Guards and
Household Cavalry to Heathrow airport in February
2003 and decided to abort a planned attack. What is
evident is that that this particular operation “freaked”
several passengers out at the airport, particularly be
cause the cavalry turned up with Scimitar reconnais
sance vehicles that, to the inexpert eye, look like tanks.
There was also widespread media skepticism about
the alert, attributed as being an attempt by the Blair
government to influence public opinion prior to the
Anglo-American invasion of Iraq.225

90

The Heathrow alert of 2003 was treated by media
critics as an example of New Labour spin. Similar op
erations nearly 30 years earlier aroused alarm rather
than scorn. Following the implementation of Op
eration MARMION in January 1974, troops were de
ployed at the airport on at least three further occasions
that year, in June, July, and September. These maneu
vers occurred at a time of considerable economic and
social upheaval, and while there were widespread
rumors that the establishment was plotting to over
throw the Labour government. While right-wing
commentators like former British Army General Wal
ter Walker hysterically declared that increased trade
union activism and industrial strikes were part of a
Soviet-backed plot to destabilize Britain, many on the
left believed that the armed forces were poised for a
coup. The Heathrow deployments were therefore seen
not as a response to a potential terrorist threat, but as
a rehearsal for a military takeover.226
Fears of a military takeover in Britain during the
1970s were closely linked with the conflict in Northern
Ireland. The putsch initiated by French commanders in
Algeria in April 1961 set a precedent in which military
frustration with an ongoing counterterrorist/COIN
campaign might lead to resentment at the perceived
obstructions imposed by a democratic order, and a
growing sense among the officer corps that in order
to win the war, the government needed to be over
thrown. The British left’s fear during the mid-1970s
that the Army’s frustrations with its inability to defeat
PIRA, not to mention fragmentary evidence of mili
tary disaffection with the Wilson government, could
lead to a coup therefore reflected the wider fears of
civil strife and social collapse that were prevalent dur
ing that time.227
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Chain of Command.
Operation BANNER, like other cases involving
military intervention in counterterrorism, was also
fraught with practical problems arising from the posi
tion of the Army within the decisionmaking hierarchy.
It is an inevitable feature of bureaucratic politics that
government departments and official agencies clash
over departmental roles, procedures, and lines of ad
ministrative responsibility.228 In Northern Ireland from
1969-72, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) was
in charge of internal security, but the Chief Constable
of the RUC possessed considerable autonomy. The
GOC was also accountable not only to the British gov
ernment in Westminster, answering to both the MOD
and the Home Office, but also—before the imposition
of direct rule by London on March 27, 1972—to the
devolved government at Stormont. Even after March
1972, the GOC of British forces took orders from the
MOD and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), but
also the Northern Ireland Office (NIO).229 This created
several opportunities for bureaucratic infighting and
departmental friction.
Such tensions were evident from August 1969,
when British troops were sent to the province. While
both the Labour and, after June 1970, the Conserva
tive governments tried to focus on peacekeeping and
preserving civil order, this agenda conflicted with
Stormont’s persistence in emphasizing the need to
crush a Republican insurrection, rather than to deal
even-handedly with both communities and to address
the grievances of the Catholic community.230 The first
GOC, Lieutenant General Sir Ian Freeland, clashed
constantly with RUC Chief Constable Arthur Young

92

throughout 1969-70. Young had been appointed to
reform the police—undermanned at 3,000 constables
and compromised by its Unionist bias—but he an
gered Freeland by taking measures (notably disarm
ing the force and reducing its role in public order
control), which in the GOC’s opinion increased the
burden on the Army for maintaining internal security.
Young, for his part, resented the fact that the RUC was
often not consulted by its military counterparts and
had no say in Army planning.231
The imposition of direct rule reduced the ability
of the Unionist establishment to block reform, but it
did not remove the tensions that existed between the
Army and the RUC. The introduction of police pri
macy in 1976 was subsequently challenged by Gen
eral Sir Timothy Creasey during his tenure as GOC.
Creasey expressed frustration at what he considered
to be feeble security force tactics, and publicly stated
that the Army should “stop messing around and take
out the terrorists.” The Warrenpoint ambush on Au
gust 27, 1979, in which PIRA managed to kill 18 British
soldiers in a skillfully planned double-bombing, only
increased the GOC’s fury. Although the newly-elect
ed Conservative government overruled Creasey’s
requests to reassert Army control over the campaign
against PIRA, his attitude was noteworthy. It is con
ceivable that in similar scenarios in the future other
generals may react against what they consider to be
unnecessary political and bureaucratic restraints on
a counterterrorist campaign, particularly if they be
lieve that military casualties are incurred as a conse
quence.232
The implementation of domestic counterterrorist
measures in mainland Britain after 1972 was also ham
pered by interdepartmental wrangles. Police chiefs
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were initially uneasy with the prospects of calling in
22SAS’s Pagoda troop to resolve an emergency, seeing
the latter as a band of trigger-happy mavericks. The
close attention 22SAS paid to liaison arrangements,
in particular standardizing communications and ar
ranging transport by air or land in the event of a cri
sis—in addition to the repeated visits paid by English,
Scottish, and Welsh chief constables to the regiment’s
headquarters near Hereford—helped alleviate police
concerns and did much to ensure close cooperation
between 22SAS and the Metropolitan Police during
Operation NIMROD.233
Preparations for maritime counterterrorist contin
gencies, with particular reference to the North Sea oil
fields, during the mid-1970s were subject to a more
intense bureaucratic quarrel, particularly regarding
command and control measures. The Home Office
backed Scottish police chiefs, who believed that they
could be saddled with the responsibility for protect
ing oil platforms, despite their lack of the resources re
quired. The MOD and the armed forces were, for their
part, loath to commit military units to the defense of
offshore installations against terrorist attack, particu
larly at a time when they faced both budget cuts and
other significant commitments, notably regarding
NATO and Operation BANNER.234 The departments
involved finally agreed in March 1977 to implement
standard MACA principles; the Home Office would
be responsible for handling any emergency, terroristrelated or otherwise, and the police authorities would
only call for military assistance if they lacked the
means to resolve it themselves. At the time of this writ
ing, contingency preparations for a maritime terrorist
attack off the UK coast have yet to be implemented,
and indeed one SBS veteran expressed the view that
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offshore oil rigs are extremely difficult for terrorists to
assault, not only because of their size but because of
the character of their work force:
I always felt it would take a particularly insane terror
ist to actually try to capture a North Sea oil platform
and then hold on to it. Many of the so-called rough
necks who work on them have military backgrounds.
It would not be like taking over a cruise ship with a
mostly elderly clientele and soft crew. If a terrorist
turned his back for a second on one of these rough
necks, it is likely that his next experience would be a
wrench crashing through his skull.235

During the 1970s, British civil servants and mili
tary personnel prepared themselves for a terrorist
attack at sea, but in Mumbai in 2008 the Indians had
to face a seaborne attack on a major city. The Indian
authorities were criticized not only for the intelligence
failure preceding the LET attacks, but also for the de
lay in calling in military reinforcements. It took the
Indian Army 5.5 hours to respond, by which time the
terrorists had claimed most of their victims. The at
tacks started at 9:20 p.m. on November 26, and local
army units took to the streets at 2:50 a.m. the following
morning. The arrival of India’s elite counterterrorist
unit, the National Security Guard (NSG), was delayed
by nearly 10 hours; not only did the NSG have to fly
from their base in Delhi, but it had no dedicated air
force transport at its disposal. Since November 2008,
the Indians have sought to enhance their capabilities
for dealing with a similar attack, establishing joint pa
trol stations for the navy, police, and coastguard, as
well as regional centers for the NSG. However, there
are still considerable problems in interagency coop
eration, not least the fact that the Indian Army, which
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provides officers to and training for the NSG, is loath
to loan personnel to train and command this unit due
to manpower shortages within its own officer corps. 236
In Britain’s case, COBRA worked well in han
dling the Iranian embassy siege in May 1980 mainly
because Ministers and officials had time to deliberate
over their actions. More recently, the Metropolitan
Police’s former chief of anti-terrorism, Andy Hayman,
has expressed frustration with COBRA’s sluggishness
and the tendency of Ministers to interfere with what
he regards as petty political considerations. Hayman’s
recommendations involve establishing a separate
body for the police and other key agencies to prepare
contingency plans for consideration by COBRA.237 In
this case, it would make sense to copy the standard
Whitehall practice of shadowing Ministerial commit
tees with official ones, particularly regarding advance
preparation for and consideration of potential emer
gency scenarios.
The Intelligence Aspect.
One of the principal causes of interdepartmental
animosity involves the means needed to gather infor
mation on a terrorist organization, its collation, and
its dissemination across various agencies. Success de
pends on the security forces’ ability to accurately iden
tify terrorists, to obtain timely information about their
operations, their objectives, and their overall strategy.
Generating this information represents a consider
able challenge, for, as Kitson noted, “the problem of
defeating the enemy consists very largely of finding
him.” As noted in Section 2, vital sources of human
intelligence (HUMINT) include undercover patrols,
informants recruited from the civilian population,
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and agents (turned terrorists who are supplying in
formation to the security forces). Both insurgents and
terrorists understand the dangers posed by HUMINT
sources; hence, their readiness to murder suspected
agents and informants in order to intimidate the gen
eral populace into silence.238
One striking aspect concerning the historical re
cord of both COIN and counterterrorism is the fact
that—despite insurgent/terrorist intimidation, not to
mention the profound racial, ethnic, cultural, and sec
tarian divides that can separate state authorities from
the general population—security forces find it easy to
recruit informants from the civil population, and to
encourage insurgents and terrorists, often while the
latter are in captivity, to change sides. This has been
demonstrated not only in Northern Ireland, but also
with the ability of Israel’s Shin Bet to recruit Palestin
ian spies in the Occupied Territories.239 The motives of
informants and agents vary, they include: monetary
gain; fear of imprisonment or as part of a bargain to
keep relatives out of jail; petty resentments; or even a
sense of remorse or disgust over atrocities committed
by their comrades. Yet spies, narks, and touts have a
disproportionate effect on a terrorist organization, as
even the suspicion of treachery can be enough to turn
members against each other, or to persuade a paranoid
leadership to purge its ranks. Abu Nidal’s destruction
of his own organization during the late 1980s provides
a graphic example of the paralyzing effect that the fear
of betrayal can have on a group.240
However, if a state’s intelligence and security ser
vices are unable to cooperate, any intelligence gath
ered is of limited value. Ronen Bergman describes the
chaos involving competing Israeli services—Mossad,
Shin Bet, and IDF intelligence—engaged with Hezbol
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lah in Lebanon during the 1980s-1990s, quoting a Shin
Bet officer who described the Israeli intelligence sys
tem’s workings as a “drugged octopus.” Inadequate
cooperation was also evident in British colonial defeats
such as Aden, where the inability of the regular Army
and 22SAS to coordinate their intelligence-gathering
activities led to at least one instance when undercover
patrols mistook each other for terrorists and shot at
each other.241
Operation BANNER involved four separate intel
ligence agencies: the Army’s Intelligence Corps, the
RUC’s Special Branch (SB), MI5, and the Secret Intelli
gence Service (SIS) (the latter’s involvement being jus
tified by PIRA’s external sources of assistance in Eire
and the United States). The services involved sought
information on PIRA, splinter Republican groups such
as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and also
the Loyalist organizations. The information sought
included background (political) intelligence on their
objectives; operational (military) intelligence, notably
contact or time-sensitive information on imminent
terrorist attacks; and criminal intelligence intended
to assist the prosecution of suspects— the latter being
of greater importance once police primacy came into
effect. The obvious question was, which agency was
responsible for generating which type of HUMINT,
and while the Army and MI5 apparently had a good
working relationship, the Intelligence Corps and the
RUC SB constantly clashed over the Army’s clandes
tine patrolling and over agent running. The Army’s
involvement in plain-clothes activity during the early
1970s, with the Military Reaction Force and 14 Intel
ligence Company, was a product of the inadequacies
and the demoralization of the SB at that time.242
The recovery of the RUC’s intelligence-gathering
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capacity from around 1975 onward led to a series of
turf wars between the Army, derided by police of
ficers as cowboys and amateurs, and the RUC—still
regarded by military critics as being infiltrated by proLoyalist hard men. (One senior Army officer noted in
the autumn of 1973 that at least 51 RUC officers were
linked to “Protestant extremists.”) The appointment
in 1979 of the retired SIS chief, Sir Maurice Oldfield,
as Security Coordinator appears to have helped de
lineate lines of communication and responsibility
between agencies, while another important decision
was the pooling of raw intelligence from the Army
and police at the RUC’s Castlereagh headquarters. Al
though interdepartmental friction persisted, it is clear
that the combined British intelligence effort led to the
penetration of PIRA and the recruitment of a network
of agents throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the effects
of which are discussed below.243
Two further points should be noted. The first is
that terrorists and insurgents are fighting their own
intelligence war as well, and the most effective organi
zations will penetrate the security services with their
own double agents and recruit their own sources. This
was as evident in Belfast in October 1972 when British
Army undercover operations were betrayed by a Fred
(a PIRA agent recruited by Army intelligence who de
cided to change sides a second time), as it was in Basra
over 30 years later, where the Mahdi Army was able
to breach British military security through its sources
in the IPS and locally employed workers at Coalition
bases.244 The second concerns the ethical dimensions
of HUMINT-gathering, which are explored in more
detail later in this chapter.
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Massacring the Innocents.
The key rationale for involving the armed forces
in counterterrorism is to save lives. This motive is
undermined in instances where a military interven
tion actually causes substantial casualties. In Russia,
the increasing ruthlessness that Chechen separatists
have shown during successive hostage takings—from
the Budyonnovsk raid of June 16, 1995, in which the
Chechens raided this Southern Russian city, taking
over a hospital in the process; to the Beslan school
siege of September 1-3, 2004—have presented the Rus
sian authorities with a series of complex crises. In each
case the civilian death toll has been high; 129 civilians
were killed in Budyonnovsk, at least 28 in the Pervo
mayskoye crisis in Dagestan (January 12-18, 1996),
130 in the Nord-Ost theatre siege (October 23, 2002),
and a minimum of 338 (including 156 schoolchildren)
at Beslan, North Ossetia.245 Yet these losses have not
simply been due to Chechen brutality, but also to a
combination of ruthlessness and official incompetence
on the part of the Russian government and its secu
rity forces—not just the army, but the Federal Security
Service (FSB) and the MVD.
At Budyonnovsk and Pervomayskoye, surviving
hostages testified that many of the dead were caused
by indiscriminate shooting on the part of the security
forces. In the latter case, the Russians bombarded a vil
lage occupied by Chechen separatists and their Dages
tani hostages with tanks and multiple rocket launch
ers. The Chechens were not only able to repel repeated
attacks by MVD troops, but the bulk of them were able
to break through the Russian cordon and escape back
into Chechnya.246 All but two of the hostages who died
during the Nord-Ost tragedy were killed by a suppos
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edly nonlethal incapacitating gas that FSB spetsnaz
troops pumped into the theatre; the Russian authori
ties even neglected to inform medical personnel treat
ing casualties as to the nature of the agent they used,
thereby hampering their ability to treat them. As for
Beslan, while Moscow insisted that Russian soldiers
only stormed the school after the terrorists started to
detonate bombs, a Duma (parliamentary) commission
reported that spetsnaz soldiers may have started the
final firefight in which so many hostages died. While
scholars need to treat competing claims about these
incidents cautiously, the manner with which the Rus
sian state has dealt with hostage crises reflects the
over-militarized and repressive manner in which both
the Yelstin and Putin governments fought their wars
against Chechen separatists.247
The consequences of a bloody counterterrorist
operation can also be seen in the aftermath of Opera
tion BLUE STAR in India (June 3-6, 1984). The Golden
Temple at Amritsar, the most sacred shrine of the
Sikh faith, had been taken over and fortified by armed
separatists fighting for an independent Kalistan. On
June 3, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi or
dered the army to storm the temple, and after 3 days
of fighting (which involved a total of 70,000 troops,
backed by tanks and armored vehicles) the Indian mil
itary recaptured the shrine and killed several hundred
militants, including their leader, Jarnail Singh Bhin
dranwale. Unfortunately, Operation BLUE STAR led
to the death of at least 1,000 people, many of them pil
grims. While the majority of Sikhs were enraged that
separatists had defiled the Golden Temple, the Indian
Army’s response outraged opinion in the Punjab, and
was seen as a gross act of mass murder and sacrilege.
Operation BLUE STAR therefore inflamed the Punjabi
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insurgency, and the most immediate consequence was
Gandhi’s assassination by two of her bodyguards,
both Sikhs, on October 31, 1984.248
The implications of killing unarmed civilians were
also evident, albeit on a smaller scale, in Northern
Ireland in the early 1970s. Troops involved in MACP
missions are likely to become involved in violent
contingencies short of outright terrorism, such as a
public order incident (a riot) involving elements of
the local population. In Belfast and Londonderry, the
ability of British soldiers to contain rioters was tested
to the limit. The British Army’s public order training
emphasizes the controlled use of force to deescalate a
riot, but in practice the stress of dealing not only with
stone-throwers, but also petrol bombers and snipers
meant that soldiers could (and did) shoot unarmed
people, thereby inflaming Catholic hostility toward
the military even further.249 The disastrous end to a
Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association march in
Londonderry on Bloody Sunday (January 30, 1972)
was the most extreme example. Troops from Support
Company, 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment (1PARA),
responded to what they considered to be incoming fire
by shooting into a crowd of demonstrators, killing 13
of them. The result was an international scandal that
was a propaganda coup for PIRA. Much of the blame
for Bloody Sunday has been placed on the aggressive
ethos of the paratroopers, who had collectively alien
ated the Catholic population and had even caused
distaste and concern among other Army units. When
1PARA deployed in Londonderry in mid-January
1972, a soldier from another battalion who saw them
arrive exclaimed, ”Christ, we’re here to stop protest
ers, not kill them!”250 The paras vigorously dispute
claims that they were trigger-happy, and the Saville
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inquiry into the shootings has shown Republican gun
men did actually shoot at the soldiers prior to the kill
ings. However, even with the advantage of hindsight,
it is hard to dispute Thomas Hennessey’s verdict on
Bloody Sunday:
The best that can be said is that, in an alien environ
ment the paratroopers who opened fire saw threats
from all quarters once they had been fired upon: rocks
became nail bombs, rifles were seen peering out from
barricades when in fact there were none. The alterna
tive is that this was murder. Somewhere between the
two is probably the truth.251

Minimum Force/Hearts and Minds.
Bloody Sunday illustrates a serious problem in
MACP, which is that the deployment of troops can
antagonize the civilian population, particularly if they
are perceived by a section of the populace as being
brutal and repressive, as was the case in Northern Ire
land. The fact is, as a former British Army officer, Col
onel Michael Dewar noted, “No army, however well it
conducts itself, is suitable for police work.”252 Neither
the problem of applying minimum force (minimum by
whose standards?) nor the issues posed by applying
lethal force in self-defense (When is it justified? What
happens if a soldier misjudges a situation and shoots
an innocent civilian?) should be regarded as unique to
Operation BANNER. They have also been shown in
the Kashmir insurgency from 1989 onward, with criti
cisms of the conduct of the Indian Army and paramili
tary troops from the BSF toward Kashmiri civilians.
One Indian Army Brigadier offered the following ex
planation in an interview in April 1995, which could
be uttered by almost any military commander faced
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with an elusive enemy who hides amongst the civilian
population and who only exposes himself or herself
prior to an attack:
The aim of the soldier is to kill or capture; win or lose
he must apply maximum force because of military
considerations. But in Kashmir overnight he has to
do a flip-flop. There is no enemy with whom he can
identify. It is his own people who have taken up arms
against him. Therefore, although you can win militar
ily you can lose the war.253

A similar problem appears to have manifested it
self in Northwest Pakistan, judging by press reports of
extrajudicial killings of TTP suspects following the re
capture of the Swat Valley in February 2009, which are
attributed to (and denied by) the Pakistani Army.254
The recruitment of local military forces can con
tribute to tensions between the armed forces and the
civilian population, particularly if, in cases where
terrorism exists alongside profound ethnic, racial, or
sectarian differences, these are seen to be representa
tive of one particular community. In 1970 the British
established the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) as a
territorial force to supplement Army operations. The
UDR became particularly important from the mid
1970s, when the British government sought to cut
troop numbers in Northern Ireland due to the fact that
the Army was overstretched meeting its NATO com
mitments.255
The problem was that the UDR was overwhelm
ingly Protestant in character; by 1985, out of 6,500
soldiers, only 175 were Catholics, in spite of British
efforts to recruit a nonsectarian force. This was partly
due to the fact that PIRA threatened to murder po
tential and actual Catholic recruits, but there was also
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a widespread feeling within the Catholic community
that the UDR was institutionally linked to the Loyal
ist movement. The involvement of some of its soldiers
in Loyalist atrocities, shown by the conviction of 16
of its number for murder between 1970 and 1989, did
little to improve the UDR’s reputation. Its defenders
may describe this as the behavior of a minority within
its ranks, but the fact remains that the UDR was not
seen by Catholics as an impartial force. As one coun
cilor of the moderate Nationalist SDLP stated, “[no]
one [in the Catholic community] considers the UDR
to be part of the British Army . . . . They are seen as
a Loyalist militia. They behave, in many cases, like a
Loyalist militia.” UDR veterans would no doubt view
this statement as a slur on their regimental honor, but
it is clear that this force’s reputation was as much a
disincentive for Catholics to join as threats from PIRA.
Despite the British government’s efforts to create a
territorial force representative of both communities,
the UDR was seen by many Catholics as a successor to
the disbanded B Specials.256
Accountability.
In certain cases, military intelligence and Special
Forces units involved in counterterrorism have faced
accusations that they have become involved in socalled “black operations.” These include assassina
tions and false flag attacks (atrocities committed by
military or security force personnel, which are then
blamed on terrorists), and they reflect the fear that the
soldiers concerned are beyond oversight or control
by civilian authorities. In Italy during the late 1960s,
when the BR first emerged, left-wing critics blamed
officers from the military intelligence service (SID) for
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inciting neo-Fascist terrorist outrages. The supposed
objective of this strategy of tension was to frame the
extreme left for the ensuing bloodshed, thereby creat
ing the conditions for a military coup. It is difficult to
determine to what degree these accusations were true,
or whether they reflect the enduring appeal of dietrolo
gia (behind-ology), the term used to describe the Ital
ian penchant for conspiracy theories.257
Britain had its own version of the SID scandal with
the activities of the Military Reaction Force (MRF) in
Northern Ireland (1971-72). This plain-clothes British
Army unit had been set up as a clandestine intelligencegathering team, but its members became involved in
at least five incidents in which civilians were shot.
PIRA claimed that the MRF were agents provocateurs
working to inflame sectarian tensions, so that the Brit
ish state could claim that it was trying to stop a civil
war between Catholics and Protestants. A contrasting
view is offered by the Northern Irish journalist Mar
tin Dillon, who described British military intelligence
operations during the early 1970s as a product of
amateurism and poor training. The Army hierarchy’s
dissatisfaction with the MRF, and its determination
to control clandestine activity and prevent individual
battalions from engaging in piratical ventures, led to
the formation of 14 Intelligence Company in January
1973; this was an established unit operating under
the command of the GOC’s deputy, the Commander
Land Forces, Northern Ireland.258 Nonetheless, Repub
lican propaganda and critics continued to emphasize
the nefarious character of British military undercover
activity, although the general tendency (notably after
22SAS was deployed to Armagh in January 1976) was
to attribute all clandestine operations to the “Special
Assassination Squads.”259
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Turkey offers a clear example where a fragile dem
ocratic state has found it difficult to control its armed
forces. In 1952, the Turkish Army formed a Special
Warfare Group (OHD) as a stay-behind force, a skel
eton resistance group to be activated in the event of a
Soviet invasion. However, there is evidence to suggest
that the OHD directed organized criminal gangs and
the far-right Grey Wolves in false flag attacks attribut
ed to leftist terrorists during the 1970s-1980s. In Kurd
istan during the 1980s-1990s a plain-clothes jandarma
intelligence unit (JITEM) used former PKK insurgents
to assassinate former comrades, and also allegedly
became involved in drug smuggling. Both the OHD
and JITEM were linked to what Turks call the derin
devlet (deep state), and are also connected with the
current scandal involving an apparent plot by a secret
organization of army and jandarma officers (known as
Ergenekon) to overthrow the Adelet ve Kalkinma Partish
(AKP) government.260
Clandestine military intelligence activity in coun
terterrorism will almost inevitably arouse wild ru
mors, conspiracy-theorizing, black propaganda, and
genuine concerns about accountability. The likelihood
that a state’s armed and security forces are involved in
unsavory and destabilizing actions under the guise of
fighting terrorism cannot always be discounted, par
ticularly in cases where the state’s democratic founda
tions are weak. Yet, the array of conspiracy theories
that 9/11 and 7/7 were false flag attacks staged by
the U.S. and British governments, respectively, show
that dietrologia and fears of the derin devlet are not ex
clusively Italian or Turkish characteristics.261 Further
more, insurgent and terrorist groups may deliberately
use false flag claims to absolve themselves of respon
sibility for civilian attacks; hence, the claim by the TTP
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and other Islamist militants that U.S. contractors from
Xe Services are responsible for the bomb attacks that
have struck Peshawar, Karachi, Rawalpindi, and other
Pakistani cities in recent months.262
Jus in bello.
LOAC stresses that if military actions are to be le
gitimate in war (in bello), they must be proportionate
and discriminate, and since 1977 the Geneva Conven
tions on the treatment of prisoners of war and civil
ians are also explicitly applicable to internal as well as
external conflicts.263 The difficulties of applying these
principles in practice can be seen in the controversies
surrounding five aspects where the military have ei
ther become or are potentially involved in counterter
rorism: the interception of hijacked aircraft, the legal
status of terrorists suspects in custody, hostage res
cue, preemptive intervention and targeted killing, and
agent running.
Interception of hijacked aircraft. Since 9/11, the pros
pects of a similar attack—in which suicide hijackers
take over a passenger plane and crash it into a city, a
nuclear power plant, or another high-value target—
have led some governments to prepare contingency
plans to shoot down hijacked aircraft. Examples in
clude the establishment of the RAF’s QRA squad
ron and also the revised orders given to the Federal
Aviation Authority and North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD) after 9/11. On the morning of
the al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington,
DC, NORAD had only four fighters from the Air Na
tional Guard at its disposal to protect the entire U.S.
Eastern seaboard. Prior to 9/11, NORAD contingency
planning did not anticipate a scenario in which a do
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mestic airliner would be taken over and turned into
a suicide craft. Since September 2001, NORAD oper
ates at a higher state of readiness, and in the 2 years
that followed 9/11, the U.S. and Canadian air forces
scrambled jets on 1,500 occasions, mainly in response
to false alarms, such as a temporary loss of contact
with a passenger jet.264
Yet the prospects of another 9/11-style attack
present democratic states with an appalling dilemma:
Governments can either order fighter pilots to inter
cept and destroy hijacked planes, complete with pas
sengers and crew, in mid-air, or accept the inevitable
loss of civilian life when the aircraft is either driven
into its target or runs out of fuel and crashes.265 This
scenario also raises two further potentially disturb
ing possibilities. The first is that an airliner can be
shot down if its pilot loses contact with air traffic con
trol, and nervous officials assume that the plane has
been hijacked. The second is that in the aftermath of a
shoot-down, members of the terrorist group respon
sible for the initial hijacking can issue a statement de
nying that they intended to use the plane for a suicide
attack, claiming that they intended to land the aircraft
and issue demands. They then are able to accuse the
responsible government of mass murder.
Legal status of terrorist suspects. As noted above, in
telligence is of crucial importance in counterterrorism,
and one means of gaining this is the interrogation of
suspects in custody. Even if one disregards obvious ex
tremes, such as the French in Algeria, the issue of how
detainees are treated in military custody is a conten
tious one. The British Army enraged the Catholic com
munity and the Irish government when it introduced
internment without trial for Republican terrorist sus
pects on August 9, 1971. Further outrage was caused
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by public disclosure of the so-called “deep interroga
tion” or CALABA methods—hooding, sleep depriva
tion, stress positions—used on some detainees. An of
ficial government inquiry reported, much to the fury
of the then-Prime Minister Edward Heath, that the
treatment associated with deep interrogation consti
tuted physical ill-treatment. What was significant was
that these interrogation methods had been used by the
Army in previous British COIN campaigns, although
they had been modified after a scandal involving de
tainee abuse in Aden. The furor surrounding deep in
terrogation led to the abandonment of these coercive
methods, although this did not prevent further accu
sations of ill-treatment both by Sinn Fein and domestic
critics in the UK. Furthermore, although internment
had negative political consequences, its actual imple
mentation, which involved 1,981 detainees between
1971 and 1975, provided the Army and the RUC with
crucial intelligence on PIRA and its principal Repub
lican rival, the Official IRA. Nonetheless, the fact that
only 107 suspected Loyalists were detained under in
ternment contributed to the sense of persecution and
injustice that many in the Catholic community felt.
The fact that the British authorities treated Loyalist
violence as, to quote Paul Dixon, “a symptom of [PI
RA’s] campaign,” was a strategic blunder; internment
may have been easier for Catholics to accept if Prot
estant extremists were seen to be treated to the same
process as suspected Republican terrorists.266
The current War on Terror also highlights the
problems involved in detaining terrorist suspects. The
Bush administration’s decision to authorize the U.S.
military to use similar methods on detainees in Guan
tanamo Bay on the grounds that al-Qaeda and Taliban
captives are not eligible to prisoner of war status un
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der the terms of the Geneva Convention not only had
a negative effect on international opinion, but it also
created a legal quagmire for the U.S. Government. Al
though the U.S. military is responsible for guarding
the detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, this contro
versy is not actually of its making. During the summer
of 2003, representatives of the Judge Advocate Gener
al’s Corps (JAG) from the Army, Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force vigorously protested against aggressive
counter-resistance techniques on moral grounds, due
to concerns about their country’s reputation and fears
that it would set a precedent for the maltreatment of
U.S. service personnel held prisoner in future con
flicts. The implications of Guantanamo Bay would be
best debated in a separate paper, but the key concerns
here are not only those outlined by the JAG, but the
fact that coercive techniques such as water-boarding
tarnish the trials of individuals like Khalid Sheikh Mo
hamed, the architect of the 9/11 attacks.267 It also ap
pears as though such guidance on counter-resistance
techniques has led to military abuses akin to the Abu
Ghraib scandal of 2003, such as the maltreatment of
suspected Taliban and al-Qaeda detainees in Bagram
and other U.S. military bases in Afghanistan, and even
some deaths in custody.268
Hostage rescue. Traditional hostage-rescue mis
sions can also present ethical problems, particularly
related to the use of minimum force. With Operation
NIMROD it is clear that then-Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher wanted to take a tough line with the Ahvaz
hostage takers to ensure that the British government
was not perceived as being soft in the face of terror
ist threats. However, during Operation NIMROD, at
least two of the gunmen shot dead are supposed to
have laid down their arms in an attempt to surrender.
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One SAS veteran subsequently stated that he and his
comrades received the following orders prior to the
assault:
The message was that we had to resolve the situation
and there was to be no chance of failure, and that the
hostages absolutely had to be protected. The Prime
Minister did not want an ongoing problem beyond
the embassy—which we took to mean that they didn’t
want anybody coming out alive. No surviving terror
ists.269

Other ex-SAS soldiers involved cannot confirm
that these orders were given, and the following points
need to be considered before judging whether there
was a policy to summarily execute the hostage tak
ers. First, the Ahvaz gunmen had already murdered
one of the Iranian embassy staff, and during the res
cue mission they tried to kill more hostages. Second,
one of the lessons 22SAS took from the Munich mas
sacre was that any assault had to be conducted with
such speed and aggression that the terrorists would
be overwhelmed before they could either retaliate
or start executing their captives, and this calculation
shaped the planning and implementation of Opera
tion NIMROD. Third, prior to this mission 22SAS had
lost one of their officers, Captain Herbert Westmacott,
at the beginning of a siege involving PIRA gunmen in
Belfast. Westmacott’s death would have complement
ed the lessons learnt from repeated exercises, which
was that until the Iranian Embassy was successfully
secured, any hesitation in using lethal force against
the terrorists could lead to the deaths of SAS person
nel or hostages.270
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Premptive intervention and targeted killing. The out
come of the Iranian embassy siege was less contro
versial than cases of preemptive intervention involv
ing the Army and the RUC in Northern Ireland. The
Loughgall ambush was regarded by military officials
as a clean operation because the eight PIRA volun
teers killed were armed and clearly involved in an im
minent attack on an RUC station. An alternate view
stresses that the terrorists could have been intercepted
and arrested en route to Loughgall, and that the am
bush also caused the unnecessary death of one civil
ian who was shot dead by mistake by the SAS. With
this in mind, it appears as though the British Army
subsequently took greater pains to try to capture
armed terrorists alive. This was demonstrated by the
arrest of the South Armagh sniper, Michael Caraher,
and his three accomplices by 22SAS in April 1997.271
There were also more controversial cases in which in
nocent civilians were killed by British Special Forces
soldiers, and even one case in which “ordinary decent
criminals” ended up in the firing line, namely the three
bank robbers killed in West Belfast by 14 Intelligence
Company on January 13, 1990.272
The most contentious shooting remains that which
occurred at the end of Operation FLAVIUS in Gibral
tar on March 6, 1988, when three PIRA terrorists—
Mairead Farrell, Danny McCann, and Sean Savage—
were shot dead by 22SAS. Contrary to initial British
government statements, none of the three were armed,
and reports that they had smuggled a car bomb onto
the peninsula were also incorrect. This device was
supposed to be intended for a military parade, but the
explosives and vehicle were still in Spain at the time
the three were intercepted and killed. The Gibraltar
shootings were cited by media critics as examples
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of a shoot-to-kill policy, in which both in Northern
Ireland and overseas British forces sought to sum
marily execute suspects who could theoretically be
apprehended. In response, Army sources refer to the
hazards of trying to arrest terrorist suspects who are
potentially armed—as one intelligence officer noted,
PIRA gunmen did not “shoot to tickle”—and the dan
ger that a soldier who hesitated in using force in selfdefense could endanger himself or his comrades. It is
also worth noting that Gibraltar had a knock-on effect.
Mourners at Farrell, McCann, and Savage’s funerals
on March 16 were subjected to a grenade and gun at
tack by Michael Stone, a Loyalist terrorist. When one
of Stone’s victims was being buried three days later,
a mob lynched two British Army corporals in civilian
dress. Deaths may have been prevented in Gibraltar,
but not in Northern Ireland.273
As Peter Taylor notes, the British Army and secu
rity forces in Northern Ireland were generally “not
in the business of going into republican or loyalist
areas and just taking terrorists out.” In Israel’s case,
however, there is a declared policy of targeted killing
directed against Palestinian terrorists. For critics like
the Israeli NGO B’Tselem, the IDF’s policy is immoral
and illegal. B’Tselem highlights cases where innocent
Palestinians have been shot dead, and its activists also
argue that Mista-aravim soldiers are not entitled to
claim shootings in self-defense, because they have de
liberately placed themselves in a situation where they
are obliged to kill. B’Tselem estimates that between
2000 and 2008, 202 Palestinians were subjected to tar
geted killings by the Mista-aravim, uniformed military
personnel, or in air strikes, with an additional 121 by
standers being killed as a consequence.274
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Aside from the ethical debate, it is also far from
clear whether such strikes actually significantly dis
rupt Hamas, PIJ, and other Palestinian militant groups.
The principal conclusions of a statistical analysis con
ducted by Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield in
2005-06 was that “targeted assassinations have no
significant impact on the rates of Palestinian violence,
even when time lags associated with possible retalia
tions are taken into account,” and that the progressive
decline in Palestinian suicide bombings and other at
tacks from 2002 could be attributable to other factors
(such as the cease-fire between Fatah and Israel, and
the construction of a separation wall between Israel
and the West Bank). Cronin also argues that targeted
killings have actually had more of an effect on inflam
ing Palestinian anger at Israel than civilian deaths. A
prime example was the killing of Yahya Ayyash, a
Hamas bomb maker nicknamed “The Engineer,” by
a booby-trapped mobile phone on January 5, 1996.
Ayyash’s death led to a fresh wave of suicide attacks
against Israeli citizens in the following 2 months.
While the IDF has scored several tactical successes in
eliminating key personnel in Hamas, PIJ and other
terrorist organizations, these have done nothing to
resolve Israel’s essential problem, which is the fierce
hatred that many Palestinians feel toward the Jewish
state, and their desire to destroy it.275
Agent running. Shooting terrorists causes enough
trouble for a democratic government; recruiting them
as agents poses further problems. The best source of
HUMINT on the hierarchy, organization, personnel,
and strategy of a terrorist group often comes from
any of its members who can be recruited as spies. In
Northern Ireland, Army intelligence, the RUC SB and
MI5 were able to progressively paralyze PIRA through
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a combination of agent recruitment and clandestine
surveillance. By 1992, five out of six of its planned at
tacks were being thwarted by the security forces. One
senior Provisional, Brendan Hughes, confirms that the
latter were able to “bring [PIRA] to a standstill,” stat
ing that “they were able to effectively stop the IRA
and contain it” by the time its leadership declared
their ceasefire on July 19, 1997.276 Yet the operations of
the FRU in Northern Ireland from 1980 onward high
light the ethical dangers involved in such activity. For
agents to remain useful, they have to divert suspicion
from themselves, and for a terrorist source this means
remaining active and also continuing to perpetrate
criminal acts. This was demonstrated by the FRU’s
recruitment of PIRA members, which allegedly in
cluded Alfredo Scappaticci, the head of the organiza
tion’s internal security unit, nicknamed the “Nutting
Squad” because it tortured and summarily executed
suspected touts. If Scappaticci was an FRU agent, then
it is more than likely that he murdered people, includ
ing other agents allegedly sacrificed by their security
forces handlers, while working for the British Army.277
Even more disturbing is the case of Brian Nelson, a
Loyalist paramilitary charged in 1990 with the murder
of Belfast lawyer Patrick Finucane. Nelson was also
an FRU agent, and his recruitment was regarded by
the Catholic community as evidence of collusion; that
Loyalist terrorists were used by the British state for
the extrajudicial killing of Republicans and trouble
some individuals like Finucane in a dirty war. The
issue of agent recruitment therefore poses a series of
moral dilemmas. To what extent does the recruitment
of terrorists as government spies actually save lives by
preventing bloody attacks? Does this justify the losses
that are incurred by keeping such agents active? For
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example, the apparent guidance given to Nelson was
to direct his comrades’ attacks against known Repub
lican rivals, rather than Catholic civilians, and to fake
tip-offs to protect genuine agents—such as the one in
which the FRU was alleged to have diverted the Loy
alists away from Scappaticci to another Republican
of Italian descent, Franscesco Notarantonio, who was
assassinated in October 1987. Furthermore, in a con
temporary environment where al-Qaeda and its affili
ates plan and commit atrocities far bloodier than those
committed by PIRA and its Loyalist foes, how can the
military and security services of any democratic state
contemplate the long-term recruitment and cultiva
tion of intelligence sources within jihadi groups?278
Creeping Authoritarianism.
Historical experience has shown that a counterter
rorist campaign has provided the pretext for military
commanders, or an unscrupulous civilian leadership,
to subvert the democratic order and establish dictato
rial rule. A prime example is that of Uruguay during
the early 1970s; the army’s intervention decisively de
feated the Tupamaros, but it also led to the militarysponsored dictatorship declared by President Juan
Maria Bordaberry in June 1973.279 While Alberto Fuji
mori was President of Peru from 1990-2000, he over
saw the military and police campaign that curtailed
Sendero Luminoso’s threat to the state, but he also es
tablished a corrupt authoritarian regime with the auto
golpe of April 5, 1992.280
The most notorious example of this process dur
ing the latter half of the 20th century is that of Argen
tina during the late 1970s. Left-wing terrorist violence
in that country was exceeded by the savagery of the
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dirty war waged by the armed force’s junta that seized
power on March 24, 1976. The era of military rule,
1976-83, was characterized by a period of lawlessness
and barbarity in which the state showed a complete
disregard for the distinction between terrorism and le
gitimate political dissent. While leftist groups such as
the Montoneros and the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueb
lo were responsible for more than 3,000 kidnappings
and murders between 1976 and 1979, the military
junta is estimated to have killed at least 15,000 people,
with a minimum of 9,000 “disappeared” between 1976
and 1983. General Jorge Videla, Argentina’s dictator
until March 29, 1981, epitomized the regime’s attitude
when describing a terrorist as “not just someone with
a gun or a bomb, but also someone who spreads ideas
that are contrary to Western and Christian civiliza
tion.” The military’s torturers and executioners acted
on this guidance. In their campaign against terrorism,
they rejected such anti-Christian vices as mercy and
compassion, not to mention “subversive concepts
alien to” Western civilization such as habeas corpus and
due process before the law.281
There is also a clear danger that states that mili
tarize the struggle against terrorism and succumb to
authoritarianism may well destabilize themselves.
This has become evident with the war against Chech
en separatism that the Russians have waged since
September 1999. Although the Russian military and
MVD’s anti-terrorist mission in Chechnya was de
clared over in April 2009, the Russian Federation’s se
curity forces have stirred up further instability in the
North Caucasus as a consequence of their crackdown
on indigenous Islam.282 The October 13, 2005, attack
by Islamist gunmen on Nalchik, the capital of the Re
public of Karbadino-Balkar, and ongoing violence in
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Ingushetia and Dagestan, the North Caucasian repub
lics neighboring Chechnya, suggest that Moscow’s re
sort to armed force against indigenous separatists on
Russia’s Southern frontier has actually incited more
armed opposition to Federal rule. Recent years have
not only shown an increase in the rate of lethal terror
ist attacks across the North Caucasus (40 in 2006, 114
in 2007, 268 in 2008, and over 500 in 2009), but also
the coalescence of jihadist groups across Ingushetia,
Chechnya, Dagestan, and other neighboring repub
lics. The implications for the Russian Federation’s sta
bility remain to be seen.283
A similar conclusion can be drawn following the
formal end of Colombo’s war with the LTTE in lateMay 2009. The Tamil Tigers were justly reviled for
their use of suicide bombing, for conscripting child
soldiers, and also for using Tamil civilians as human
shields in the face of the Sri Lankan Army’s offensive,
thereby contributing to the thousands of casualties
suffered at the climax of the conflict. Former LTTE
leader, Vellupilai Prabhakaran, also had a Stalinist at
titude toward his ethnic kin manifested by his willing
ness to murder rival Tamil leaders who challenged his
absolute authority over his people. Yet, the barbarity
of the LTTE does not justify the blatant chauvinism
of the Sinhalese-dominated government, or the ap
palling conditions experienced by Tamil civilians in
Army-run refugee camps in the war’s aftermath.284 An
additional disturbing trend includes the erosion of Sri
Lanka’s democratic system. Journalists, medics and
other civil society figures are subjected to state sanc
tioned intimidation when examining the less savory
aspects of the LTTE’s defeat—notably the numbers
of civilians killed in the last phases of the war, or the
treatment of internally displaced Tamils in army-run
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refugee camps. Former Chief of the Defence Staff
General Sarath Fonseka, widely credited with victory
over the LTTE, was also imprisoned after standing in
the February 2010 Presidential election against the in
cumbent, Mahinda Rajapaksa, and was charged with
unspecified military offences.285 The suppression of le
gitimate opposition by President Rajapaksa, officially
sanctioned Sinhalese chauvinism, and enduring Tamil
grievances of deprivation and disenfranchisement
could all contribute to the resumption of communal
and ethnic violence in the foreseeable future.
CONCLUSIONS
The underlying theme of this paper is that while
the use of military means to fight terrorist organi
zations can have clear drawbacks and unwelcome
consequences, this does not necessarily mean that a
democratic state should eschew the use of the armed
forces as part of an overall counterterrorism policy.
The requirement to call in the military depends on a
variety of factors: whether the terrorist threat is do
mestic or international; whether the civilian authori
ties and police/gendarmerie services can cope with
the problem; whether positive or negative historical
experiences, notably residual memories of Nazism
and Fascism in post-war Germany and Italy, influence
the ability of a government to request military sup
port; and whether public opinion supports the use of
such means. It is also evident that international sup
port is crucial, whether this is with reference to the
(admittedly wavering) levels of support for Opera
tion ENDURING FREEDOM in the United States and
allied countries, or the effect that Predator strikes in
Pakistan are having on relations between Washing
ton, DC, and Islamabad.
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There may indeed be specific situations—such as
MACA/MACP, hostage rescue, deterrence, training
allied forces, and even a response to a Mumbai-style
attack—where the military alone has the means to
contain the threat terrorism poses to society, or to re
solve a specific crisis. The problem with the post-9/11
War on Terror is not the fact that the United States and
its allies have employed their armed forces against
al-Qaeda and affiliated groups; it is the fact that the
militarization of counterterrorism has taken place in a
political and strategic vacuum. In the case of the Bush
administration, the conduct of the War on Terror/
Long War was governed more by party-political pos
turing and electoral calculations than any long-term
thinking.286
The change in administrations in Washington in
January 2009 appears to have encouraged a system
atic reevaluation of U.S. counterterrorist and national
security policy. Indeed, even before President Obama
took office, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates publicly
stated that:
What is dubbed the War on Terror is, in grim real
ity, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a
struggle between the forces of violent extremism and
moderation. In the long-term effort against terrorist
networks and other extremists, we know that direct
military force will continue to have a role. But we
also understand that over the long term we cannot
kill or capture our way to victory. Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures
to promote better governance, economic programs to
spur development, and efforts to address the grievances amongst the discontented from which the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of
quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat
extremist movements and their ideology.287
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In Britain’s case, the Labour government did be
queath to the current coalition a declared strategy in
the form of CONTEST, but neither Tony Blair nor Gor
don Brown paid any significant attention to the con
sideration of how resources should be allocated to ful
fill the prevent, pursue, protect, and prepare aspects
of CONTEST—the fiasco over the CCRF being a case
in point. As far as military means were concerned,
the British armed forces were expected to fulfill their
counterterrorist missions overseas—most notably in
Afghanistan—and domestically, despite successive
cuts which left the defense budget at 2.2 percent of
national income.288 The current coalition administra
tion is committed to sharp reductions in government
expenditure, and it is inevitable that the SDSR will
lead to further cuts for the MOD. It remains to be seen
whether David Cameron’s government will deliver
the integrated National Security Strategy its Ministers
have promised, and whether this will give the UK’s
armed forces the resources and manpower required to
fulfill all its tasks, including those related to counter
terrorism.289
Both the U.S. and British examples demonstrate
that democratic governments dealing with a terrorist
threat need to return to that much-overused but little
understood term, namely strategy. In an issue as im
portant as national security, strategy is about deciding
what means should be employed to achieve specific
goals. In counterterrorism, these means include eco
nomic power; diplomatic means; the legal resources
of a state, police, and judiciary; the use of intelligence
gained by a state’s security and foreign espionage
services; and the employment of military power. In
this respect, the government’s task is to decide which
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means are best used to resolve specific problems arising
from terrorism, whether domestic or international.290
Yet, to begin this process of deliberation, a govern
ment needs to formulate an overall objective, an end
to which means are to be applied. The objective of any
liberal democracy involved in any conflict against ter
rorism should be the preservation of constitutional or
der and the basic tenets of a liberal state and society; a
government’s accountability to the elected representa
tives of the people; the preservation of governance by
law and not by force, etc.; but also the protection of the
security and the rights of its citizens, foremost among
them the right to life. The latter applies not only to
minimizing the ability of terrorists to kill and maim
members of the general public, but also to ensuring
that civilians are not exposed to excessive violence by
the state and its agencies, as experienced by Argentina
in the 1970s, and is evident in Russia and Sri Lanka
today. Nearly 2 decades ago, Roland Crelinstein and
Alex Schmid observed that “when agents of the state
begin consistently to shoot suspects without bother
ing to arrest them, or to mistreat them during interro
gation in order to force confessions, then the state has
moved far along the road to a regime of terror.”291 That
observation of the potential consequences of counterterrorism without an overarching strategic and politi
cal context has not lost its relevance.
The identification of a strategic objective provides
a focus for a government involved in any form of con
flict against an armed foe, whether state or nonstate
in character. However, in deciding which means are
needed to achieve overall strategic goals, and how
these should be related to each other, decisionmakers
face a challenge familiar to that which a school pupil
encounters when presented with a quadratic equa
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tion in a math class. The student has the hard task
of translating an algebraic formula into arithmetic;
the policymaking elite involved in counterterrorism
has to resolve a series of dilemmas related to specific
decisions. Western countries involved in the conflict
in Afghanistan have to contend with the fact that in
tervention in that country is exploited by radical Is
lamist ideologues to radicalize would-be militants, on
the grounds that a jihad needs to be waged to defend
Islam. Yet, any decision to disengage militarily from
Afghanistan also runs the risk of encouraging al-Qa
eda and its affiliates at their victory, inspiring more
support for their cause and reenergizing their efforts.
Likewise, UAV strikes against al-Qaeda militants in
Northwest Pakistan and Yemen might have a discern
ible effect in weakening their network, but it might
also anger public opinion in both countries, and cause
resentment among friendly governments over the in
fringement of their sovereignty. In a domestic context,
the democratic state faces the problem familiar from
Northern Ireland in the 1970s to Western Europe to
day, that a government’s measures to contain terrorist
violence and to crack down on specific groups can ac
tually alienate a section of the population and foster a
perception of persecution and discrimination, thereby
radicalizing future terrorists and contributing to fur
ther bloodshed and instability.
Nonetheless, it is easy to relate military power to
political ends once a clearly articulated objective is
defined. Policymakers also need to understand that
strategy is a dynamic, not a static, process. Wars, par
ticularly long ones, rarely end with the victors achiev
ing their initial goals. The means employed by a state
at any given time have to be reassessed constantly.
This sets a tough challenge for any democracy, given
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the constraints imposed, for example, by electoral
cycles. This problem is evident in counterterrorism
as it is in any other type of conflict.292 For an MACP
example, Operation BANNER shows how the British
state struggled with the employment of military force
in pursuit of its objectives. The Army-led policy of the
early 1970s that antagonized the Catholic populace
gave way to police primacy after 1976. Preemptive
intervention operations by 22SAS and the RUC dur
ing the late 1980s-early 1990s, such as Loughgall, were
apparently directed against elements of PIRA that
were the most intransigent in their commitment to
the armed struggle, notably the East Tyrone Brigade.
Similar operations appear to have been subsequently
conducted in a less-lethal manner in order not to dis
rupt negotiations leading toward a peace settlement;
for example, the fact that the Armagh sniper team was
captured alive in April 1997 suggests that the British
did not want to disrupt the peace negotiations with
Sinn Fein’s leadership that ultimately led to PIRA’s
ceasefire. The deescalation process between the Army
and PIRA’s Derry Brigade in Londonderry during the
1990s, based on discreet contacts facilitated by Quaker
intermediaries, also illustrates the flexibility of British
military tactics on Operation BANNER. After a fal
tering start by the British in 1969-72, one can see the
evolution of a process in which military force was em
ployed to shape an eventual political outcome, name
ly, to encourage and coerce the Republican movement
to pursue its objectives through the ballot box as op
posed to the Armalite rifle and the bomb.293
The question of how to determine strategic priori
ties is evident with reference to U.S. policy in Afghan
istan. Prior to the President’s announcement on De
cember 1, 2009, that an extra 30,000 troops would be
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sent on COIN operations in that country, the Obama
administration was engaged in a prolonged debate,
with Vice President Joseph Biden proposing that UAV
strikes, Special Forces raids, and the use of local prox
ies would have a greater effect on the war against
al-Qaeda and the Taliban in both Pakistan and Af
ghanistan than the continued COIN campaign. Both
Andrew Bacevich and Austin Long are vocal propo
nents of this counterterrorist alternative; Long has
even produced detailed recommendations of the force
structure involved, concluding that 13,000 U.S. and al
lied elite troops and supporting personnel, complete
with air assets, can contain al-Qaeda and its affiliates
through a series of intelligence-led raids, assisted by
the numerous Afghan tribal militias that are hostile to
the Taliban and external militants. Long’s argument
is that such an approach will be far less expensive in
blood and treasure to the United States, and will also
achieve a greater economy of force, disrupting and
crippling al-Qaeda and affiliated groups in Afghani
stan.294
On closer analysis, the counterterrorism option
looks less appealing. As far as its overall strategic ra
tionale is concerned, it is fair to comment, as Michael J.
Boyle has, that “[a counterterrorist] mission would fo
cus exclusively on Al-Qaeda, while offering little or no
support to the [Afghan government]; a COIN mission
envisages a comprehensive commitment to defeating
the Taliban and rebuilding the Afghan state while
destroying Al-Qaeda operatives there.”295 A counterterrorist focus would achieve at best a tactical effect;
it might eliminate substantial numbers of al-Qaeda
militants, but it would not address the wider problem
that Afghanistan’s instability poses for regional secu
rity. It would essentially represent a refinement of the
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policy that successive U.S. administrations followed
toward that country prior to September 2001.296 Many
of the weaknesses that Long notes in the COIN cam
paign could conceivably apply to his proposals. The
deaths in combat of Delta Force or SEAL operators on
a counterterrorist mission could have as damaging an
effect on U.S. public opinion as the deaths of Soldiers
and Marines in COIN operations, undermining Wash
ington DC’s will to maintain the mission in the face
of popular outcry. Furthermore, Long appears to be
overly confident in the ability of U.S. and allied per
sonnel to gain accurate intelligence on al-Qaeda and
like-minded militant groups from Afghan warlords
and tribal leaders, particularly given the past tenden
cy of their number to either issue false tip-offs to coali
tion intelligence or to accept bribes from the enemy.297
In this respect, if U.S. and allied air strikes or Special
Forces raids end up claiming innocent lives due to
compromised intelligence, then their operations will
have the same adverse effect on Afghan or Pakistani
opinion as those reflected in recent cases in which
large numbers of civilians have died due to Interna
tional Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations. It
will also put further pressure on Hamid Karzai and
Asif Zardari to distance their governments from U.S.
actions, undermining the rationale of the counterter
rorist campaign as a result.298
With reference to Afghanistan counterterrorism as
envisaged by Bacevich and Long, it has many of the
flaws of the COIN strategy; in this respect, the only
alternatives for the United States and other NATO
countries involved in Operation ENDURING FREE
DOM are to continue with counterinsurgency and
state building, or to disengage and withdraw. While
operations in Iraq suggest that there is a role for elite
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units to decapitate terrorist adversaries such as AQI
through targeted killings and intelligence-led preemp
tive intervention raids, it is easy to forget that these
Special Forces operations required framework activity
by over 150,000 U.S. troops at the height of the surge
in 2007-08, in addition to a further 577,000 Iraqi troops
and police. Secondly, counterterrorism is about more
than using door-kickers and UAVs to eliminate highvalue targets; the big disadvantage with the latter is
that dead terrorists yield less HUMINT than live ones
under interrogation. Whether in a domestic context,
particularly with hostage rescue or with reference to
a COIN campaign, there is scope for military activity
to eliminate or arrest the most hardened of terrorists
and insurgents. Yet, these are tactical actions that have
to be integrated within a wider strategy that incorpo
rates political, socioeconomic, cultural and informa
tion operation calculations aimed at containing ter
rorist violence, frustrating the objectives of the groups
involved, and facilitating a peaceful settlement.299 The
Northern Ireland examples noted above can be com
plemented with that of Cyprus in February 1959. By
this point in their campaign against EOKA, the British
had acquired accurate intelligence that would enable
them to trap and kill General Grivas, but then-Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan vetoed an operation to
eliminate him on the grounds that it would lead to an
upsurge of violence from the Greek-Cypriot commu
nity which would undermine negotiations for a peace
settlement.300 One of the paradoxes of counterterrorism
is that there can be a strategic rationale for not killing
an adversary, but this is an aspect a purely military
approach to this activity may overlook.
Sections Three and Four discussed the ethical di
mensions of counterterrorism (in terms of jus ad bellum
and jus in bello) when applying military means in both
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an international and domestic context. As is the case
in interstate warfare, there are no easy resolutions to
the ethical questions raised: Is this decision to retali
ate against a nonstate group or a state sponsor pro
portionate? Does the use of military force resolve this
problem, or complicate it? How do we avoid unnec
essary deaths or human suffering? Nonetheless, for
a democratic state involved in counterterrorism, the
worst error a government and its officials can make
is to assume that what is ethical and legal automati
cally conflicts with what is practical and necessary.
In any action—be it the interrogation of suspects, a
preemptive intervention mission to apprehend ter
rorists, or the killing of a senior al-Qaeda figure in a
UAV attack—the question “Is this morally right?” is
as important to ask as “Will this work?” More often
than not, an action that is unethical is also strategically
counterproductive. Democratic politicians involved in
anti-terrorism need to treat strategy and ethics as in
tertwined. Ethics without strategy leads to indecisive
ness and unproductive soul-searching, while strategy
without ethics simply undermines a state’s reputation
and cause. The Sri Lankan government’s treatment of
the Tamil minority, notably the plight of around 76,000
civilians still interned in army-run camps, is not only
morally flawed, but it also threatens to undermine the
policy of reconciliation needed to prevent the reemer
gence of Tamil separatism.301
It is also important to remember that with the de
batable exception of Israel, terrorism does not pose an
existential threat to democracy. Cronin observes that
“except where a state overreacts or a group becomes
strong enough to transition to another form of violence
[such as insurgency], killing non-combatants through
terrorist attacks is not a promising way of achieving
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strategic political ends.”302 The only examples that
have achieved such goals are the cases—such as with
Irgun and Lehi in Palestine in 1945-48, the FLN in Alge
ria, and EOKA in Cyprus—involving colonial powers
who could accept defeat and withdraw without com
promising essential national interests. Although the
Israelis have long perceived that Palestinian terrorism
threatens state survival, in practice Israel has not only
outlasted the PLO’s challenge to its existence, but is
arguably currently in a stronger position in relation
to Hamas and its external backers than they realize.
With the exception of Iran, the sponsors of the Pales
tinian cause have essentially conceded the rights of
the Israelis to statehood, as shown by the Arab League
peace initiative following the Beirut summit of March
2002. Yet Israel shows an inability to relate military
strength to political objectives. This is partly a product
of its notoriously fractious politics, deriving from the
proliferation of political parties and the challenges of
coalition-building in the Knesset, but it is also due to
the intransigence of the current Likud-dominated gov
ernment. The challenges to a peace settlement have
not emerged from one side in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, but the current government’s reluctance to
accept a Palestinian state based on 1967 borders and to
curtail activities such as the building of Jewish settle
ments in the West Bank, which would assist peace ne
gotiations, that demonstrates a strategic incoherence
on the Israeli side. Palestinian leaders are not the only
ones who, to paraphrase Abba Eban, never miss an
opportunity to miss an opportunity and, in this case,
the inability to relate IDF operations to strategic out
comes is clear.303
One consolation is that if the United States and its
allies have blundered in their counterterrorist policies
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since 9/11, then al-Qaeda’s strategic performance has
been lamentable. A movement that could not even
establish control over the Sunni Triangle of Iraq with
out encouraging the local tribes to revolt against it,
let alone one that forces its former supporters to con
demn it for its barbarity towards fellow Muslims, is
one that is unlikely to achieve its objective of a global
caliphate. It is also important to recognize that alQaeda by itself is very much a parasitic entity. It can
exploit the advantages offered by insurgency and civil
strife in certain countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq,
Yemen, and Somalia, but it cannot actually incite these
conflicts, and, in contrast with traditional insurgent
movements, it has failed to generate the level of pop
ular backing required to seize power in any Muslim
country.304 What is indeed striking about the course of
the War on Terror is the inability of al-Qaeda to capi
talize on its enemies’ mistakes, and its persistence in
committing its own. A networked terrorist group may
be difficult to attack, but it is also difficult to control
and direct; hence, Ayman al Zawahiri’s futile plea to
Zarqawi in his letter of July 9, 2005, to stop slaughter
ing Shia “heretics.” Al-Qaeda’s most glaring failure
is its irrelevance in the one issue guaranteed to mo
bilize Arab and Muslim opinion; namely Palestine.
Not only are its members derided for their failure to
help the Palestinian cause, but its leadership’s clumsy
efforts to incorporate Palestine into their jihad have
been rejected by both Fatah and Hamas. Al-Qaeda’s
demise cannot be declared with confidence. In the im
mediate future, it will continue to recruit supporters
worldwide and to plot and conduct attacks across the
globe, and its affiliates, particularly Pakistani groups
such as LET and HUM, will continue to destabilize
particular regions such as the Indian subcontinent.
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But, as Cronin notes, “in ending terrorism, [the prior
ity for the government’s involved] should not be to
win people’s hearts and minds, but rather to amplify
the natural tendency of violent groups to lose them.”
Al-Qaeda and its allies are certainly acting in accor
dance with this tendency, particularly with reference
to the increasing anger within the Muslim world at the
pointlessness and callousness of its suicide bombings
and other atrocities.305
Recent historical examples demonstrate that if a
democratic state uses its armed forces in a prolonged
counterterrorist role (in contrast to hostage rescue or
other similar ad hoc cases), the essential mission of the
military cannot, and should not, be the physical de
struction of terrorist organizations, but their contain
ment and frustration. This is not to say that individual
terrorists may not be killed, but that the key process
in the defeat of their organization is the demoralizing
effect that military and nonmilitary operations have in
constraining their activities. Terrorist groups can im
plode under pressure, and an organization that sees
attacks consistently thwarted and members arrested
and imprisoned or killed in intervention operations
will become progressively less effective, and may well
experience internal decay and discontent. Its activ
ists may wonder if continued violence is worthwhile,
or suspect that traitors are destroying it from within.
This is as true of PIRA and ETA, as it was of the ANO
and its suicidal purges during the late 1980s.306
Kilcullen is therefore correct when he argues that
the physical elimination or incarceration of terrorists
is a secondary task to wider nonmilitary measures to
reduce the appeal of terrorism, notably the need to
work with foreign governments, civil society groups
and NGOs to address socioeconomic and political
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problems which may radicalize potential recruits for
al-Qaeda. It is also advisable following the Iraq de
bacle to keep direct military intervention by Western
states to an absolute minimum. But as Patrick Porter
notes, specific military measures can be applied if they
are related to a wider process of political engagement
with regional powers, and also aspects of soft power
such as public diplomacy. With reference to drone
strikes in the FATA, for example, specific operations
(such as the killing of Mehsud and other TTP leaders)
are ideally employed in conjunction with Pakistani
military operations to recover control over Waziristan.
Arguably, these operations should also be used in as
restricted a manner as possible, so as to ensure that
a failed attack which kills several civilians does not
counteract increasing public anger in Pakistan at the
extent of the suicide bombings and other atrocities
committed by the TTP and other militant groups.307
Democratic governments do need to consider other
means of achieving specific counterterrorist goals. For
example, David Gompert argues that the U.S. armed
forces should invest more effort in developing non
lethal munitions which can be employed against ter
rorists and insurgents, particularly in urban conflict
scenarios.308 Gompert’s recommendations are likely to
meet resistance from a military hierarchy which, as
noted in Section Three, fears the loss of core warfight
ing skills that are required when facing a state-based
adversary. Furthermore, in an MACP context, the use
of nonlethal means by an army does not necessar
ily prevent civil disaffection. Catholics in Belfast and
Londonderry did not respect the British Army more
because it generally used CS gas and water cannons
rather than live ammunition (Bloody Sunday except
ed) to quell riots during the early 1970s. Furthermore,
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nonlethal weapons can still be deadly; as demon
strated by occasions in which British troops and RUC
officers firing baton rounds killed rioters in Northern
Ireland, and also by the death of hostages through ex
posure to an incapacitating gas in the Nord-Ost siege
in Moscow in October 2002.
One area where alternative solutions can and
should be employed is that of the aerial interception
and destruction of hijacked passenger planes. The best
means of preventing another 9/11 is not to order air
forces to shoot down an airliner in mid-flight, but to
improve airport security and prevent would-be ter
rorists from being in a position to take over a plane in
the first place. Mohamed Atta and his 18 companions
would have been thwarted if their hand luggage had
been properly searched by security staff at Boston and
Newark airports, and their box-cutter knives had been
confiscated. Passenger jets with cockpits controlled
by keypad locks—or with sky marshals armed with
tasers, mace sprays, or other nonlethal arms—would
also present future hijackers with a tougher target.
In this case, the best defense against future aerial
suicide attacks involves a global effort to coordinate
enhanced security measures with airport authorities
and international airlines rather than with the RAF’s
QRA and other similar formations. Within individual
states, close cooperation is also required between the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies; the lack
of interdepartmental cooperation and the lamentably
adversarial relationship between the FBI and the CIA
had catastrophic consequences, contributing to the
failure of both the Clinton and Bush administrations
to thwart the 9/11 attacks.309
As far as diplomatic measures are concerned, the
establishment of a NATO Contact Group to liaise
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with other governments, such as Pakistan, or security
structures, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organi
zation (SCO), on counterterrorism and Afghanistan,
would help encourage international cooperation with
both problems. An advantage NATO has with its
struggle against the Taliban is that none of Afghani
stan’s neighbors, with the possible exception of ele
ments within the Pakistani military and ISI, actually
want to see Mullah Omar and his movement back in
power. Much of the friction in the West’s relationships
with Russia and China could be assuaged by assur
ances that NATO will leave its bases in Central Asia
once the Afghan government has sufficient means to
fight the Taliban insurgency with a minimum of for
eign support. With the remaining state sponsors of
terrorist groups, the example of Libya in December
2003 suggests that diplomatic engagement, combined
with sanctions and other nonviolent tools of coercion,
can cajole leaders like Gaddafi into abandoning sup
port for terrorism. Damascus’s support for Hamas
and other Palestinian rejectionists may diminish if
Syria were to recover the Golan Heights as part of a
peace deal. However, the failed attempts by U.S. of
ficials during the late 1990s to encourage the Taliban
regime to abandon its alliance with bin Laden’s net
work show that diplomacy cannot guarantee success
in persuading a state sponsor of terrorism to abandon
a proxy, although it is debatable whether any regime
will allow a nonstate organization to usurp its sover
eignty and authority in the way that Mullah Omar did
with al-Qaeda.
On an international level, Western assistance in
training indigenous military and police forces has its
utility, but should be provided in conjunction with
discreet diplomatic pressure to introduce political and
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socioeconomic reforms in countries such as Pakistan,
Yemen, and Uzbekistan, not to mention measures to
reduce corruption and improve governance.310 The
Uzbek regime poses a particular challenge because
of Karimov’s despotism, not to mention the fact that
Western diplomatic pressure on Tashkent can be coun
tered by Russia and China, as neither of these states
shows any particular concern about the democratic
or the human rights credentials of potential allies. Yet
a combination of patience and guile can and should
be used by U.S. and NATO partners to encourage the
Uzbek president to at least clean up his government
and improve the socioeconomic plight of his subjects.
Karimov’s implicit threat to sabotage Operation EN
DURING FREEDOM can be countered, insofar as if
NATO fails in Afghanistan, his IMU foes will be the
main beneficiaries. A resurgence of Islamist insurgen
cies across Central Asia may be, at present, a remote
prospect, but it poses a potentially mortal threat to
the ruling elites in Uzbekistan and neighboring states.
Self-preservation and pragmatism suggest that Uz
bekistan’s president may not be converted to democ
racy overnight, but he can be persuaded that the best
way of avoiding the fate of the Shah of Iran would be
to stop treating his country as a private bank/torture
chamber. Western governments providing military
aid to Uzbekistan have more leverage over the latter
than they realize.
Pakistan has also been a problematic ally not only
because of its own problems with corruption and
governance— although Musharraf was less greedy
and more humane than his Uzbek counterpart— but
also because of the self-destructive notion prevalent
within the Pakistani Army and ISI hierarchy, which
considers the Taliban and groups such as LET and
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HUM as strategic assets regarding Kashmir and Af
ghanistan. Pakistan’s military elite has until recently
labored under the illusion that there are bad militants
associated with al-Qaeda, and good militants who can
be counted upon to establish a pro-Pakistani regime in
Kabul (the Afghan Taliban) and to wage a proxy war
in Kashmir that weakens the eternal enemy, India. A
state’s strategic culture cannot be changed overnight,
but it appears as though the majority of Pakistanis
have finally realized that jihadist and Taliban proxies
actually destabilize their country; hence, widespread
popular support for the Pakistani Army’s counterof
fensive against the TTP.311 While this is a welcome de
velopment, American and Western aid should also be
directed at specific social reforms as well as to the Pak
istani security forces. Funding aimed at the provision
of a more comprehensive educational system would,
in the long term, do much to undermine the radical
Islamist cause. If poorer Pakistanis have adequate
secular schools to send their children to as opposed to
madrassas, this would be as beneficial a development
for state stability as arms supplies and training pro
grams for the Army, police, and Frontier Corps.312
What of specific military measures in support of
counterterrorism? On an international level, retalia
tion should be considered as a last resort, and regime
change directed against a state sponsor is a rarity.
Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was a unique case, insofar
as it is extremely unlikely that any other government
would allow its policies to be dictated by both an un
compromising ideology and a complete ignorance of
the international environment. Prior to 9/11, Mul
lah Omar was warned by the U.S. Government that
he would be held responsible for al-Qaeda’s actions
because of his willingness to provide the latter with
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sanctuary and official support. Retaliation and target
ed killings run the risk of provoking wider diplomatic
crises and military clashes with the states involved, as
was the case with Israel and its Arab neighbors, Tur
key and Iraqi Kurdistan, and the United States with its
Special Forces raid into Pakistan in September 2008.
Hostage rescue missions require host-nation support
to be successful, Entebbe being the sole exception, and
maritime or air interdiction requires actionable intel
ligence to be effective.
In the domestic sphere, military means can be used
with MACA, in particular in MACP scenarios where
terrorism coexists with a wider threat to state stability.
The challenge here is to ensure that military interven
tion is a short-term process, akin to that of the Cana
dian Forces in the October crisis of 1970, rather than a
prolonged operation such as in Northern Ireland, al
though, depending on specific political and social cir
cumstances, this could be easier said than done. While
the British Army’s conduct in the first years of Opera
tion BANNER has received justifiable criticism, in this
case the military faced the consequence of generations
of Catholic-Protestant strife which had brought Ulster
to the brink of civil war. As Thomas Hennessey notes,
the deterioration of the security situation in Northern
Ireland during the early 1970s was not solely a prod
uct of military ineptitude and maltreatment of the
Catholic population; it also derived from the polariza
tion of political opinion and the decision by Republi
can and Loyalist groups to resort to arms to achieve
their goals.313
Deterrence operations have their utility, although
the deployment of troops to Heathrow in 2003 did
cause some public alarm. After Mumbai, govern
ments operating in 2008 needed to seriously consider
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the possibility of copy-cat attacks, and in the UK’s
case, the 2012 Olympics in London present a golden
opportunity for any terrorist organization to launch a
spectacular attack that would command international
attention and cause widespread public panic.314 One
would hope that the contingency planning for 2012
will involve consideration of cases where the British
armed forces can be swiftly deployed in the event of
a major emergency, whether to contain a crisis with
the deployment of military Quick Reaction Forces
to cordon off a terrorist incident, or to intervene in a
hostage-taking/siege scenario.
The principal conclusion here is to argue that there
is a role for a state’s armed forces in counterterrorism
even by democracies, but that the use of military force
must form part of an overall strategy which also incor
porates and prioritizes nonmilitary means. For their
part, both the academic community and informed
opinion in general should understand that democratic
governments may be required as guarantors of na
tional security to employ their armed forces in specific
circumstances, which may be beyond the capabilities
of the civilian authorities. Nonetheless, governments
need to ensure that the resort to armed force does not
dislocate or dictate counterterrorist policy, and that
the use of the military does not undermine the consti
tutional and legal framework upon which a liberal de
mocracy rests. Papers of this type usually end with a
list of recommendations relevant to policymakers and
professional military officers. However, one of the pri
mary points here is that any government’s response
to this problem depends very much on the nature of
the terrorist group and the threat that it poses to the
state and society. Any conclusions drawn can there
fore only be generic, and in this respect, the author
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feels that there is more utility in concluding with a list
of questions which policymakers of any liberal demo
cratic state (be they in a Cabinet, National Security
Council, or an equivalent body) need to address when
faced with the complex phenomenon that is terrorism:
• Is this a domestic or an international problem?
• Are existing means (police, judiciary, and intel
ligence services) insufficient to deal with the
threat?
• Can your chiefs of staff confirm that armed
forces have the resources, manpower, and skills
needed to address this specific problem?
• Would the use of the armed forces be a shortterm measure (hostage-rescue, MACA, MACC,
preemptive intervention, or retaliation), or will
it require a long-term commitment of manpow
er and resources (MACP, intervention, and re
gime change)?
• Do opposition parties and the general pub
lic support the involvement of the military in
counterterrorism?
On a domestic level:
• How effective are the terrorists, as far as both
their ability to kill and injure substantial num
bers of your citizens and to disrupt civil society
are concerned?
• Does terrorism coexist with a major threat
to state stability (such as insurgency or civil
strife)?
• What precisely is the military’s position within
the counterterrorist hierarchy? Which authori
ties are the armed forces accountable to?
• How will information be gathered and dissemi
nated between the military, the police and the
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•
•

•

•

•

•

intelligence services, and who is in charge of
coordinating the overall intelligence-gathering
effort?
What ROE do service personnel work under?
Have you ensured that your troops operate un
der LOAC?
Do the armed forces have the training needed
not only to perform their duties, but also to
interact effectively and in sympathy with the
public in a manner that does not arouse fear or
resentment among civilians?
Regarding terrorist suspects, what guidelines
are offered to military and/or police personnel
responsible for their custody? Are regulations
on interrogation compatible with international
law and, in particular, the Geneva Convention?
Does the state have procedures designed to en
sure that the interrogation of terrorist suspects
for intelligence purposes minimize the dangers
that the latter might be maltreated?
Has the government planned and rehearsed re
sponses to specific contingencies through war
games, command post exercises, etc.? Have
these been conducted with all the relevant
agencies?
Have shortcomings and problems in these ex
ercises been identified and an attempt made to
resolve them (relating to bureaucratic param
eters, chain of command, and other logistical
and organizational complications)?
In circumstances short of an imminent and dire
emergency, such as a major terrorist incident
requiring an immediate MACC response, has
the government consulted the parliamentary
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opposition on its reasons for calling out the
armed forces?
On an international level:
• Do other governments support your resort to
armed force? If so, will they cooperate in either
providing their own military units in a coali
tion, or by other means (sharing intelligence,
providing host-nation support and bases, etc.)?
• Can military action be justified under interna
tional law?
• If you are intervening on the territory of anoth
er sovereign state, is that country’s government
sympathetic to the terrorists? Are you retaliat
ing against the terrorist organization itself, or
the regime that supports it?
• If, in the scenario described above, the indige
nous government is not aligned with the terror
ists, can it be persuaded to take action against
the latter itself?
• Is it more politically sensitive and practical to
provide indirect assistance to indigenous se
curity forces (e.g. training, arms, intelligence
cooperation, or air support) in their own coun
terterrorist campaign?
• If you are involved in training local security
forces, can you ensure that they are employed
in the roles you intend rather than for more ne
farious purposes (such as a praetorian guard
for a repressive regime, or as a death squad)?
In this instance, what mechanisms do you have
to prevent them from “going rogue”?
• If you are assisting a third-party government,
can you also influence it to introduce the nec
essary socioeconomic and governance reforms
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that address the grievances which contribute to
terrorist activity?
• Will the commitment of your armed forces
overseas deprive you of the means needed to
respond effectively to a domestic MACA emer
gency?
• Is a foreign intervention mission likely to be so
controversial that it antagonizes or even radi
calizes a section of your own society?
• Finally, if you are trying to overthrow a regime
that supports terrorism, such as the Taliban, do
you have international opinion on your side?
Are you also prepared for the long-term stabili
zation and state-building effort that will inevi
tably follow regime change?
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
22SAS

22nd Special Air Service
Regiment.

Action Directe

A French far-left terrorist group
active during the 1980s.

Auto-golpe

“Auto-coup.” The term given to
Peruvian President Alberto Fuji
mori’s assumption of authoritar
ian power in April 1992.

AFRICOM

Africa Command. The U.S. mili
tary’s regional command cover
ing all of Africa (bar Egypt, which
is still within Central Command’s
area of operations).

AFP

Armed Forces of the Philippines.

AKP

Adelet ve Kalkinma Partisi. A Turk
ish Political Party.

al-Qaeda

Translates from Arabic as “the
base” or “the foundation.” Origi
nally founded by Osama bin
Laden in the latter phases of the
anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan,
al-Qaeda is now considered by
scholars of terrorism to consist of
a network of groups or individuals
drawn together by the movements’
common hostility to Western gov
ernments, Israel and “apostate” re
gimes in the Islamic world and to
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share the long-term goal of found
ing a global caliphate.
ANC

African National Congress.

ANO

Abu Nidal Organisation. A de
funct Palestinian terrorist group
led by Sabri el-Banna (“Abu Ni
dal”). El-Banna died in mysteri
ous circumstances in Baghdad on
August 16, 2002, either as a result
of suicide or execution by the
Baathist regime.

ANP

Afghan National Police.

AQAP

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin
sula.

AQI

Al-Qaeda in Iraq.

AQIM

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

BBE

Bijzondere Bijstands Eenheid. Dutch
counterterrorist unit formed from
the Royal Netherlands Marine
Corps.

BR

Brigate Rosse. Italian Red Bri
gades.

BSF

The Indian Border Security Force.

BSO

Black September Organization.
A terrorist network set up after
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the PLO’s expulsion from Jordan
(July 1971) to conduct deniable
attacks on behalf of Fatah. The
organization took its name from
the month in which King Hussein
unleashed the Jordanian army
against Palestinian fedayeen based
in his country (September 1970).
B Specials

The Northern Ireland police re
serve force disbanded by the Brit
ish in January 1970.

Bundeswehr

The Federal
forces.

CALABA

Code name given to the British
Army’s methods of “deep interro
gation,” applied to some Republi
can terrorist suspects in Northern
Ireland during the early 1970s.
The methods (which included
sensory deprivation techniques
such as “hooding” suspects and
subjecting them to “white noise”
prior to interrogation) were aban
doned after they were condemned
by the European Commission on
Human Rights in September 1972.

CBRN

Chemical, Biological, Radiologi
cal and Nuclear.

CCRF

Civil Contingencies Reaction Force.
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German

armed

Carabinieri

Italian paramilitary police.

CENTCOM

U.S. Central Command.

CGS

Chief of the General Staff (UK).

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency.

CJTF-HOA

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn
of Africa. According to NATO
terminology, a “joint” force incor
porates elements from more than
one of the three armed services
(Navy, Army, Air Force) while a
“combined” force includes mili
tary units from more than one
country (see CTF below). A CJTF
is therefore comprised of the
maritime, land, and/or air forces
drawn from a coalition of states.

COBRA

Cabinet Office Briefing Room “A.”
Established in late 1972, this is the
British government’s principal
deliberative body in the event of
a crisis arising from terrorism or
other significant emergencies. It
is named after the room within
the Cabinet Offices where this
body meets.

COIN

Common acronym for COunterINsurgency.

CONTEST

Official acronym for the UK govern
ment’s COuNterTerrorism STrategy.
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CTF

Combined Task Force. U.S. and
NATO term for a multinational
military formation drawn from
similar services (in the case of
CTF150, from the navies of sev
eral countries).

Dietrologia

An Italian term that loosely trans
lates as “behind-ology.” This
phrase describes the popularity
of conspiracy theories in Italy.

Delta Force

A U.S. Army special forces unit,
specifically established for coun
terterrorism.

Derin Devlet

Turkish for “deep state.” A term
given to the clique of military and
security force officers (and their
civilian sympathisers) which al
legedly constitutes the real pow
er behind the government in
Ankara.

DFLP

Democratic Front for the Libera
tion of Palestine.

Echelon

An Anglo-American intelligencesharing program incorporating
GCHQ and NSA (see below), that
also includes its Australian, Ca
nadian, and New Zealand coun
terparts.

EOKA

“National Organisation of Cypri
ot Fighters.” The Greek Cypriot
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terrorist group fighting British
rule from 1955-1959.
Ergenekon

The name given to an alleged plot
organized by officials within the
“deep state” to overthrow the
AKP government in Turkey. The
Ergenekon scandal has polarised
Turkish politics since 86 suspect
ed plotters were put on trial in
October 2008.

ETA

Euzkadi to Askatasuna. Basque ter
rorist group fighting for indepen
dence from Spain.

FARC

Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia.

FATA

The Federally Administered Trib
al Areas of Pakistan. The FATA
consists of seven agencies (Ba
jaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai,
Kurram, North Waziristan, and
South Waziristan).

Fatah

The Palestinian nationalist move
ment, formerly a terrorist organi
zation, now officially committed
to achieving a peace settlement
with Israel. Not to be confused
with FATA.

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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FCO

Foreign and Commonwealth
Office.

FLN

Algerian National Liberation Front.

FLQ

Front de Liberation du Quebec. A
terrorist group briefly engaged in
1970 in a campaign for the inde
pendence of Francophone Que
bec from Canada.

FRG

Federal Republic of Germany.

FRU

Force Research Unit. A contro
versial British Army intelligence
formation that recruited agents
within Republican and Loyalist
organizations in Northern Ireland
during the 1980s-1990s.

FSB

Federalnaya Sluzhba Byezopasnosti.
Federal Security Service. The in
ternal security service of the Rus
sian Federation.

Garda Siochana

Police service of the Republic of
Ireland.

GCHQ

Government Communications
Headquarters. The UK’s SIGINT
service.

GDR

German Democratic Republic.
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GHQ

General Headquarters.

GIA

Groupe Islamiste Armée. A radical
Islamist group involved in the Al
gerian Civil War (1992-2002).

GIGN

Groupe d’Intervention de Gendar
merie Nationale. French counterterrorist unit raised from France’s
Gendarmerie Nationale.

GOC

General Officer Commanding.

GSG9

Grenzschutzgruppe-Neun. A Ger
man counterterrorist unit raised
from the Bundespolizei (formerly
known as the Bundesgrenzschutz).

GSPC

Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication
et de Combat. A sister movement
to the GIA, now part of AQIM.

Hamas

The principal Palestinian Islamist
movement, affiliated with the
Muslim Brotherhood.

Hezbollah

“Party of God.” A hybrid politi
cal-military movement with its
core support based within Leba
non’s Shia community.

HRW

Human Rights Watch.

HUM

Harkat ul-Mujahidin. Pakistani Is
lamist group involved in fighting
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the Kashmir insurgency. Known
as Harkat ul-Ansar before 1998.
HUMINT

Human Intelligence. In this con
text, information gained from
clandestine surveillance, infor
mants within the civilian commu
nity, and agents recruited within
a terrorist group.

ICU

Islamic Courts Union. The Is
lamist government of Somalia
from May to December 2006.

IDF

Israeli Defense Force.

IMU

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

INLA

Irish National Liberation Army.

INS

Irish Naval Service.

IPS

Iraqi Police Service.

IR

Islamic Resistance. The guerrilla/
terrorist wing of Hezbollah.

ISA

Intelligence Support Activity. A
U.S. Army unit formed in Janu
ary 1981 to conduct clandestine
intelligence gathering. ISA is still
in service, although it has under
gone numerous changes of name
since the late-1980s.
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ISAF

International Security Assis
tance Force, Afghanistan. The
NATO-led security mission in
Afghanistan.

ISI

Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
organization.

JAG

Judge Advocate Generals Corps.
(U.S.)

Jandarma

The Turkish gendarmerie.

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Jemaah Islamiyah

The Southeast Asian branch of alQaeda.

JITEM

Jandarme İstihbarat ve Terörle Müc
adele Merkezi. A covert counterter
rorist force of the jandarma, cur
rently accused of human rights
abuses in the war against the
PKK, and also organized criminal
activity.

Knesset

The Israeli parliament.

KRG

Kurdish Regional Government.
Based in Irbil, Northern Iraq.

LET

Lashkar e-Toiba. A Pakistani Islamist
group active in the Kashmir insur
gency, responsible for the Mumbai
massacre (November 2008).
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LOAC

Laws of Armed Conflict.

Loyalist

In the context of Northern Ire
land, this was the term applied to
members of the Protestant com
munity whose commitment to the
Unionist cause was such that they
were prepared to resort to ter
rorism against the local Catholic
community.

LTTE

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam, commonly known as the
“Tamil Tigers.”

MACA

Military Aid to the Civil Author
ity. Official British government
term for the call-up of the armed
forces to assist in a domestic
emergency.

MACC

Military Aid to the Civil Commu
nity. Official British government
term for the employment of the
armed forces for disaster relief.

MACP

Military Aid to the Civil Power.
Official British government term
given to the use of the Army to
preserve domestic law and order.

MI5

The UK’s internal security
service.

Ministerium fur
Staatssicherheit

The former East German secret
police.
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Mkhonto we
Sizwe

“Spear of the Nation.” The mili
tary wing of the African National
Congress (until its incorporation
into the South African National
Defence Force in 1994).

MNF

The Multinational Force (consist
ing of U.S., French, Italian, and
British units) sent to Lebanon in
1983.

MOD

UK Ministry of Defence.

Mossad

Hebrew for “the Institute.” The
Israeli foreign intelligence ser
vice.

MRF

Military Reaction Force (also
dubbed in secondary literature
as the “Mobile Reconnaissance
Force”). A controversial plain
clothes British Army intelligence
unit active in Belfast in 1971-72.
The MRF was subsequently re
placed by 14 Intelligence Compa
ny, the precursor to the SRR (see
below).

MVD

Ministerstvo Vnutrennikh Dyel.
Russian Ministry of Internal Af
fairs. The MVD has its own mili
tary arm known as the vnutren
niye voiska (“interior troops’).

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
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NGO

Non-Governmental Organization.

NIO

Northern Ireland Office.

NORAD

North American Air Defense
Command. A combined organi
zation incorporating the U.S. Air
Force and the Canadian Forces,
responsible for protecting North
American airspace.

N17

“The Revolutionary Organisation
17th November.” A far-left Greek
terrorist group.

NSA

National Security Agency. The
U.S. SIGINT service.

NSC

National Security Council (U.S.).

NSG

National Security Guard. An elite
Indian counterterrorist unit.

NWFP

The Northwest Frontier Province
of Pakistan.

OHD

Ozel Harp Dairesi. “Special War
fare Group.” A clandestine branch
of the Turkish Army founded in
1952 to organize resistance in the
event of a Soviet invasion.

PFLP

Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine. A rival to Fatah, and
one of the first major terrorist
groups to hijack airliners.
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PIJ

Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

PIRA

Provisional Irish Republican
Army. The Provisional IRA split
from the Official IRA in January
1970, emerging as the principal
Republican group fighting for a
united Ireland.

PKK

Kurdistan Worker’s Party (Par
tiya Karkeren Kurdistan). A terror
ist/insurgent group fighting for
Kurdish independence from Tur
key.

PLF

Palestine Liberation Front. A
minor group responsible for the
Achille Lauro hijacking in October
1985.

PLO

Palestine Liberation Organisa
tion. The umbrella group led by
Fatah from 1969, campaigning by
diplomatic and military means
for the Palestinian cause.

QRA

Quick Reaction Alert force. An
RAF squadron assigned in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001
(9/11), to be on stand-by to react
to a aerial hijacking in British air
space.

RAF

Royal Air Force.
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Republicanism

In an Irish context, the name giv
en to the ideology within North
ern Ireland and Eire that favors
and end to British rule over the
Northern six counties of Ireland
and their reunification with the
Irish Republic.

ROE

Rules of Engagement. Regula
tions governing the military’s use
of lethal force.

RR

Rashtriya Rifles. An Indian para
military force raised specifically
for COIN in Kashmir.

RUC

Royal Ulster Constabulary. Re
named the Police Service of
Northern Ireland on April 4, 2001.

Sayeret Maktal

Israeli army special forces.

SB

Special Branch. Term given to the
branch of a British police force as
signed to counterterrorism.

SBS

Special Boat Service. The special
forces unit of the Royal Marines.

SCO

Shanghai Cooperation Organiza
tion.

SDLP

Social Democratic and Labour
Party. A moderate Nationalist po
litical party in Northern Ireland,
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committed to the goal of a united
Ireland through constitutional,
nonviolent means.
SDSR

Strategic Defence and Security
Review (UK).

Sendero
Luminoso

“Shining Path.” A Maoist insur
gent/terrorist group active inPeru from May 1980. It is still
active, although far from its peak
strength during the late 1980s.

Sepah e-Pasdaran

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps.

Shayetet 13

The Israeli Navy’s special forces.

Shin Bet

The Israeli internal security ser
vice.

SID

Military Intelligence Service (Italy).

SIGINT

Signals Intelligence.

Sinn Fein

“Ourselves Alone.” The principal
political party within the Irish Re
publican movement, hitherto the
political spokesmen of PIRA.

SIS

Secret Intelligence Service. The
UK’s external intelligence service.

Spetsnaz

Term given to Russian military
and security services special
forces. An abbreviation of “spet
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sialnovo naznachenia’ (“special
designation”).
Solidarnosc

“Solidarity.” An independent
trade union formed in Commu
nist-era Poland in 1980, which
was subsequently involved in a
nonviolent campaign for civil lib
erties and multiparty democracy.

SRR

Special Reconnaissance Regi
ment. A British Army unit estab
lished in April 2005 for clandes
tine surveillance.

Taliban

A Sunni Islamist movement
(named after the Pashto phrase
for “madrassah students”) that
governed Afghanistan from Sep
tember 1996 to November 2001,
and is currently waging an insur
gency against the NATO-backed
government in Kabul.

TFG

The Transitional Federal Govern
ment of Somalia.

TTP

Tehrik e-Taleban Pakistan. The al
liance of Taliban-affiliated tribes
and foreign militants currently
fighting an insurgency in the
NWFP and FATA.

UAE

United Arab Emirates.
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UAV

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

UDR

Ulster Defence Regiment. Formed
in January 1970 to supplement
the regular British Army in coun
terterrorist operations. The UDR
was amalgamated with the Royal
Irish Regiment following the UK
Defence Review of 1991.

Unionism

The name given to political opin
ion within Northern Ireland
(within the Protestant majority)
that supports Northern Ireland’s
constitutional status as part of the
UK.

UNSC

United Nations Security Council.

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction.
Popular term given to CBRN
weapons.
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MILITARY OPERATIONS CITED IN THE TEXT
ACTIVE
ENDEAVOUR

NATO maritime counterterrorist
patrols in the Mediterranean.

BANNER

The British Army’s MACP mis
sion in Northern Ireland from
1969-2007.

BLUE STAR

The Indian Army operation to
recapture the Golden Temple in
Amritsar (June 3-6, 1984).

CAST LEAD

The IDF incursion into Gaza in
December 2008-January 2009.

EAGLE CLAW

The abortive U.S. military attempt
to free the embassy hostages in
Iran, April 1980.

EL DORADO
CANYON

U.S. air-strikes against Libya in
April 1986.

ENDURING
FREEDOM

The U.S. military name for coun
terterrorist and COIN operations
in Afghanistan since October
2001.

FLAVIUS

An operation mounted by the
Gibraltar police, MI5, and 22SAS
to arrest three PIRA terrorists
planning a bombing attack in this
crown colony (March 6, 1988).
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FLINTLOCK

A multinational exercise
Northwest Africa, May 2010.

INFINITE
REACH

The U.S. cruise missile strikes on
Afghanistan and Sudan in
August 1998.

IRAQI
FREEDOM

The U.S. military term for the in
vasion and occupation of Iraq
(March 2003 onward).

JACANA

The multilateral military opera
tion to clear al-Qaeda in South
eastern Afghanistan after Opera
tion ANACONDA (March 2002).

MARMION

A British contingency plan from
the early 1970s, outlining the de
ployment of troops to Heathrow
Airport in response to intelli
gence of a precise terrorist threat.

MONOGRAM

A UK MOD program for training
overseas militaries in counterter
rorism and COIN.

NIMROD

The storming of the Iranian em
bassy in London by 22SAS on
May 5, 1980.

SUN

The Turkish military incursion
into Northern Iraq in February
2008.
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